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论文编号：	11940
作者编号：	1120140790
上传时间：	2020/9/15 6:43:42
中文题目：	多个大股东对企业风险承担的影响研究：机制与经济后果
英文题目：	Research on the Influence of Multiple Blockholders on Corporate Risk-taking：Mechanism and Economic Consequences
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	多个大股东；企业风险承担；股东身份；治理效应
英文关键字：	multiple blockholders; corporate risk-taking; identity of blockholder; governance effects
中文摘要：	多个大股东的治理效用问题成为近年来国内外学者关注的热点，现有研究认为多个大股东对公司绩效、价值和融资成本等有积极作用，但对于作为公司重要经营和投资战略的风险承担行为，相关文献较少予以关注。而企业风险承担水平直接关系到企业的创新投入和未来收益，提高我国企业整体风险承担水平就是为中国经济和科技发展注入持续的活力和动能。目前有学者研究认为多个大股东并存缓解了控股股东与小股东间的代理问题，能够正向影响企业风险承担水平；也有学者指出其他大股东对控股股东可能存在“过度监督”，使控股股东更不愿进行高不确定性的决策从而降低了公司风险承担水平；由此可见，多个大股东如何影响公司风险承担倾向还有待探讨。特别是，在逐步深化国有企业混合所有制改革过程中，国家股东控股、非控股大股东为民营性质或其他不同身份性质的多个大股东公司越来越多的情况下，多个大股东对企业风险承担的影响作用研究更加重要。鉴于此，本文基于混合所有制改革的制度背景，从理论和经验证据上深入探讨了多个大股东对企业风险承担的影响、机制和经济后果。具体回答了以下几个问题。 （1）国有上市公司多个大股东并存是否有利于提高企业的风险承担？多个大股东存在下的促进竞争效应、联盟效应和折衷效应，哪一种效应发挥了主导作用？（2）多个大股东发挥治理效应的具体机制是什么？在中国情境下，是通过“发声” 还是“退出”机制？多个大股东影响企业风险承担的具体公司政策路径是什么？（3）不同身份股东带来的股东间关系不同会导致多个大股东怎样不同的治理效应？导致差异性效应的具体机制是什么？（4）基于SCP模型，在多个大股东公司中风险承担的提高是否会带来公司资本配置效率的提升？ 本文以2008-2017年我国A股国有上市公司为研究样本，通过对上述问题的理论分析和实证检验，本文得到的主要研究结论如下： 第一，基于国有上市公司全样本检验，多个大股东公司比仅有单一控股股东的公司有显著更高的风险承担水平，这符合本文所提出的多个大股东的促进竞争效应。 第二，通过影响机制检验，本文发现多个大股东在风险承担方向上的治理作用主要是通过“发声”机制来实现的，而“退出”机制在中国特殊的制度背景和资本市场的低定价效率下并不能有效的发挥作用。在影响的具体路径上，更多的并购决策、更高的经营集中度是多个大股东正向影响企业风险承担水平的具体渠道。 第三，引入民营性质非控股大股东的国有上市公司相比于单一国有控股股东公司有更低的风险承担水平，国有控股股东与民营非控股大股东间的相互作用更多地表现为折衷效应；而引入国有非控股大股东能够发挥促进竞争效应而正向影响风险承担，国有股东之间的竞争关系也会起到提高风险承担的“鲶鱼效应”。通过作用机制检验，本文排除了联盟关系导致风险承担下降的效应，研究发现股东间冲突和融资约束是存在民营非控股大股东时多个大股东公司风险承担水平更低的可能原因。 第四，通过资本配置效率的经济后果检验，发现相对于仅有单一控股股东的公司，多个大股东公司有更高的资本配置效率。细分非控股大股东身份后，发现国有非控股大股东的治理作用的发挥能够正向调节风险承担与公司资本配置效率的关系；而当公司存在民营性质的非控股大股东时，会负向调节公司风险承担对资本配置效率的影响。该结论为风险承担的经济后果以及在不同股权结构下差异化的经济后果提供了新的实证证据。 本研究的创新点主要体现在以下几个方面： 第一，本文拓展性的分析了中国情境下大股东治理的具体作用机制，并创新性的提出了多个大股东间的促进竞争效应，拓展了多个大股东的相关研究。同时，更加全面地分析了多个大股东如何影响企业风险承担，也有助于深入理解企业风险承担决策的影响因素。 第二，本文拓展了股东关系的相关研究。股东身份以及由此决定的股东间关系是多个大股东治理作用发挥与否的约束项，本文拓展性地讨论了公司内同时存在相同或不同性质身份的大股东时非控股大股东治理作用的差异。 第三，本文揭示了民营大股东的存在负向影响风险承担的股东冲突机制和融资约束机制。近年来有关多个大股东治理作用的讨论形成了丰富的研究成果，但鲜有文献关注大股东间冲突的影响效应，本文研究补充了这一方向上的实证证据，并由此提出在深化国企混改的过程中应进一步重视股东偏好不相容的冲突问题。
英文摘要：	The question on governance effects of the multiple blockholders has become the hotpot which raise attention from scholars at home and abroad recently. The existing studies believe that multiple blockholders have a positive effect on corporate performance, corporate value and financing cost, but less attention has been paid to the corporate risk-taking as which is an important business and investment strategy of a company. The level of corporate risk-taking is directly related to the corporate innovation investment and earnings for the future. To improve the overall risk-taking level of Chinese enterprises is to inject sustained vitality and dynamism into the development of economy、science and technology. Some scholars believe that the coexistence of multiple blockholders can alleviate the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, which can positively affect the level of risk-taking. Some scholars also pointed out that other blockholders may have "excessive supervision" over the controlling shareholders, which makes the controlling shareholders less willing to take high uncertainty investment projects. Therefore, it remains to be discussed about how multiple blockholders affect the corporate risk-taking. In particular, in the process of further mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, it is more important to study the influence of multiple blockholders on risk-taking under the circumstance that more and more firms has formed the structure of the state dominant shareholder accompanied with private non-controlling blockholders or other blockholders with different identities. Given this, this paper, based on the background of mixed-ownership reform, deeply discusses the specific impact of multiple blockholders on corporate risk-taking and the influence mechanism from the theoretical and empirical evidence. The following questions are specifically studied. (1) Whether the coexistence of multiple blockholders in state-owned listed companies is conducive to improve the corporate risk taking? Which effect plays a leading role, procompetitive effect、coalition effect or compromise effect? (2) What is the specific mechanism in Chinese context，through "voice" or "exit"? What is the specific corporate policy approach? (3) How different governance effects will be caused by different identities of blockholders? What are the specific mechanisms that lead to the difference effect? (4) Will the increasing of risk-taking in multiple blockholders corporate improve the capital allocation efficiency? Using a sample of A－share listed State-owned firms in China from 2008 to 2017, and through theoretical analysis and empirical test on the above issues, the main research conclusions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, Compared with the presence of a single controlling shareholder，multiple blockholders can improve corporate risk-taking，which is in line with the Procompetitive Effects of multiple blockholders proposed in this paper. Secondly, through the mechanism test, it is found that the governance effects of multiple blockholders is mainly realized through "voice", while the "exit" mechanism cannot play an effective role under the special institutional background of China and the low pricing efficiency of the capital market. In the specific path test, more M&A decisions and higher business concentration are the specific channels. Thirdly, the existence of private blockholders have negative effect on corporate risk-taking，and the interaction between state-owned controlling shareholder and private non-controlling blockholders is more consistent with Compromise Effects. On the contrary，the existence of stata non-controlling blockholders can promote corporate risk-taking, that means state blockholders are also in a competitive relationship that can bring about "Catfish Effect". Through mechanism test，this paper finds that the blockholders conflicts and financing constraints are the possible reasons for the lower corporate risk-taking with the existence of private blockholders. Fourthly, through the test of economic consequences of capital allocation efficiency, it is found that compared with companies with only a single controlling shareholder, companies with multiple blockholders have higher capital allocation efficiency. After subdividing the identity of other blockholders, it is found that the governance role of state blockholders can positively moderate the relationship between risk-taking and capital allocation efficiency and private non-controlling blockholders will negatively moderate the impact of corporate risk-taking on capital allocation efficiency. This conclusion provides new empirical evidence for the economic consequences of risk-taking and differentiation under different ownership structures. The main innovation points of this paper maybe reflected in the following aspect. Firstly, this paper makes an extensive analysis about the specific mechanism of blockholders governance in the context of China, creatively proposes the Procompetitive Effects among multiple blockholders, and expands the research on multiple blockholders. At the same time, this paper makes a more comprehensive analysis of how multiple shareholders affect corporate risk-taking. Secondly, this paper expands the research of shareholder’s relationship. The identity of the blockholders and the relationship count on it are the constraints on the governance of multiple blockholders. This paper proposes a further discussion of the non-controlling blockholders’ different governance effect when a company with the same or different identity of blockholders. Thirdly, this paper reveals the shareholder conflict mechanism and financing constraint mechanism that how the presence of private blockholders negatively affect risk-taking. Few literatures have focused on the impact of conflicts among blockholders. This paper has supplemented empirical evidence in this direction, and thus proposed that in the process of mix-ownership reform, more attention should be paid to the conflict of incompatible shareholder preferences.
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