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论文编号：	12368
作者编号：	2120192833
上传时间：	2021/6/9 17:11:53
中文题目：	控股股东股权质押对企业投资效率的影响研究——基于机构投资者持股的调节效应
英文题目：	Research on the Impact of Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge on Enterprise Investment Efficiency: Based on the Moderating Effect of Institutional Investor’s Shareholding
指导老师：	张晓农
中文关键字：	控股股东股权质押；投资效率；机构投资者；自由现金流；债务融资成本
英文关键字：	Pledge of controlling shareholder''''s equity; Investment efficiency; Institutional investors；Free cash flow; Debt finance cost
中文摘要：	近年来，为防范系统性金融风险，推动经济去杠杆，我国监管部门加强了对金融市场的监管，股权质押因其信息披露与监管要求低、不影响表决权等特点获得控股股东的青睐，2014年到2019年，发生控股股东股权质押的上市公司涨幅达到110%。控股股东通过出质股权，能够缓解资金短缺问题，但也面临因不能如期偿还债务丧失控制权的风险。为获得充足资金偿还债务，控股股东有动机提升公司的投资效率，但也可能采用激进冒险的方式掏空公司、谋取私利，进而对投资效率产生消极影响。随着资本市场的发展和完善，机构投资者利用自身的专业能力积极参与公司治理，监督控股股东行为。基于上述背景，有必要研究控股股东股权质押行为对企业投资效率产生何种影响以及机构投资者在其中是否发挥了应有的治理作用。 本论文研究主题是控股股东股权质押和企业投资效率，选取中国2010年至2019年3159家A股上市公司为研究样本，共获得19291个观测值，主要研究内容包括三部分。第一，研究控股股东股权质押会对企业投资效率产生何种影响，并将非效率投资分为过度投资和投资不足两组样本分别进行实证检验；第二，引入外部治理机制机构投资者，试图探究和检验机构投资者在控股股东股权质押与投资效率关系中的调节作用。第三，本文还探究了股权质押影响投资效率的作用机制，引入自由现金流量和债务融资成本两个中介变量，研究控股股东股权质押影响投资效率的可能路径。 经过实证检验，得到以下结论：（1）控股股东股权质押行为降低了企业的投资效率，并且对过度投资和投资不足均有消极影响。（2）机构投资者持股不能抑制控股股东股权质押对企业投资效率的影响，甚至起到了消极作用；（3）股权质押行为可能通过减少自由现金流和增加债务成本的方式降低投资效率。基于以上结论，本文认为应加强对控股股东股权质押行为的约束、完善公司内部控制和治理机制以及健全机构投资者外部监督机制。
英文摘要：	In recent years, in order to prevent systemic financial risks and promote economic deleveraging, our country has strengthened the supervision of the financial market. Equity pledges have been favored by controlling shareholders due to its low information disclosure and regulatory requirements, and no impact on voting rights. From 2014 to 2019, the growth rate of listed companies that have pledged their controlling shareholders' equity reached 110%. Controlling shareholders can alleviate the shortage of funds by pledge of equity, but they also face the risk of losing control due to failure to repay debts on time. In order to obtain sufficient funds to repay debts, controlling shareholders have the motive to improve the company's investment efficiency, but they may also use aggressive and risky methods to hollow out the company and seek personal gain, which in turn will have a negative impact on investment efficiency. With the development and improvement of the capital market, institutional investors use their professional capabilities to supervise company operations. Based on the above background, it is necessary to study the impact of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior on the company's investment efficiency and whether institutional investors have played their due governance role in it. The research theme of this thesis is controlling shareholder equity pledge and company investment efficiency. This article selects 3,159 listed companies in China from 2010 to 2019 as the research sample, and a total of 19,291 observations are obtained. The main research content includes three parts. First, study how the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge will affect the company’s investment efficiency, and divide inefficient investment into two samples of overinvestment and underinvestment for empirical tests. Second, introduce external governance mechanism institutional investors to try Explore and test the regulatory role of institutional investors in the relationship between controlling shareholder equity pledge and investment efficiency. Third, this thesis also explores the mechanism of equity pledge affecting investment efficiency, introducing two intermediary variables, free cash flow and debt financing cost, to study the possible paths of controlling shareholder equity pledge affecting investment efficiency. After empirical testing, the following conclusions are obtained: (1) The controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior reduces the company's investment efficiency, and has a negative impact on over-investment and under-investment. (2) Institutional investors’ shareholding cannot suppress the impact of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on the company’s investment efficiency, and even has a negative effect; (3) Equity pledge behavior may reduce investment efficiency by reducing free cash flow and increasing debt costs. Based on the above conclusions, this article believes that it is necessary to strengthen the restraint on the controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior, improve the company's internal control and governance mechanism, and improve the external supervision mechanism of institutional investors.
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