联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	1229
作者编号：	2120071948
上传时间：	2009/6/12 0:00:28
中文题目：	审计意见对大股东掏空行为的反应
英文题目：	The Research About the Relatio
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	审计意见;大股东掏空;占用资金;<
英文关键字：	Audit opinion;Tunneling of maj
中文摘要：	自许多学者证明当前上市公司股权结构中普遍存在的是大股东持股而不是分散持股以来，公司治理的焦点由第一类委托代理问题转向了第二类委托代理问题，即从关注股东与经营管理者间的利益冲突转向关注大股东与中小股东间的矛盾。我国上市公司非常突出的特点就是股权集中度高，股权结构复杂。第一大股东牢牢掌握着上市公司的控制权，往往具有绝对的信息优势并使得信息严重不对称，有动机而且有能力粉饰甚至虚构财务报告，掩盖实际问题，为自己谋取私利，掏空上市公司，侵害中小股东的利益。 近些年来，国内外许多学者都对大股东掏空行为进行了不同方面的研究，但是将其和注册会计师的审计联系起来的研究却很少。在这样的背景下，本文选择2006、2007年沪市、深市共1915家上市公司作为样本，以审计意见作为被解释变量，以大股东掏空上市公司的几种方式作为解释变量，并设置适当的控制变量以减少实验误差，建立回归模型，从审计意见出发，研究注册会计师出具的审计意见与大股东掏空行为间的关系。研究结果表明，在对大股东掏空行为的识别上，审计意见作为一种缓解代理成本的机制，具有信息含量。上市公司资金被大股东占用越多，与大股东间关联销售和债务担保越严重，注册会计师越有可能出具非标准的审计意见。由此可见，作为经济警察的注册会计师对大股东掏空行为具有识别作用，其在审计过程中会对大股东掏空行为表示关注，衡量其对审计风险及最终的审计意见的影响。
英文摘要：	Since many scholars stated that currently in listed companies major shareholders existed pervasively, the emphasis of company governance has changed from Entrust Agent 1 (focusing the conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers) to Entrusted Agent 2 (focusing the contradiction between major shareholders and minor shareholders). In china, listed companies have higher ownership concentration and complex ownership structure. The first major shareholder controls the company firmly, has absolute information advantage and thereby has enough motivation and ability to fabricate financial statements, tunnel the company and spoil other minor shareholders. Recently, many scholars conduct many researches respectively about this tunneling and audit opinion, but there are fewer researches about the relationship between them. Given this, this paper selects 1915 general listed companies from Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange in 2006 and 2007 as research samples, respectively adopts the audit opinion as the dependent variable and several kinds of tunneling of major shareholders as independent variables, meanwhile sets appropriate control variables to minimize the empirical deviation, designs regression model and researches the relationship between the audit opinion and the tunneling of major shareholders. And the empirical result indicates the audit opinion, as a tool of reducing the agent cost, to some extent has information values to identify the tunneling of major shareholders. That is to say, in listed companies, the more capital occupied by major shareholders, more related sales and more debt assurance to major shareholders, the more probability that the auditor releases non-standard audit opinions. So the auditor, as the economic policeman, could find the tunneling of major shareholders, highlight this phenomenon when working and consider its effect on the ultimate audit opinions.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)