联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	122
作者编号：	2120052034
上传时间：	2007/6/22 21:22:34
中文题目：	民营上市公司控股股东选择独立董
英文题目：	Controlling Shareholders'' Pre
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	民营上市公司;独立董事;股权集中
英文关键字：	private listed company;indepen
中文摘要：	2008年即将迎来我国改革开放三十年，这三十年来，经济领域里一个最引人注目的现象是我国民营经济的迅速崛起，并在国民经济中扮演着越来越重要的作用。但是，与此同时我国的民营企业也遇到了越来越多的体制难题，例如产权问题，家族企业治理问题等等。随着越来越多的民营企业上市，这些问题暴露得更加明显。 独立董事制度的目标在于解决上市公司所存在的委托代理问题，即上市公司各个权利主体之间的目标函数不一致所产生的问题。在这一背景下，中国民营上市公司稳步推进独立董事制度，其主要价值就在于对股东、经理层等内部人进行制衡监督，强化董事的独立性和效率。 本文借鉴国外对独立董事特征问题的研究成果，分八个维度考察了我国民营上市公司独立董事的特征，在此基础上以股权集中度为出发点研究民营上市公司控股股东选择独立董事的偏好，并重点探索了这种偏好的形成机制以及形成原因，最后为民营上市公司独立董事制度的改善提出建议。 为了对中国民营上市公司控股股东选择独立董事的偏好进行分析，本文首先通过对美国、英国、香港等的独立董事选择标准进行比较分析，并且探讨了我国民营上市公司的特殊性，从而找出影响民营上市公司独立董事选择的制度背景因素。本论文认为除了制度背景的因素外，独立董事的选择在实际操作中还有很多现实困难，例如激励机制问题、道德风险问题等。如果民营上市公司处理不好这些问题，独立董事的独立性难以得到保证，其就会变成“花瓶”。 本文引用2003-2005年度沪深两地中国民营上市公司数据，从聘用独立董事人次、独立董事任职家数、来源地、性别、年龄、学历构成、职业背景、薪酬等八个维度研究了中国民营上市公司独立董事的特征，并与美英等国进行的比较，以此得出中国民营上市公司独立董事的一般性特点及存在问题。 由于控股股东是决定独立董事的关键因素，也是民营上市公司很多问题的根源，所以，本文创新性地提出以股权集中度为出发点来分析民营上市公司独立董事的特征，分析不同股权集中度下独立董事的特征变化，以此寻找二者之间的关联，从而为前文统计的独立董事特征寻求解释，并为民营上市公司提供解决问题的思路。 本文的两个实证部分有一个递进的关系，即在研究一般独立董事特征的基础上考察股权集中度影响下的独立董事特征。在实证部分的描述性统计中，本文发现独立董事特征与股权集中度有很多U型曲线关系，当引入股权集中度为50%-59.99%的“适度集中”区间概念时，这些曲线得到了有效的解释。即借助“适度集中”区间概念，我们可以对民营上市公司大股东选择独立董事的偏好有一个清晰的轮廓，并且挖掘出这种偏好形成的深层原因，即股权集中度水平的差异导致股权制衡机制的差别，这种差别对控股股东行为的影响。最后，本文得出“控股股东选择独立董事的偏好随股权集中度的变化而变化，股权的适度集中会影响控股股东的决策”的重要结论。 在此基础上，本文为民营上市公司在股权集中度、独立董事独立性、任免机制以及职业独立董事人才市场建设等方面的提出几条建设性意见，希望通过股权集中度这个着眼点，推动中国民营上市公司独立董事制度的整体优化。
英文摘要：	Since 1978 the opening-up, it is almost thirty years to 2008. During this period, a most noticeable phenomenon is the fast emergence of the private economy of our country in the economic field. But meanwhile, the enterprises meet more and more problems with their growth in the process of into capital market. The main target for independent director system is to solve the agency problem in private listed companies, i.e. conflicts among controlling shareholders’ infringements of rights, which is the ubiquitous problem in private listed companies, indicates the imminence of reform of independent director system. The independent director system has been vigorously promoted in Chinese private listed companies. The main value of independent directors becoming to balance and monitor insiders includes the management, and strengthen the independence and improve the efficiency of the board. This thesis analyses the controlling shareholders’preference on choosing independent directors and the forming mechanism and reason, and then tables some proposals for the improvement of independent system of private listed companies. In order to analyze the controlling shareholders’preference on choosing independent directors, this thesis compares the independent director systems and standards of U.S., U.K. and Hong Kong, and then finds the system background of their choices. In addition to the system reason, we still have many practical difficulties in the process of choosing independent directors, such as incentive mechanism and moral hazard. If private listed companies cannot solve these problems, the independence of independent directors would not be guaranteed and they may retrogress to “Vase”. Hence, the matter of choosing independent composes the basement of construction of independent director system. This thesis cites private listed companies’data from Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges from 2003 to 2005. We analyses Chinese private listed companies from independent directors’number, gender, age, education experience, career background and compensation compared with that of other countries, and then concludes the general characteristics and existing problems of independent director of private listed companies. Because controlling shareholders is the key factor to decide independent directors, this thesis uses CR_5 (concentration ratio of top-5 shareholders, it is the sum of top-5 shareholders’equity ownership ratio) to research the characteristics of private listed companies’independent directors to solve the problems. On the basis of formal analysis, we make another empirical analysis to find explanations for the independent characteristics and the potential relationships between independent characteristics and CR_5. The two empirical analyses have a step-up relationship, because we analyses the influence of controlling shareholders on the basis of characteristics of independent directors. We find many U-shape curves between big shareholder’s equity restriction ratio and independent characteristics. When we use the concept of “moderate concentration” (CR_5 is in the section of 50%-59.99%), these curves can be explained. Finally, we conclude that moderate equity concentration corresponds to scientific independent director structure and analyze the further reason of this condition, which own to be the influence equity restriction on controlling shareholders’ behavior. On the basis of formal analysis, this thesis tables some proposals in the fields of ownership concentration, independence of directors, appointment and removal mechanism and human resources in order to optimize the independent director system of private listed companies.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)