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论文编号：	12400
作者编号：	2120192882
上传时间：	2021/6/10 13:08:41
中文题目：	“区块链+”保理融资业务参与主体博弈分析与收益分配研究
英文题目：	Research on Game Analysis and Income Distribution of the Stakeholders in the
指导老师：	焦媛媛
中文关键字：	保理融资；区块链技术；博弈分析；Shapley值法
英文关键字：	Factoring Financing; Blockchain Techniques; Game Analysis; Shapley Value Method
中文摘要：	供应链中小企业常采用赊销方式吸引核心企业，应收账款的叠加使中小企业陷入资金流动性困境，其生产经营难以为继。保理融资为中小企业高流动性资产变现创造条件，成功地让应收账款“动起来”。但近几年我国保理融资面临发展中难题，应收账款信用管理不足导致上游供应商和核心企业违约等非合作现象频发，银行面临有钱不敢贷困境；此外，保理融资是由上游供应商、核心企业和银行组成的利益联盟体，收益分配的合理性直接影响合作的持久性，而我国保理融资收益分配制度建立相对迟缓。区块链去中心化和智能合约技术是重构银行信任和定义收益分配的有效途径。因此，系统探讨“区块链+”保理融资参与主体博弈行为和收益分配，对促进保理融资健康发展具有重要现实意义。 本文探索性地将区块链技术植入保理融资业务中，从贷前、贷中和贷后三个方面设计“区块链+”保理融资的核心业务流程，并构建服务系统总体框架，探究降低保理融资信用管理风险的可行方案；同时，在区块链背景下，对保理融资参与主体的博弈行为进行分析，厘清影响参与主体合作的关键因素，并贷前测算各主体合作的可能性，为避免保理融资中“银行惜贷、核心企业违约、供应商违约”的非合作行为提供方向性参考；此外，公平合理的收益分配能够保障保理融资联盟维持良好的融资生态，持续为供应链赋能，本文通过分析区块链背景下影响保理融资收益分配的因素，采用AHP和模糊综合评价法对Shapley值模型进行修正，并对保理融资合作收益进行分配。 通过研究发现，区块链技术特征能够有效匹配保理融资信用管理的需求；博弈结果表明，违约成本足够大（包括机会成本和惩罚成本）可以优化参与主体的行为决策，促进合作，而区块链的奖惩机制可以保障这一条件的实现；利用逆向归纳法得到测算各参与主体合作可能性的等式，代入相关参数后能够帮助银行甄选高合作可能性的保理融资联盟成员；综合风险承担、投入成本和信息化水平三大因素对Shapley值模型进行修正，发现区块链背景下投入成本和信息化水平是影响收益分配的主要因素，利用修正的Shapley值模型对保理融资联盟收益进行分配后，银行分配收益增多，供应商与核心企业分配收益减少。
英文摘要：	The small and medium-sized enterprise financing is often used to attract the core enterprises of supply chain, the superposition of accounts receivable make modest liquidity difficulties for small and medium-sized enterprises. Factoring financing creates conditions to meet the demand of high liquid assets of small and medium-sized enterprises in the supply chain, and successfully makes accounts receivable "move". However, in recent years, China's factoring financing is facing difficulties in the development. Insufficient credit management of accounts receivable leads to frequent defaults of upstream suppliers and core enterprises. Banks suffer loss of interests and are faced with the predicament of being too rich to dare to lend. In addition, factoring financing is an interest alliance composed of upstream suppliers, core enterprises and banks, and the rationality of income distribution directly affects the durability of cooperation. However, the establishment of the income distribution system of factoring financing in China is relatively slow. As a cutting-edge technology in the field of financial technology, blockchain, with its decentralized theory and smart contract technology, is an effective way to reconstruct banks’ trust and define income distribution. In this view, it is of great practical significance to systematically discuss the game behavior and income distribution of the participants of "Blockchain+" Factoring Financing to promote the healthy development of factoring financing. In this research, the blockchain technology is exploratively inserted into the factoring financing business, and the core business process of "Blockchain+" Factoring Financing is designed from three aspects: pre-loan, post-loan and post-loan, and the overall framework of the "Blockchain+" Factoring Financing Service System is constructed to explore feasible solutions to reduce the credit management risks of factoring financing. At the same time, under the background of chain blocks, factoring financing game behavior participation were analyzed, and clarify the key factors influencing the participation cooperation, and loan measure each subject before the possibility of cooperation, in order to avoid in factoring financing "Banks reluctant to lend, the core enterprise of default, suppliers of default " non-cooperative behavior provides the reference direction; In addition, fair and reasonable income distribution can guarantee alliance to maintain good financing ecological, factoring financing for assignment of the supply chain can, in this research, through analysis of block chain under the background of factors that influence the factoring financing income distribution by using AHP and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method to modify the Shapley value model, and factoring financing cooperation benefits. Through the research, it is found that the technical features of blockchain can effectively match the needs of factoring financing. The game results show that large enough default cost (including default opportunity cost and penalty cost) can optimize the participants' behavior decisions and promote cooperation, and the reward and punishment mechanism of blockchain can guarantee the realization of this condition. The equation to calculate the cooperation possibility of each participant can be obtained by reverse induction method, and the relevant parameters can help the bank select the members of the factoring financing alliance with high cooperation possibility. Combination of risk exposures, input costs, and the informationization level of three factors on the Shapley value adjustment model, found that investment cost and informatization level are the main factors influencing the income distribution, using modified Shapley value model after factoring financing alliance income distribution, bank profits increase, suppliers and the core enterprise income distribution.
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