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论文编号：	11949
作者编号：	1120140794
上传时间：	2020/9/15 21:13:37
中文题目：	非控股股东参与董事会治理与上市公司并购商誉减值问题研究
英文题目：	Non-controlling Shareholders’ Involvement in the Governance of the Board of Directors and the Impairment of Goodwill after M&A in Listed Companies
指导老师：	李姝教授
中文关键字：	非控股股东，董事会，商誉减值，代理问题，信息不对称，经济后果
英文关键字：	non-controlling shareholders, board of directors, goodwill impairment, agency problem, information asymmetry, economic consequence
中文摘要：	并购重组市场作为IPO市场以外的主要资源配置渠道，在2012年的IPO“堰塞湖”现象后呈现出交易数量逐年大幅度上升的井喷态势，与之相伴随的是并购溢价导致的上市公司账面商誉急剧增长。商誉账面余额大幅增长的背后是上市公司层出不穷的商誉减值“暴雷”现象和逐年攀升的商誉减值损失，商誉减值已经成为侵蚀上市公司利润的突出不良因素。与此同时，证监会也出台了多项监管政策以遏制上市公司“跟风式”并购行为，旨在保障并购重组活动的有序性、效率性和上市公司可持续盈利能力的提升。另外，按照《上市公司重大资产重组管理办法》以及证监会对上市公司发行股份购买资产的相关规定，上市公司采用收益法对被收购公司进行估值定价的，董事会需要对估值参数的合理性以及估值结果的公允性做出评价和决议，因此董事会是并购决策的“责任人”。商誉作为收益法下并购溢价在会计上的确认方式，面对上市公司严峻的商誉减值问题，董事会特征是否会对此问题产生影响是我们提出本文研究话题的动机。 本文首先从股权制衡和董事会监督两类主体融合的角度提出了“非控股股东参与董事会治理”这一理念，并指出非控股股东是否参与治理会导致董事会呈现出两种不同的格局：一种是未参与情形下由独立董事和控股股东董事组成的“二元格局”，另一种则是包含非控股股东董事的“三元格局”。通过对两种格局差异性的分析，本文指出“三元格局”可能会加强董事会的内部监督（简称监督）力量并抑制第二类代理问题对决策效率的不良影响。另外，除了治理格局的改变，非控股股东参与治理还可能导致董事会人力资本的改变，非控股股东董事可能会利用自身的人力资本优势进一步加强董事会的内部监督效率，也可能通过自身的人力资本优势和决策参与权向董事会传递增量的有用信息进而缓解董事会决策制定过程中面临的信息不对称问题并提高决策制定效率。考虑到非控股股东参与治理可能会带来董事会监督效率或决策制定效率的改善，同时把商誉减值作为低效率并购决策的后果，本文提出第一个研究问题：非控股股东参与董事会治理的特征是否能够抑制并购商誉减值的发生？ 接下来，在第一个问题得以验证的基础之上，本文分析了第二类代理问题和交易双方信息不对称问题对商誉初始计量公允价值高估的影响。由于非控股股东参与董事会治理具有抑制控股股东利益输送的监督能力，落脚到并购定价决策上时，这一监督能力有可能降低第二类代理问题引起的商誉初始计量公允价值高估；类似地，非控股股东参与董事会治理也有可能通过决策制定的权力为董事会带来增量的有用信息，降低信息不对称问题引起的商誉初始计量公允价值高估。本文将这两类作用路径分别称为“监督机制”和“信息机制”。根据上述分析，本文提出第二个研究问题：非控股股东参与董事会治理的相关特征是否能够通过监督机制或信息机制降低商誉初始计量的高估进而抑制商誉减值的发生？ 最后，本文考察了非控股股东参与董事会治理影响商誉减值的经济后果。对于投资者来说，当商誉初始计量信息发布至市场时，他们能否意识到过高估值蕴含的商誉减值风险并对此作出理性的短期反应；另外，当商誉减值损失逐步得到验证时，投资者是否会这一信息作出理性的长期反应，长期反应与短期反应存在何种联系；而且，存在非控股股东参与董事会治理的公司与非控股股东未参与董事会治理的公司在上述反应中是否会表现出差异？综合上述分析思路，本文提出第三个研究问题：非控股股东参与董事会治理与并购商誉减值的联系会带来什么样的经济后果？ 通过对上述三大问题的理论分析和实证检验，本文主要得出以下结论： 第一，在全部样本中，相较于不存在非控股股东参与董事会治理的公司，存在非控股股东参与董事会治理的公司在并购日后面临更低的商誉减值概率及规模。其次，在非控股股东参与董事会治理的样本中，随着参与水平的提高，商誉减值的概率及规模在整体上也得到了进一步的抑制。之后，同样以非控股股东参与董事会治理的样本为研究对象，本文还发现具有机构背景的非控股股东对商誉减值的抑制能力要显著强于不具有机构背景的非控股股东。 第二，本文发现不论是第二类代理问题还是信息不对称问题导致的商誉初始计量过高估值，均与并购日后的商誉减值呈现显著正相关的关系。而且，非控股股东参与董事会治理的三类特征均能够通过监督机制降低第二类代理问题引发的商誉初始计量公允价值高估并抑制商誉后续减值的概率及规模，但是信息机制的作用仅体现于机构背景的非控股股东参与董事会治理这一特征。 第三，在全部样本和非控股股东未参与董事会治理的样本中，商誉初始计量公允价值高估的水平越严重，市场给予股票的短期超额回报也越高，本文认为这是投资者非理性的表现；而存在非控股股东参与董事会治理的样本中，商誉初始计量过高估值与短期超额回报并无显著关系。从市场长期表现来看，商誉减值越高的公司、市场给予的负的超额回报也越高，而且不论非控股股东是否参与董事会治理，商誉减值与长期超额回报均表现出较为显著的负相关系。研究还发现，在全部样本和非控股股东未参与董事会治理的公司样本中，短期超额回报与长期超额回报表现出显著的反转关系；而存在非控股股东参与董事会治理的公司，其短期超额回报与长期超额回报并未表现出显著的反转关系。 总的来说，上述问题的研究既丰富了我们对董事会格局及治理效率差异性的认识，同时也深化了我们对于商誉减值诱发因素的认识，而且经济后果的揭示也有助于我们更为充分地理解投资者对于商誉会计信息所表现出的理性与非理性反应以及股票短期超额回报和长期超额回报之间的联系。此外，非控股股东参与董事会治理这一现象的考察以及控股股东利用并购商誉过高估值获取私有收益这一问题的发现也有助于我们对相关领域在未来做进一步的拓展研究。
英文摘要：	As the main resource allocation channel outside the IPO market, the M&A market shows a blowout trend that the number of transactions increases dramatically year by year after the IPO “barrier lake” phenomenon in 2012, which is accompanied by a sharp increase in the goodwill’s book value of listed companies caused by the premium in M&A. Behind the substantial growth of book value is the “thundering” of goodwill impairment, which has been increasing sharply year by year. The impairment of goodwill has become a prominent negative factor which is eroding the profits of listed companies. At the same time, China Securities Regulatory Commission（CSRC）has also issued a number of regulatory policies to curb the trend of “follow” in M&A, aiming to ensure the order and efficiency in M&A and the sustainable profitability of listed companies. In addition, in accordance with the “Measures for the Administration of the Material Asset Restructurings of Listed Companies” and the relevant provisions of the CSRC on the issuance of shares by listed companies to purchase assets, if the listed companies adopt the income method to value the acquired companies, the board of directors needs to make evaluation and resolution on the rationality of the valuation parameters and the fairness of the valuation results, so the board of directors is responsible for the M&A decision. Goodwill, as the accounting recognition of M&A premium under the income method, is in the face of a serious problem of impairment in listed companies, whether the characteristics of the board of directors will have an impact on this problem is the initial motivation of our research. First of all, we put forward a concept that “non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in the governance of the board of directors”, which can organically integrate the balance mechanism and the board of directors’ supervision into the same principal. Whether the non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in governance will lead to a different governance structure: one is the “dualistic structure”, which is composed of the independent directors and controlling shareholders’ directors under the absence of non-controlling shareholders, while the other is the “ternary structure” which includes the non-controlling shareholders’ directors. Through the analysis of the differences between the two structures, we point out that compared with the “dualistic structure”, the “ternary structure” may has a much stronger supervision power in the board of directors and can inhibit the adverse effects of the type II agency problem on decision-making efficiency much better. In addition to the change of governance structure, the involvement of non-controlling shareholders in governance may also lead to a change of human capital of the board of directors. With their human capital advantages, the directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders may strengthen the internal supervision of the specific decision made by the board of directors, and may also provide incremental information to the board of directors with their participating rights which is useful in decision-making, thereby alleviating the information asymmetry problems faced in the decision-making process of the board of directors and improving the efficiency of decision-making. Considering that the involvement of non-controlling shareholders in the governance may bring about the improvement of the supervision efficiency or decision-making efficiency of the board of directors, at the same time, taking the impairment of goodwill as the consequence of an inefficient M&A decision, we put forward the first research issue of this article, whether the characteristics of non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in the governance of the board of directors can inhibit the occurrence of the impairment of goodwill in the M&A? On the basis of the confirm of the first issue, we analyze the influence of type II agency problem and information asymmetry problem on the overvalued initial measurement of goodwill. As the involvement of non-controlling shareholders in governance has the ability of supervision to inhibit the transfer of interests of controlling shareholders, when it comes to the decision of M&A pricing, this supervision ability may reduce the overestimation of the fair value of goodwill initial measurement caused by the type II agency problem. Similarly, the involvement of non-controlling shareholders in governance may also provide incremental information to the board of directors that is useful in decision-making, which can reduce the overestimation of fair value of initial measurement of goodwill caused by information asymmetry. We name these two kinds of functional paths “supervision mechanism” and “information mechanism”, respectively. Based on the analysis above, we put forward the second research issue, whether the relevant characteristics of non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in governance can reduce the overestimation of initial measurement of goodwill through supervision mechanism or information mechanism, and then inhibit the occurrence of goodwill impairment? Finally, we investigate the economic consequences of non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in governance on goodwill impairment. Considering the investors, when the initial measurement information of goodwill is released to the market, can they realize the risk of goodwill impairment contained in overvaluation and make a rational short-term response to it? In addition, when the impairment of goodwill is recognized gradually, will investors make a rational long-term response to this information? What is the relationship between the response and the short-term response? What's more, will there be any difference between the companies with non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in governance and the companies without non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in governance? With the comprehensive analysis of the above ideas, we put forward the third research issue of this article: what kind of economic consequences will be brought about by the non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in governance and goodwill information? Through the theoretical analysis and empirical test of the three issues above, we mainly draw the following conclusions: Firstly, in the total sample, the involvement of non-controlling shareholders in board governance can effectively inhibit the probability of goodwill impairment, as well as the absolute and relative scale of goodwill impairment. Moreover, in the sample of non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in governance, with the improvement of involvement level, the probability and scale of goodwill impairment have been further suppressed. In the sample of non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in governance, we also find that non-controlling shareholders with institutional background have a significant improvement on the inhibition effect of goodwill impairment than that non-controlling shareholders without institutional background. Secondly, after we examine the overvaluation of the goodwill in initial measurement, we find that the overvaluation of goodwill in initial measurement caused by the type II agency problem and the information asymmetry problem, both of which have a significant positive correlation with the impairment of goodwill after the M&A. Moreover, the three characteristics of non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in governance can reduce the probability and scale of the overestimation of the fair value of initial measurement of goodwill caused by the type II agency problem and restrain the subsequent impairment of goodwill through the strengthening of supervision mechanism. However, the strengthening of information mechanism only reflects in the characteristic that non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in governance with institutional background. Thirdly, in the total sample and the sample of which the non-controlling shareholders do not involve in the governance, the more serious that overvaluation of the fair value of the goodwill initial measurement is, the higher that the positive excess return（short-term）will be given by the market. While in the sample of which the non-controlling shareholders involve in the board governance, there is no significant relationship between the overvaluation of the goodwill initial measurement and the short-term excess return. From the perspective of long-term return of the stock after the M&A, the higher the impairment of goodwill is, the higher the negative excess return will be given by the market; Moreover, whether non-controlling shareholders involve in governance or not, there is a significant negative correlation between goodwill impairment and long-term excess return in both groups. It is also found that in the total sample and the sample of which the non-controlling shareholders do not involve in governance, the short-term excess return and the long-term excess return show a significant reversal relationship; while in the sample of which the non-controlling shareholders involve in governance, the short-term excess return and the long-term excess return do not show a significant reversal relationship. Generally, the research on above issues not only enriches our understanding of the difference of board structure and governance efficiency, but also deepens our understanding of the induced factors of goodwill impairment, and the disclosure of economic consequences helps us to understand the rational and irrational response of investors to goodwill accounting information, as well as the relationship between short-term excess return and long-term excess return of the stock. In addition, the investigation of the phenomenon that non-controlling shareholders’ involvement in the governance and the discovery that controlling shareholders grab the private benefits by using the overvaluation of goodwill recognized in M&A will also help us to expand our research in related fields in the future.
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