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论文编号：	11945
作者编号：	1120140811
上传时间：	2020/9/15 13:51:52
中文题目：	风险资本联合投资、内部结构与并购退出收益
英文题目：	Venture Capital Syndication, Internal Structure and M&A Return
指导老师：	黄福广
中文关键字：	风险资本；联合投资；并购退出；内部结构；退出收益
英文关键字：	venture capital; syndication; M&A; internal structure; eixt return
中文摘要：	本文考察风险资本的联合投资策略对并购退出收益的影响，试图研究构成联合投资的内部结构和外部环境对联合投资成员合作与竞争关系的影响。研究结论表明，当联合投资的内部结构有利于成员合作，或能限制竞争时，联合投资策略能够带来更好的投资绩效。而外部环境的变化则会对联合投资内部结构与并购退出收益之间的关系产生调节作用。对联合投资内部结构和外部环境的研究有助于更加深入地理解风险资本如何进行联合投资能够获得更好的投资绩效。 利用手工搜集的我国2009-2018年1080个风险资本并购退出案例为样本，检验了联合投资策略对并购退出收益的影响，并从风险资本在联合投资时形成的内部结构以及外部环境研究了联合投资影响并购退出收益的机制。本文从联合投资成员构成、内部治理机制、成员地位考察内部结构，将外部环境分为宏观经济不确定性和风险资本行业发展周期。除使用IRR，还引入考虑市场风险的PME衡量投资收益，通过OLS模型、QR模型检验假设，并做进一步的分析以得到稳健可靠的研究结果。 主要研究结论包括：第一，采用联合投资策略的风险资本在并购退出时获得的收益显著更低。采用联合投资策略的风险资本在并购退出时的PME平均为24.39%，而单独投资风险资本则达到84.23%。且这一结论不受融资阶段、地域、行业和投资期限的影响。使用QR模型对四分位点检验发现在条件分位点上，联合投资与单独投资的收益差距小于均值处差异，而且在获得高收益上，联合投资与单独投资的差距高于在中低收益上的差距。进一步研究发现，联合投资并购退出收益更低并不是因为风险投资机构的投资金额更大或者被投资企业经营业绩更差，而是由于联合投资支持的企业并购价格更低导致。第二，构成联合投资的成员在经验、地域和类型上的异质性加大了沟通和交易成本，容易产生“搭便车”，也更容易对并购退出价格等退出决策产生分歧，最终影响并购退出收益。第三，风险资本在联合投资时形成的正式契约治理和非正式的关系治理，能够规范联合投资成员的行为，增加成员之间的信任，从而使联合投资更能达成一致意见，有利于提升并购退出收益。第四，作为领投的风险资本在联合投资中承担了更多风险，付出了更多成本，也获得了更优势投资位，从而在并购退出时获得更多补偿，退出收益更高。最后，并购退出时的外部环境变化会改变联合投资成员的激励，改变他们对未来的预期和投资行为，从而对联合投资成员异质性与并购退出收益之间的关系产生调节作用。 主要创新点包括：第一，首次使用并购退出样本研究联合投资策略对风险资本投资收益的影响，将联合投资策略发挥作用的机制延伸到退出阶段。联合投资不仅在投资前筛选和投资后管理时发挥作用，在投资退出阶段，联合投资策略也会改变风险资本的预期和行为，从而影响投资绩效。第二，本文从构成联合投资的成员特质，联合投资中的治理机制和在联合投资中的地位等三个维度，全面深入地研究了风险资本如何进行联合投资更有利于降低代理成本，促进联合投资成员的合作，从而加深了对风险资本联合投资结构的研究。第三，本文首次引入公开市场当量（PME）测量风险资本的投资收益，发现考虑市场风险后，风险资本的投资收益降低，联合投资与单独投资的收益差距变小。
英文摘要：	This dissertation examines the impact of venture capital's(VC’s) syndication strategy on the return of M&A, and attempts to study the impact of the internal structure and external environment of syndication on the cooperation and competition among syndication members. The conclusions show that syndication can bring better performance when the internal structure is favorable for cooperation instead of competition. The change of external environment will moderate the relationship between the internal structure and the return of M&A. The research on the internal structure and external environment of syndication is helpful to better understand how VC can achieve better investment performance. Using a sample of 1080 M&A exit cases of VC from 2009 to 2018 in China, this dissertation examines the impact of syndication strategy on M&A exit return, and studies the mechanism of the syndication from the internal structure and external environment. On the basis of the commonly used IRR, I introduce PME which adjusted by market risk. Based on the OLS model and Qr Model, we test the hypothesis and do further analysis to get robust and reliable results. The main conclusions of this dissertation are as follows: First, VCs using syndication strategy get lower returns when exit through M&A. The average PME of VCs who do syndicated investments is 24.39% , while that of standalone investment is 84.23% . And this conclusion is not affected by the stage of financing, region, industry and investment period. Using QR-model, I find that, at the conditional quartile, the income gap between syndicated and standalone investment is less than at the average, and that the difference is higher when obtaining high income compared to obtaining low and medium return. Further research shows that the lower M&A return of syndication is not due to larger investment or the worse operating performance of invested enterprises, but due to the lower merger price. Second, the heterogeneity in experience, region and type of the members increase the communication and transaction costs, and make it easy to "free-ride" , affecing the M&A performance at last. Thirdly, the formal contractual governance and informal relationship governance formed by VCs in syndication can regulate the behavior of syndication members, increase trust among them, and make syndication more consensual, help to enhance the M&A performance. Fourth, the leading VC bears more risks, pay more costs, but also to obtain a more advantageous investment level, so get more compensation when M&A. Finally,the change of the external environment will change the incentive VCs, and also change their expectation and behavior in the future, and thus moderate the relationship between the heterogeneity of syndication members and the performance of M&A exit. The main contributions are as follows: Firstly, for the first time, we use the M&A exit sample to study the impact of syndication on the investment return, extending the mechanism of syndication to exit stage. Snydication not only plays a role in screening and post-investment, but also changes the expectation and behavior of VC when exit. Secondly, this dissertation studys the traits of members, the governance mechanism and the position of VC, and deeply studies how thees structure reduce agency cost and promote cooperation, thus deepening the research on syndication structure. Finally, this dissertation introduces the Public Market Equivalent (PME) to measure the return for the first time. I find that after considering the market risk, the return decreases, and the gap between syndicated and standalone investment becomes smaller.
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