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论文编号：	12257
作者编号：	1120170867
上传时间：	2020/12/21 10:38:17
中文题目：	资金约束下低碳供应链运营与融资策略研究
英文题目：	Operational and Financing Strategies in Low Carbon Supply Chains with Capital Constraints
指导老师：	方磊
中文关键字：	低碳供应链；供应链融资；减排投资；贸易信用; 合同能源管理
英文关键字：	Low-carbon supply chain; supply chain financing; carbon reduction investment; trade credit; energy performance contracting
中文摘要：	随着工业经济的快速发展，二氧化碳排放量也随之逐年递增，导致全球温室效应日益严重，给生态平衡造成了不可逆的破坏。因此，如何有效地平衡工业二氧化碳过度排放与经济稳定发展之间的矛盾已成为当前全球亟需解决的重大挑战。为了缓解该难题，中外政府实施了一系列低碳减排政策，借此引导企业在追求经济利益最大化的同时降低其在生产运营中的碳排放量，从而促进低碳经济与社会可持续的发展。但是，大部分企业都属于中小型企业且面临着资金约束的困境，严重影响了企业的政策生产运营与整体效益。而碳减排投资会使得中小型企业面临资金约束的难题更加严峻，从而降低了企业自身以及供应链整体的经济与环境效益。因此，本文以碳减排政策为背景，研究不同供应链结构下某个成员面临资金约束难题时，选择不同的融资方式对各个成员的决策以及利润的影响，从而为企业的生产运营与减排投资提供相应的管理启示，实现经济效益与环境效益的“双赢”。 基于上述资金约束下低碳供应链的背景，本文对前人的相关文献进行梳理，确定当前低碳供应链融资问题的研究不足，进而采用博弈论以及数值仿真等研究方法分析资金约束下低碳供应链的运营与融资问题。本文的具体研究问题分为以下四个方面：基于银行信贷与预付款融资的上游资金约束供应链均衡决策问题、基于担保融资与贸易信用的下游资金约束供应链均衡决策问题、基于合同能源管理的上游进入资金约束下游市场的供应链均衡决策问题以及基于合同能源管理的下游资金不对称供应链均衡决策问题。 首先，考虑供应链中上游供应商面临资金约束且承担所有的库存风险时，可以通过银行信贷或者混合融资方式来执行生产决策和减排投资决策，其中，混合融资方式是指下游制造商的预付款与银行信贷的混合融资方式。根据上述背景构建Stackelberg博弈模型，分析供应商的初始资金、顾客低碳感知等因素对供应链中各个成员均衡决策及利润的影响。结果表明，随着供应商的初始资金增大，供应商的生产量决策反而越保守，且从愿意接受制造商提供的提前支付的混合融资方式转变为只选择银行信贷融资。 其次，考虑供应链中下游制造商面临资金约束且受到碳交易机制约束时，通过上游担保融资或者担保与贸易信用混合融资方式来执行订货决策和减排投资。根据上述背景构建博弈模型，分析担保比例对供应链中各个成员的均衡策略及利润的影响。结果表明，当担保比例处于较低的水平时，供应商只愿意提供信用担保帮助制造商获得资金。但是，当担保比例处于较高的水平时，供应商更愿意同时提供贸易信用与信用担保融资。 再次，考虑供应商提供两种不同的减排融资服务帮助资金约束的制造商实现减排投资，即收取一定利率的贷款形式或合同能源管理。其中，合同能源管理是指供应商扮演减排服务公司的角色，承担所有制造商所需的减排成本，最后通过共享节省的碳税获得收益。但是，当下游制造商资金约束时，供应商可能通过投入一笔固定费用，开发零售市场与制造商进行水平竞争。因此，考虑在三种不同情形下，即只提供贸易信用、提供贸易信用同时提供减排贷款，以及提供贸易信用同时提供合同能源管理，重点讨论供应商进入零售市场成本与碳初始排放量对供应商是否需要进一步开发零售市场与下游制造商进行竞争的影响。 最后，考虑下游资金不对称的两个制造商存着水平竞争关系且两家制造商都受到碳税政策的约束。供应商会提供贸易信用帮助资金较弱的制造商缓解订货资金短缺难题，增强资金较弱的制造商的竞争力，从而使得供应商自身获得更大收益。此外，供应商可以为下游两家制造商提供合同能源管理，帮助下游实现减排投资，最终通过共享节省的碳税获得收益。考虑三种情形，即对两家都不提供合同能源管理、只提供给资金较强的制造商，以及只提供给资金较弱的制造商，通过讨论不同情形下的合同能源管理对供应链中各个成员的价值，分析供应商应该选择资金较强的还是资金较弱的制造商提供合同能源管理。 本文分别设计了预付款与银行信贷的混合融资、贸易信用与核心企业担保的混合融资帮助供应链中资金约束成员实现运营决策与减排投资，从而拓展了低碳供应链融资领域。此外，本文针对低碳供应链的融资特性，把合同能源管理作为一种新型的融资方式引入供应链中，丰富了低碳供应链融资模式。本文对于提升供应链整体的经济与环境效益、促进低碳经济与社会可持续发展都具有重要的理论和实践意义。
英文摘要：	With the rapid development of industrial economics, the volume of carbon emission has been significantly increasing in recent years, thus leading to serious climate change and destruction of the ecosystem. Therefore, how to control extreme carbon emission has become one of the most important challenges. In recent years, some governments have announced a series of emission reduction regulations to induce the manufacturing enterprises to pay more attention on the emission reduction investment when manufacturing products. However, most of the enterprises, which are small-medium enterprises suffer capital constraint and cannot achieve their operational decisions. Emission reduction investment leads to the capital constraints of the manufacturers’ challenge more serious. As a result, both the enterprise’s economic and environmental performance is significantly reduced. Therefore, according to the government regulations about carbon reduction, this dissertation investigates that one of the supply chain members suffers capital constraint and execute his or her operational decision and carbon emission reduction through different financing schemes. As a result, the entire supply chain can achieve win-win of economic and environmental performance. According to the above industrial backgrounds, this dissertation first reviews the prior literature, and find out the research gap in the flied of low-carbon supply chain finance. Then, we establish the mathematical model to characterize the operational and financial decisions in low-carbon supply chain by using game theory and numerical studies. The research questions of this dissertation can be divided into four parts, including: bank credit financing and prepayment in a low-carbon supply chain with a capital-constrained upstream; trade credit and particle credit guarantee in a low-carbon supply chain with a capital-constrained downstream; supplier encroachment in a low-carbon supply chain with a financial-constrained downstream; and energy performance contracting in two financially asymmetric downstream manufacturers. First, we consider that the supplier suffers capital constraint and bears all of the inventory risk. The supplier can execute his operational decision and carbon emission investment by two financing schemes: bank credit financing and mixed financing. The mixed financing includes prepayment and bank credit financing. According to the two financing schemes, we establish the two Stackelberg models to analyze the impact of manufacturer’s initial capital and consumer low-carbon awareness on the operational decisions and emission reduction investment of the supply chain members. The result indicates that the higher manufacturer’s initial capital induces the supplier to make a more conservative decision about production quantity. Furthermore, the supplier changes his willingness from mixed financing to the bank credit financing. Second, we consider that the manufacturer suffers capital constraint under cap-and-trade regulation. The manufacturer can execute his operational decision and carbon emission investment by two financing schemes: partial credit guarantee and combining trade credit with partial credit guarantee. According to the two financing schemes, we establish the two Stackelberg models to analyze the ratio of partial credit guarantee on the supplier decision-making regarding that whether the supplier should provide partial credit guarantee or the combination of trade credit with partial credit guarantee. The result indicates that when the ratio of partial credit guarantee is within a relatively low range, the supplier should only provide partial credit guarantee for the capital-constrained manufacturer. Otherwise, the supplier should choose the combination of trade credit with partial credit guarantee. Third, we consider that the manufacturer suffers capital constraint under carbon tax regulation. The manufacturer can execute his operational decision by trade credit, but the carbon emission investment should be implemented by two other financing schemes: the supplier finance and energy performance contracting. Energy performance contracting means that the supplier acts as an energy service company to bear investment cost of carbon emission and help the manufacturer to implement carbon emission. Finally, the manufacturer should share partial carbon tax savings for the supplier. However, the supplier also may investment a fixed cost to encroach the manufacturer’s market. According to the two financing schemes, we establish the Stackelberg models to demonstrate that whether the supplier should enter the manufacturer’s market and compete with him under three scenarios. Fourth, we consider two financially asymmetric manufacturers under carbon tax regulation. The financially weak one needs the trade credit offered from the supplier to address the capital of ordering. However, the two manufacturers have no ability to implement carbon emission investment. The supplier can act as an energy service company to provide carbon emission reduction for alternative manufacturer. According to the two financing schemes, we establish the Stackelberg models to demonstrate that who should be chosen by the supplier to provide energy performance contracting the financially strong one or the weak one. This dissertation designs two combinated financing schemes, i.e., prepayment and bank credit financing, partial credit guanrantee and trade credit, for capital-constrained supply chain members to execute operational decisions and low-carbon investment, thus extending the traditional flied of supply chain finance. Additionally, we introduce a new financing scheme called energy performance contracting to enrich the traditional financing schemes. The analystic results can guide the supply chain members to execute their operational and financing decisions in the realistic industry. Therefore, this dissertation can well improve the supply chain economic and environmental performance and promote the development of low-carbon economy.
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