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论文编号：	11888
作者编号：	2120182944
上传时间：	2020/6/23 16:04:23
中文题目：	CEO创新激励、风险偏好与企业创新
英文题目：	CEO Innovation Incentive, Risk Appetite and Enterprise Innovation
指导老师：	程新生
中文关键字：	创新激励；风险偏好；企业创新
英文关键字：	innovation incentive; risk appetite; enterprise innovation
中文摘要：	创新是企业取得竞争优势的主要途径，企业想要实现创新升级或者获取市场竞争力，CEO发挥着核心的创新投资决策地位。企业创新是一个周期长、风险大、不确定性强的复杂过程，需要CEO花费更多的私人成本、承担更高的失败风险，因而CEO往往缺少内在的创新动力。因此，如何对CEO进行创新激励成为企业实现创新的关键因素之一。 本文围绕CEO创新激励与企业创新，以2012年-2018年我国A股上市公司作为研究对象，引入CEO风险偏好，从以收益最大化效应为主的提高CEO创新管理收益和以风险兜底效应为主的降低CEO创新失败损失这两种激励路径出发，探究不同的创新激励方式对企业创新影响的差异性。研究结果表明：提高CEO创新管理收益与降低CEO创新失败损失都能促进企业创新，但随着CEO风险偏好度的变化这两种促进作用呈现不同方向变动。对于低风险偏好度的CEO来说，对其进行降低创新失败损失的激励更有效，而对于高风险偏好度的CEO来说，提高其创新管理收益更能促进企业创新。进一步检验发现，提高CEO创新管理收益与降低CEO创新失败损失具有交互作用，能够共同促进企业创新，但这种交互作用仅在CEO低风险偏好时存在。 本文的研究具体分析了不同CEO创新激励方式的有效性，补充了相关理论与实证研究。CEO创新激励与企业创新的关系对企业创新激励政策的制定与实施具有一定的指导意义。以往的学者对降低CEO创新失败损失与企业创新之间的关系研究较少，结合风险偏好对不同创新激励方式经济效果的对比研究尚属空白，因此，本文的研究结论是该研究领域的一个补充，对后人的研究具有一定的借鉴意义。
英文摘要：	Innovation is the main way for an enterprise to obtain competitive advantages. If an enterprise wants to achieve innovation upgrade or gain market competitiveness, the CEO plays a core role in innovation investment decision-making. Enterprise innovation is a complicated process with long cycle, high risk, and high uncertainty. It requires the CEO to spend more private costs and bear higher risk of failure thus the CEO often lacks inherent motivation for innovation. Therefore, how to motivate the CEO to innovate has become one of the key factors for enterprise innovation. This article focuses on CEO innovation incentives and corporate innovation, taking China's A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2018 as research objects, introducing the CEO's risk appetite from improving the return of CEO innovation management based on the benefit maximization effect and focusing on the risk pocket effect Starting from the two incentive paths of reducing CEO innovation failure losses, we explore the differences in the impact of different innovation incentive methods on corporate innovation. The research results show that both the improvement of CEO innovation management income and the reduction of CEO innovation failure loss can promote the innovation of enterprises, but with the change of CEO risk appetite, the two promotion effects show different directions. For CEOs with a low risk appetite, it is more effective to provide incentives to reduce the loss of innovation failure. For CEOs with a high risk appetite, improving their innovation management income can promote innovation of the company. Further inspection found that increasing CEO innovation management benefits and reducing CEO innovation failure losses have interactions, which can jointly promote enterprise innovation, such interactions only exist when CEOs have low risk appetite. The research in this article specifically analyzes the impact of different CEO innovation incentives on corporate innovation, supplementing the relevant theoretical and empirical research. The relationship between CEO innovation incentives and corporate innovation has certain guiding significance for the formulation and implementation of corporate innovation incentive policies. Previous scholars have rarely done research on the relationship between reducing the loss of CEO innovation failure and corporate innovation. The comparative study of the economic effects of different innovation incentives combined with risk preference is still blank. Therefore, the research conclusion of this paper is a supplement to this research field. And it has a certain significance for the study of future generations' research.
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