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论文编号：	11951
作者编号：	1120130810
上传时间：	2020/9/16 10:07:13
中文题目：	研发补贴、股权结构与企业创新
英文题目：	R&D Subsidies, Ownership Structure and Firm Innovation
指导老师：	黄福广
中文关键字：	研发补贴；股权结构；企业创新；关联交易；风险承担
英文关键字：	R&D subsidies; ownership structure; innovation; related party transactions; risk-taking
中文摘要：	创新是企业获得可持续竞争优势的重要来源。由于创新成果的技术溢出效应及创新项目面临的融资约束问题，使企业的创新经常会投资不足。为了鼓励和扶持企业创新，向企业直接提供研发补贴成为各国政府的重要政策手段。但研发补贴对企业创新是否起到促进作用尚存在争议。 企业怎样使用研发补贴，是由对企业拥有资源和利益主导权的控制权主体决定的，这种控制权和企业的股权结构密切相关。基于委托代理理论、资源基础理论和政府干预的“掠夺之手”理论等，本文分析了股权结构（包括股权集中度、股权制衡度及股权性质）会怎样影响研发补贴与企业创新之间的关系。本文发现股权结构对研发补贴与企业创新关系的影响，主要来自于两个重要路径——控股股东关联交易和风险承担。 以2008-2016年A股上市公司为样本，采用公开财务数据和手工搜索的政府研发补贴数据，本文进行回归后得出的主要结论如下。 第一，研发补贴整体上促进了企业研发投入和专利产出，但当研发补贴规模过大时，会替换出企业自有研发资金，形成“挤出”效应。事后奖励补贴并没有比事前研发补贴的促进作用更大，但事前研发补贴过大时会挤出企业自有研发资金，事后奖励补贴则没有这种影响。进一步分样本回归发现，研发补贴对高科技行业、高市场竞争行业、融资约束严重和市场化较高地区中企业的研发投入促进作用更大。通过使用倾向得分匹配法（PSM）、Heckman两步法和两阶段最小二乘法（2SLS）控制内生性问题后，研发补贴对企业创新的促进作用依然存在。 第二，股权集中度会抑制研发补贴对企业研发投入的促进作用，但股权集中度不影响研发补贴和企业研发产出的关系；当研发补贴规模过大时，股权集中度会加剧研发补贴对企业自有研发资金的挤出效应。进一步分析发现，事前补贴更高及控股股东财务约束更大时，股权集中度抑制了研发补贴对企业研发投入的促进作用。当企业研发补贴较高时，控股股东关联交易增加与风险承担降低是股权集中度抑制研发补贴效果的重要原因。而控股股东关联交易增加也是股权集中度加剧研发补贴对企业自有研发资金“挤出”效应的重要原因。 第三，股权制衡度越高，研发补贴对企业研发投入的促进作用越大；而研发补贴水平规模较大时，股权制衡度没有减少研发补贴对企业自有研发资金的挤出作用。进一步分析发现，当研发补贴资金较高时，股权制衡度起到了“双刃剑”的作用：一方面，股权制衡度更高可以有效减少控股股东通过关联交易挤出企业研发资金；另一方面，股权制衡度更高导致对企业“过度监督”，企业的风险承担水平下降，向发明专利等风险性更高的专利投资降低，表现出对研发补贴使用方向的一种“挤出”效应。 第四，相对于非国有企业，在国有企业中研发补贴对企业研发投入的促进作用更小；研发补贴规模较大时，相比于非国有企业，国有企业不会加剧研发补贴对企业自有研发资金的挤出。而国有产权不影响研发补贴和企业研发产出的关系。进一步分析发现，关联交易加剧了各类股权性质企业中研发补贴的挤出效应；当关联交易较高时，其对国有企业研发补贴的挤出效应加剧作用大于非国有企业。当企业风险承担水平较低时，相对于非国有企业，国有企业会抑制研发补贴对企业研发投入的促进作用。 本文的创新之处主要体现在以下几个方面：第一，本文基于委托代理理论，揭示了控股股东关联交易在股权结构对企业研发补贴使用效果影响中的作用，补充了股权结构如何对研发补贴效果产生影响的研究。第二，揭示了风险承担在股权结构对企业研发补贴使用效果的作用，丰富了风险承担与企业创新影响的研究。第三，揭示了研发补贴对企业创新存在着促进与挤出双重作用，研发补贴在规模适度时会产生促进作用，而过度补贴会对企业自有研发资金产生挤出效应，丰富了有关研发补贴效果的相关研究。
英文摘要：	Innovation is an important source of sustainable competitive advantage for companies. Due to the technological spillover effects of innovations and the financing constraints faced by innovative projects, resulting in underinvestment in innovation. In order to encourage and support firm innovation, granting R&D subsidies from governments to firm is an important policy tool. However, it is ambiguous whether R&D subsidies will promote the firm innovation. How much R&D subsidies an enterprise invests in innovation activities is determined by the controlling entity that has the resources and control rights of the company. The control rights are closely related to the ownership structure of the company. Based on the theory of principal-agent theory, resource-based theory and the theory of “predatory hand” of government intervention, this paper analyzes how the ownership structure (including ownership concentration, equity restriction and equity nature) affects the relationship between R&D subsidies and corporate innovation. This paper finds that the impact of ownership structure on R&D subsidies and corporate innovation relation mainly comes from two important paths: controlling shareholders' related party transactions and risk-taking. Using the 2008-2016 A-share listed companies as sample, taking public financial data and manual search for government R&D subsidy data, the main conclusions drawn from this paper are as follows. First, R&D subsidies have promoted R&D investment and patent output. However, if R&D subsidies are too large, they replace the company's private R&D funds and form an “crowding-out”effect. Ex post subsidies have not been more effective than ex ante R&D subsidies. However, if the ex ante R&D subsidies are too large, the company's private R&D funds will be crowded out, and the ex post subsidies will have no such effect. R&D subsidies have a greater role in promoting R&D investment in high-tech industries, high-market competition industries, and heavily financing constraints and market-oriented regions. After using the propensity score matching method (PSM), the Heckman two-step method, and the two-stage least squares method (2SLS) to control endogeneity problems, the promotion of research and development subsidies to firm innovation still exists. Second, the ownership concentration will inhibit the promotion of R&D subsidies to R&D investment of enterprises, but the ownership concentration does not affect the relationship between R&D subsidies and R&D output of enterprises; when the scale of R&D subsidies is too large, the ownership concentration will increase the R&D subsidies replace the company's private R&D funds. Further analysis found that when ex ante subsidies are higher and the controlling shareholders' financial constraints are greater, the ownership concentration inhibits the R&D subsidies on the R&D investment of enterprises. When corporate R&D subsidies are high, the increase in related party transactions and the reduction of risk-taking are important reasons for the effect of ownership concentration the suppression of R&D subsidies. The increase in related party transactions is also an important reason for the effect of the ownership concentration on the “crowding-out”effect of R&D subsidies on the company's private R&D funds. Third, the equity restriction has a greater role in promoting R&D investment; while the R&D subsidies are large, the equity restriction does not reduce the “crowding-out”effect of R&D subsidies on R&D funds. Further analysis found that when the R&D subsidy funds are high, the equity restriction has played the role of “double-edged sword”: on the one hand, the higher equity restriction can effectively reduce the controlling shareholder's R&D funds through related party transactions; higher equity restriction lead to “over-supervision” of enterprises, the level of risk-taking of enterprises is reduced, and the risky patent investment such as invention patents is lowered, showing an “crowding-out”effect on the direction of use of research and development subsidies. Fourth, compared with nonstate-owned enterprises, R&D subsidies in state-owned enterprises have a smaller role in promoting R&D investment; when R&D subsidies are larger, state-owned enterprises will not exacerbate R&D subsidies replace the company's private R&D funds than non-state-owned enterprises. State-owned property rights do not affect the relationship between R&D subsidies and corporate R&D output. Further analysis found that the related transactions exacerbated the crowding out effect of R&D subsidies in various types of equity-type enterprises; when the related transactions were higher, the crowding-out effect on the R&D subsidies of state-owned enterprises was greater than that of non-state-owned enterprises. When the level of corporate risk-taking is low, compared with nonstate-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises will inhibit the promotion of R&D subsidies to the level of R&D investment. The contributions of this paper are: First, based on the principal-agent theory, this paper reveals the role of controlling shareholder’s related party transactions in the impact of the shareholding structure on the use of R&D subsidies, and supplements the shareholding structure on R&D subsidies and firm innovation. Second, it reveals the role of risk-taking in the effect of ownership structure on corporate R&D subsidies, and enriches the research on risk-taking and corporate innovation impact. Thirdly, it reveals that R&D subsidies have a dual role of promotion and crowding-out for enterprise innovation. R&D subsidies will promote when the scale is moderate, and excessive subsidies will have a crowding effect on the company's private R&D funds, enriching the relevant R&D subsidies research.
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