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论文编号：	12258
作者编号：	1120160825
上传时间：	2020/12/21 11:44:55
中文题目：	转型期国有企业行政型治理嵌入驱动因素和经济后果研究
英文题目：	Research on the Drivers and Economic Consequences of Administrative Governance Embeddedness of Chinese State-owned Enterprises During the Transition Period
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	国有企业；行政经济型治理模式；行政型治理嵌入；驱动因素；经济后果
英文关键字：	State-owned Enterprise; Administrative Market Governance; Administrative Governance Embeddedness; Drivers; Economic Consequences
中文摘要：	改革开放以来，国有企业在由行政型治理向经济型治理转型的过程中，逐渐呈现出一种行政型治理与经济型治理相互交织、互相作用的治理模式，即行政经济型治理模式。在行政经济型治理模式下，从实践层面看，国有企业已经建立起了现代企业制度下“三会一层”的经济型治理结构，但在经济型治理结构中仍旧嵌入着诸多行政型治理要素，形成行政型治理与经济型治理并存交织的状态，如经营的行政目标与经济目标的双重压力、高管的行政人与经济人双重身份等等，进而在国企内部呈现为一种行政型治理嵌入的形式。从理论层面看，国企内部的行政型治理和经济型治理的两重治理逻辑并存，其背后的实质就是，从行政型治理向经济型治理的制度变迁过程中行政型治理要素长期存在于国企之中，形成了行政型治理嵌入，即在一般的经济型治理结构中，嵌入了各类行政型治理要素，进而与经济型治理要素交织并存的治理转型特点。这种行政型治理嵌入是当前国有企业的行政经济型治理模式下的典型特征。 那么，在国企治理转型过程中，行政经济型治理模式下所形成的行政型治理嵌入的理论内涵是什么？哪些因素是驱动行政型治理嵌入水平提升的核心？国企形成的行政型治理嵌入又会带来怎样的经济后果？是正向的还是负向的？这些研究结果又如何为未来的国企治理改革提供有价值的理论参考？显然，突破这一系列理论问题是推动深化国有企业治理改革的关键研究命题。 为此，本论文聚焦于国有企业的行政经济型治理模式，从行政型治理嵌入的视角出发，首先，对已有国有企业治理的研究文献进行回顾和梳理。其次，在梳理国有企业改革政策脉络的基础之上，对国有企业行政型治理嵌入进行理论分析，并构建起基本理论框架图，依循“驱动因素—投入效率—产出效率”的研究思路，提出本文的三个研究命题，并搭建开展相关实证研究的基本框架。最后，从经营目标、资源配置和高管任免三个维度构建起国有企业行政型治理嵌入指标体系，从驱动因素、投入效率和产出效率三个视角分别进行了实证检验。 通过上述分析，论文得出的主要研究结论如下：第一，从国有企业行政型治理嵌入的驱动因素来看，地方新任官员是影响其行政型治理嵌入水平高低的重要因素，会利用助推地方城投债水平的方式，来撬动国有企业资源，进而达到提升国企行政型治理嵌入水平的目的。第二，从国有企业的投资效率来看，国有企业行政型治理嵌入会带来非效率投资问题，特别是过度投资，印证了行政经济型治理下的“过剩逻辑”。第三，从国有企业的创新绩效来看，适度的行政型治理嵌入会带来创新激励，而过度的行政型治理嵌入则会导致创新抑制，行政型治理嵌入对国企创新绩效具有显著的“权变”效应。 本论文的主要创新点在于，第一，从行政型治理与经济型治理间的二元互动观入手，以更为动态的视角关注国有企业行政经济型治理模式下，行政型治理与经济型治理间的交互状态，并尝试性地分析和验证国有企业行政型治理要素嵌入经济型治理结构的内在机制，进而对已有围绕国企行政型治理的一元视角进行补充。第二，尝试构建了行政型治理对经济型治理嵌入的指标体系，利用行政型治理与经济型治理间的比值，进而有效度量一个国有企业中行政型治理要素与经济型治理要素间的强弱程度，在此基础上分析其驱动因素及经济影响。第三，考察了行政型治理嵌入的权变作用，提出适度的行政型治理嵌入能够提升国企治理的有效性，维持适当的行政型治理要素可以对经济型治理机制进行有效补充，这为进一步深化国企治理改革提供了有价值的理论参考。
英文摘要：	Since the reform and opening up from 1978, in the process of transforming from administrative governance to market governance, state-owned enterprises have gradually shown a governance mode in which administrative governance and market governance are interlaced and interact with each other, that is, administrative market governance mode. Under the mode of administrative economy, from a practical point of view, state-owned enterprises have already established a market-oriented governance structure of "Shareholder-Board-Supervisory Board-Management" under the modern enterprise system. However, there are still many administrative governance elements embedded in the market governance structure. The formation of administrative governance and market governance coexist and interweave, such as the dual pressure of administrative and economic objectives of management, the dual identity of administrative and market personnel of senior executives, etc., and then presents an embedded form of administrative governance within state-owned enterprises. From a theoretical point of view, the dual governance logic of administrative governance and market governance in state-owned enterprises coexist. The essence behind this is that, in the process of institutional change from administrative governance to market governance, administrative governance elements have long existed in state-owned enterprises, forming the governance transition characteristics of administrative governance embedding, that is, various administrative governance elements are embedded in the general market governance structure, and then coexist with market governance elements. This kind of administrative governance embeddedness is a typical feature under the current administrative market governance mode of state-owned enterprises. So, what is the theoretical connotation of administrative governance embedded in the process of state-owned enterprise governance transition? Which factors are the core driving the improvement of the embedding level of administrative governance? What economic consequences will the embedding of administrative governance formed by state-owned enterprises bring? Is it positive or negative? How can these research results provide valuable theoretical references for the future governance reform of state-owned enterprises? Breaking through this series of theoretical issues is the key research proposition to promote the deepening of the governance reform of state-owned enterprises. The main research conclusions drawn from the above analysis are as follows. First, from the perspective of the driving factors of the embedding of state-owned enterprises' administrative governance, the new local officials are an important factor that affects the embedding level of their administrative governance and will leverage the resources of state-owned enterprises by boosting the level of local urban investment bonds, thus achieving the goal of improving the embedding level of state-owned enterprises' administrative governance. Second, from the perspective of the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises, the embedding of administrative governance of state-owned enterprises will bring about inefficient investment problems, especially over-investment, which confirms the "surplus logic" under administrative market governance. Third, from the perspective of the innovation performance of state-owned enterprises, moderately appropriate administrative governance embeddedness will bring innovation incentives, while excessive administrative governance embeddedness will lead to innovation inhibition. Administrative governance embeddedness has a significant "contingency" effect on the innovation performance of state-owned enterprises. The main innovation of this paper is that, first, starting with the dual interaction between administrative governance and market governance, this paper focuses on the interaction between administrative governance and market governance under the administrative and market governance mode of state-owned enterprises from a more dynamic perspective, and tries to analyze and verify the internal mechanism of embedding administrative governance elements into the market governance structure of state-owned enterprises, thus supplementing the existing unitary perspective around administrative governance of state-owned enterprises. Secondly, it tries to construct an index system of embedding administrative governance into market governance and uses the ratio between administrative governance and market governance to effectively measure the strength and weakness of administrative governance elements and market governance elements in a state-owned enterprise. On this basis, this paper analyzes driving factors and economic impact. Thirdly, this paper examines the contingency effect of administrative governance embedding and proposes that appropriate administrative governance embedding can improve the effectiveness of state-owned enterprise governance, and maintaining appropriate administrative governance elements can effectively supplement the market governance mechanism, which provides a valuable theoretical reference for further deepening the governance reform of state-owned enterprises.
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