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论文编号:12091 
作者编号:2320180675 
上传时间:2020/12/11 17:05:17 
中文题目:乐凯集团改制员工持股研究 
英文题目:Research on the Employee Stock Ownership Plan at Lucky Group Company 
指导老师:周建教授 
中文关键字:国有企业;员工持股;改制;案例; 
英文关键字:state-owned enterprise; ESO; restructuring; case; 
中文摘要:摘要 党的十八届三中全会提出要积极发展混合所有制经济,随后国有企业混合所有制改革加快推进,员工持股成为新时期国有企业混合所有制改革的重要途径。在历经30多年的曲折发展后,员工持股再次引领国有企业改革方向,获得了广泛关注。 本文采用案例研究的方法,选取乐凯集团2002年至2011年期间4个改制员工持股案例进行集中分析研究。首先,本文回顾了员工持股理论基础、我国员工持股发展历程以及存在的主要问题;其次,重点分析介绍了乐凯集团改制员工持股案例,包括乐凯集团实施改制员工持股的背景和必要性分析、改制员工持股方案主要内容和特点,在此基础上,系统总结乐凯集团改制员工持股的实施效果,分析了存在的主要问题,提出了改进建议;最后,总结得出对其他国有企业开展员工持股的启示。 本文研究发现:乐凯集团开展员工持股取得了显著成效,基本实现了预期目标。从经营机制层面看,优化了经营管理机制,真正确立了企业市场主体地位,为转型发展提供了有力支撑;从经营业绩层面看,企业经营规模和效益水平大幅提升,实现了乐凯集团与改制企业双赢;从公司治理层面看,形成了较为完善的公司治理结构,管理规范化水平明显提升;从激励机制层面看,员工意识发生根本转变,工作积极性明显提高,实现了企业发展和员工受益的良好局面。与此同时,乐凯集团改制员工持股也存在股权转让和退出机制不健全、职工股东和国有股东利益冲突、持续激励机制不完善等问题,这些问题导致员工持股长期激励作用逐渐弱化。乐凯集团的案例表明,一方面,员工持股对于推动国有企业改革发展具有重要意义。另一方面,员工持股有其适用范围,并不是所有企业都适合开展员工持股,需要因企施策;实施员工持股最重要的是要坚持长期导向原则,建立动态化的管理机制,此外还要合理确定持股范围和持股比例。 本文主要创新点:一是将研究重点聚焦于员工持股计划的本质——即长期激励机制,考察了案例企业在较长时期内员工持股的实施效果以及存在的问题,为员工持股政策的制定和国有企业员工持股实践提供有益借鉴。二是案例丰富,代表性强。案例数量多,避免了单一案例分析带来的局限性;公司类型全,既有上市公司,也有非上市公司;开展员工持股时间较早,有利于充分验证员工持股的长期激励效果。 
英文摘要:Abstract The Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed to actively develop a mixed-ownership economy. Subsequently, the mixed-ownership reform of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) was accelerated, and employee stock ownership (ESO) was an important way to realize the mixed-ownership reform in the new era. After more than 30 years of tortuous development, ESO has once again led the reform of SOEs and has aroused widespread concern. This paper adopts the method of case study and selects 4 ESO reform cases of Lucky Group from 2002 to 2011 for concentrated analysis and research. First, this article reviews the theoretical basis of ESO, the history of ESO in China, and the main problems that exist; secondly, it focuses on the introduction and analysis of Lucky Group restructuring ESO cases, including the background and necessity of Lucky Group’s implementation of restructuring ESO, and analyzes the main content and characteristics of the ESO plan. On this basis, this paper systematically summarizes the effect of Lucky Group’s ESO reform, analyzes the main problems, and puts forward suggestions for improvement; finally, this paper concludes the experience and enlightenment which is helpful for other SOEs mixed ownership reform. It is found in this paper: ESO contributes a lot to Lucky Group’s development after the reform and most goals have been achieved. From the perspective of operating mechanism, the management mechanism has been optimized, and the company's market dominant position has been truly established, providing strong support to the group’s transformation and development; from the perspective of operating performance, the scale and efficiency of the company have been greatly improved, and Lucky Group and the reformed enterprises have realized a win-win situation; from the perspective of corporate governance, a relatively complete corporate governance structure has been formed, and the level of management standardization has been significantly promoted ; from the perspective of incentive mechanism, the awareness of employees has undergone a fundamental change, and the enthusiasm for work has been significantly improved, achieving a good situation of corporate development and employee benefits. However, there are also many problems after Lucky Group’s reform, such as incomplete equity transfer and exit mechanisms, conflicts of interest between employee shareholders and state-owned shareholders, and imperfect continuous incentive mechanisms. These problems have led to the gradual weakening of the long-term incentive effect of ESO, which even disappeared. The case of Lucky Group shows that, on one hand, ESO is of great significance in promoting the reform and development of SOEs. On the other hand, ESO has its limitation, such as scope of application. ESO is not suitable for all companies, and policy and strategy should base on the company’s actual situation. The most important thing to implement ESO is to adhere to the long-term guiding principle and establish a dynamic management mechanism. It is also necessary to reasonably determine the scope and proportion of shareholding. The main innovations of this article: First, the research focuses on the essence of the ESO plan—that is, the long-term incentive mechanism. It not only examines the effects and the problems of ESO in the case company in the long run, but also provides a reference and advice for the design and implementation of ESO in SOEs. Second, there are abundant cases in this article and the cases present most typical characteristics of the ESO reform. The large number of cases avoids the limitations of a single case analysis; the cases cover different company types, including listed companies and non-listed companies; cases in which the ESO reform was implemented years ago are conducive to fully verifying the long-term incentive effect. Keywords: state-owned enterprise; ESO; restructuring; case; 
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