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论文编号：	12380
作者编号：	2120192800
上传时间：	2021/6/10 9:08:18
中文题目：	电商平台下自有品牌和入驻品牌的推广策略研究
英文题目：	Research on Promotion Strategy of Private Label and Agency-selling Brand on E-commerce Platform
指导老师：	侯文华
中文关键字：	推广资源；电商平台；自有品牌；入驻品牌；付费推广
英文关键字：	Promotion resources; E-commerce platform; Private label; Agency-selling brand; Paid promotion
中文摘要：	随着电子商务的发展，众多制造商入驻电商平台，开发自己的线上渠道。而平台除了支持制造商的线上销售外，也开始发展自有品牌，与入驻品牌在消费者市场形成竞争。另外，电商平台拥有着大量的推广资源，可以通过站内不同形式广告吸引消费者，达到提高产品销量的目的。基于此，本文研究了在不同情景下平台和制造商对自有品牌和入驻品牌的推广策略。 本文首先考虑了平台的单一品牌推广策略，对比了平台推广自有品牌和入驻品牌的均衡决策和企业利润。接着，本文探究了平台的双品牌推广策略，即同时推广自有品牌和入驻品牌，并分析了单一品牌推广和双品牌推广下的决策区别。进一步，引入有限推广资源的设定，探究资源的分配问题。现实中，平台可以选择出售推广资源给制造商，制造商通过购买推广资源提高自己的产品销量，平台也可以获得额外的收入。因此，本文在最后讨论了付费推广策略，并研究了制造商和平台对付费推广和免费推广的偏好。 本文的主要结论如下：在单一品牌推广下，制造商总是偏好于自己的产品被推广，但当市场竞争不激烈，自有品牌推广效率低且收入分成比例高时，平台愿意放弃部分自有品牌销售收入来换取更高的入驻品牌分成收入，即偏好于推广入驻品牌。在双品牌推广下，考虑到分成比例会对平台的推广决策造成影响，制造商和平台都并不总是偏好于自己能够获得更高的分成比例。当推广资源有限时，从推广占比来看，平台会选择“锦上添花”，推广更容易获利的品牌，而在无限资源下会选择“雪中送炭”，利用富裕的推广资源以期从两个品牌中都收获较多利润。在付费推广下，尽管制造商需要付费购买推广资源，但他拥有了推广力度的决策权，而平台尽管可以出售推广资源获利，但其自有品牌的销售收入会受到入驻品牌过高的推广力度的负面影响；此外，本文还发现当收入分成比例和推广价格处于中等范围时，制造商和平台会在付费推广下实现双赢。 本文创新性地考虑了当电商平台引入自有品牌时，面对平台内的推广资源，制造商和平台的推广决策和产量决策问题。通过建模分析得到的结论具有一定的理论意义和实践指导意义。
英文摘要：	With the rapid development of e-commerce, many manufacturers utilize e-commerce platforms to establish their online sales channels under agency selling. In addition to supporting the manufacturers’ sales, the platforms begin to launch private label products to compete with the national brands in end markets. It is noteworthy that the platforms own promotion resources which can attract consumers’ attention and thus increase sales. Considering these interesting situations, this thesis investigates the promotion strategy of a manufacturer and a platform under different cases. First, we consider the single-brand promotion case and compare the equilibrium outcomes and firms’ profits when the platform promotes either the manufacturer’s or the private label’s products. Then we discuss the double-brand promotion case where the platform promotes the manufacturer’s and the private label’s products simultaneously. Further, the limited promotion case is analyzed. In practice, the platform can sell the promotion to manufacturers, which we refer to as the paid promotion case. In this case, the manufacturer purchases the promotion to increase sales and the platform generates extra profits from the promotion sales. Thus, this thesis also investigates the paid promotion case and presents the manufacturer’s and the platform’s preferences over the free and paid cases. The main findings are as follows: First, under the single-brand promotion case, the manufacturer always prefers that his product is promoted. However, the platform may promote the manufacturer’s product rather than its private label’s when the market competition is not intensive, the promotion efficiency of the private label is low and his proportion of revenue sharing is high. Second, under the double-brand promotion case, the manufacturer and the platform do not necessarily benefit from a higher rate of revenue sharing because the rate influences the platform’s promotion decisions. From the perspective of the promotion proportion of the two products, with limited promotion, the platform is willing to allocate more promotion to the profitable product; while with unlimited promotion, she chooses to strongly promote the less profitable one for gaining revenue from both. Third, under the paid promotion case, though the manufacturer pays for the promotion, he can decide the promotion efforts. On the contrary, the platform earns profits from promotion sales but the excessive promotion of the manufacturer’s product may reduce the private label’s sales. Also, this thesis find that the manufacturer and the platform can achieve a “win-win” situation under the paid promotion case when the proportion of revenue sharing and the promotion price are moderate. This thesis considers the platform’s and the manufacturer’s promotion decisions under agency selling when the platform introduces the private label product. By building and solving the models, we obtain the above interesting findings which are insightful for future research and industry practice.
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