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论文编号：	11864
作者编号：	1120160827
上传时间：	2020/6/23 9:53:50
中文题目：	股东网络对企业绩效的影响机制研究———基于代理问题与投资决策的双重视角
英文题目：	The Influence Mechanisms of Shareholder Network on Enterprise Performance—From the Dual Perspective of Agency Problem and Investment Decision
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	两类代理问题；投资决策；股东网络；股东异质性；企业绩效
英文关键字：	two types of agency problems; investment decision; shareholder network; shareholder heterogeneity; corporate performance
中文摘要：	当前中国公司治理实践面临着新挑战，股东的公司治理角色成为关注焦点。新时期，中国经济领域的重大改革正有序推进，一方面，国有企业混合所有制改革向纵深推进，实现不同所有制主体从“混”到“改”；另一方面，去杠杆、防风险等政策指引不断鼓励企业扩大直接融资比例，且为促进企业股权融资建立了更为完善的资本市场体系与股权融资渠道，进一步推进金融市场供给侧结构性改革。伴随着上述改革与政策实践的落地，股东关系、股东积极主义、多个大股东并存以及股东异质性等问题逐渐成为关注热点，股东在公司治理与公司决策中承担着越来越重要的角色与职能。股权结构的分散化使得股权集中向多个大股东并存进行转变，单一控股股东治理向多个大股东协同的股东网络治理进行转变。同时，混合所有制改革带来的股东多元化导致了股东行为偏好与利益诉求的异质性冲突，对股东行为与股东权益的协调机制产生了强烈需求。然而反观已有研究，以股权结构研究范式为核心的理论探索始终徘徊于两类代理问题此消彼长的困境之中，最优的股权结构也仅仅是对两类代理成本进行的艰难权衡；同时，股权结构研究范式仅仅揭示了股东的“经济人”属性，关注焦点集中于控制权配置与监督制衡，因此其难以为股东协调与股东互动提供机制与结构支撑，从而也难以促进混合所有制的深度融合以及股权投资的相互信任与合作。综上可见，未来的公司治理需要构建有效的治理机制与治理结构，在发展混合所有制经济以及推动股权融资的过程中促进多元股东互动、协调股东利益冲突、发挥多元股东资源优势并同时缓解两类代理问题。基于上述现实背景与改革实践，在股权结构愈加分散的情境下，控股股东治理向多个大股东协同治理进行转变。由于股东关系及其网络结构为股东的互动、协调、制衡以及合作提供了重要渠道，因此其在公司治理中发挥出了愈加重要的治理功能，重新形塑了股东的权力地位与信息地位，最终影响公司的两类代理成本以及决策质量。通过将社会网络理论与公司治理和股权结构研究相融合，探索构建股东网络分析范式，试图验证股东网络能否以及如何对两类代理问题和投资决策发挥出重要的监督制衡效应与支持效应，从而在上述重大经济改革实践中有效缓解两类代理问题并促进股东互动与协调，缓解股东之间权力与信息的不对称，积累信任资源并进一步发挥多元股东的资源优势。可见相较于股权结构研究范式，股东网络分析范式关注股东的“社会人”角色、情感与资源交换以及利益协调与合作等，探索股东关系资源对股东权力地位和信息地位的重塑，揭示股东网络的资源配置效应以及社会资本效应的治理功能与支持功能，从而对已有的股权结构研究范式形成了有益的理论补充，并为破解两类代理问题以及挖掘企业竞争优势提供了新的理论视角和实践路径，推动了混合所有制改革从“形混”向“神合”的纵深推进，也为企业扩大股权融资提供动力。基于委托——代理理论、社会网络理论以及资源基础理论，以2011年——2017年中国沪、深两市A股上市公司为研究样本，运用规范分析方法、社会网络分析方法以及回归分析方法建立中国上市公司的股东网络结构模型、网络研究理论模型与实证模型，探索中国上市公司股东网络对企业两类代理问题以及企业投资决策的治理效应与支持效应。最终得到如下研究结论：第一，股东网络能够有效抑制两类代理问题，降低企业代理成本。首先，股东网络通过信息资源的配置效应缓解了股东与管理层之间的信息不对称，同时其赋予股东的社会资本效应与网络地位效应使得管理层的机会主义行为面临着更高的成本约束与声誉约束。因此股东网络能够改善股东的信息资源基础并提升监督动机与能力，对管理层道德风险行为具有强大的“声誉威胁”效应，进而缓解了公司第一类代理问题。其次，股东网络的信息配置与传递效应提升了核心位置非控股股东的信息地位，其不仅能够降低非控股股东搜集有关控股股东私利行为信息的成本，还能拓展非控股股东的信息获取渠道，提升信息控制能力；同时，股东网络为非控股股东开展协同制衡提供了治理结构基础，增加了控股股东私利行为的实施成本。上述作用机制使得信息资源与权力配置不再唯一取决于股权结构，改善了非控股股东的信息地位与权力地位，进而有效抑制了第二类代理问题的发生。第二，股东网络能够显著改善企业投资决策质量与决策偏好，提升企业的投资效率和风险承担水平。其一，股东关系作为企业的一项重要资源基础，能够发挥信息交换功能进而影响企业的信息资源基础。同时，股东关系不仅能够帮助企业缓解投资决策中的信息约束，还能够为企业投资活动提供融资渠道，破解企业投资面临的资金困境。此外，股东网络的信息效应有助于企业遴选优秀的管理层人员，缓解经理人市场中的逆向选择问题，并抑制管理层在投资决策中的道德风险行为。上述支持效应表明股东网络将对企业投资效率具有积极影响。其二，股东网络能够缓解企业投资决策中面临的信息约束，有助于管理层或董事会等决策机构克服市场中的不确定性，识别和捕捉优质的投资机会、行业信息以及政策趋势等，从而降低了风险承担的潜在成本；同时，基于股东网络的信息传递效应，一旦核心位置股东识别了管理层的风险承担行为，管理层将会获得更高的声誉激励与市场认同，从而刺激了管理层的风险承担动机。此外，股东网络促进了企业间的合作行为，推动了企业间的风险共担，有利于企业降低投资活动面临的决策风险与潜在损失。综上可见，股东网络对企业风险承担也发挥了显著的促进效应。第三，从股权结构、股东身份以及内部治理结构的视角进一步探索了股东网络监督效应、制衡效应与支持效应的约束条件。首先，在股东网络对两类代理成本的抑制效应中，股权集中度强化了股东网络对第一类代理问题的监督效应，却显著弱化了股东网络对第二类代理问题的制衡效应。而考虑股权结构的性质特征后，发现不同身份性质的股东具有差异化的调节效应。政治驱动型股东持股以及财务驱动型股东持股均显著强化了股东网络对两类代理问题的抑制效应，而战略驱动型股东持股和社会驱动型股东持股均对股东网络的监督与制衡效应不存在显著影响。其次，就股东网络对投资决策的支持效应来看，政治驱动型股东持股不能显著影响股东网络对投资效率的促进效应，但却显著抑制了股东网络对风险承担的促进效应；财务驱动型股东持股和战略驱动型股东持股在企业投资决策过程中发挥了重要的积极作用，能够显著提升股东网络对投资效率和风险承担的支持效应；社会驱动型股东持股对股东网络的支持效应均不具有显著影响，既难以提升股东网络对投资效率的促进效应，也难以强化股东网络对企业风险承担的支持功能。除股东身份外，董秘人力资本状况对股东网络的支持效应也具有影响效应。研究结论表明，董秘人力资本不能显著影响股东网络对投资效率的促进作用，但能够显著强化股东网络对风险承担的促进效应。第四，对股东网络影响企业绩效的作用路径进行了检验。在监督制衡的作用路径中，股东网络通过降低两类代理成本提升了企业绩效；而在决策支持的作用路劲中，股东网络通过促进投资效率提升了企业绩效，表明投资效率发挥了显著的中介效应；但风险承担的中介效应检验并未得到数据支持，表明股东网络不能通过提升风险承担促进企业绩效的提升。相较于已有研究，上述理论探索具有以下可能的创新意义：首先，本文为股东参与公司治理并缓解两类代理问题提供了新的理论视角。其次，本文为企业投资决策的绩效差异以及建立竞争优势提供了新的理论解释，揭示了股东网络对投资效率和风险承担的影响效应，从而更为完整地揭示了股东网络对投资决策的支持效应。最后，本文还进一步考虑了股东异质性和股东身份类型对股东网络监督效应、制衡效应和支持效应的影响，揭示了不同身份股东的行为动机与行为能力差异，从而进一步影响了企业间差异化的代理成本以及投资决策质量。 同时，本研究对混合所有制改革以及防风险、去杠杆政策背景下的公司治理实践具有现实指导意义。首先，研究结论证实股东网络能够发挥积极的监督、制衡与支持效应，因此企业能够在一定程度上通过优化股东网络结构降低两类代理成本，同时也能促进企业投资效率与风险承担水平的提升；此外，股权结构、股东身份与内部治理结构对股东网络作用机制发挥着显著调节作用。上述研究结论为企业优化产权结构和公司治理机制提供了一条新的可行路径，有助于进一步提升中国公司的治理水平与竞争优势。其次，本研究阐明股东网络作为一项重要的治理机制促进了混合所有制改革从“混”到“合”、从交叉持股到“精神融合”，也为企业扩大股权融资增添动力。股东网络促进了多元股东的信息透明与权力平衡，进而推动多元股东之间的利益协调，有利于抑制控股股东的私利行为，改善中小股东的权力与信息地位；同时股东网络也为股东之间搭建了沟通渠道，促进股东之间信任资源的积累，有利于多元股东的协同与合作，强化股东的治理监督与决策支持。此外，利用股东网络能够快速捕捉资本市场的信息流动并开展重要信息节点管控，提升资本市场监管效率，进一步强化了外部治理机制。
英文摘要：	Nowadays, Chinese corporate governance is facing new challenges, the role of shareholders has become the concerning focus of corporate governance. In the new period of China, economic reforms progress smoothly. On the one hand, the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises has been advanced in depth, promoting different ownership entities mixture grow into reform of ownership and governance. On the other hand, “deleveraging” and “risk prevention” policies encourage enterprises to expand the proportion of “direct financing”, and establish a more complete capital market system and financing channels to promote equity financing of enterprises, advacing the structural reform of financial market supply-side.Under the implementation of the above-mentioned reforms and policies, share ownership diversification, shareholder activism, the coexistence of multiple blockholders, and shareholder "heterogeneity" have gradually become hot topics in society.The above-mentioned new changes in corporate governance indicate that shareholders are acting as more and more important roles and functions in corporate governance and corporate decision-making. The decentralization of ownership structure lead to the transformation form ownership concentration to coexistence of multiple blockholders, and the transformation form “Controlling shareholder governance” to “Shareholder network governance" that coordinated by multiple blockholders. At the same time, mixed ownership and shareholder diversification lead to heterogeneous conflicts of shareholder behavior preferences and interests, which has created a strong demand for a coordination mechanism of shareholder behavior and intrests. However, reffering to existing research, most theoretical explorations concentrated on the ownership structure researching paradigm, hovering in the dilemmas of two types of agency problems, and the "optimal ownership structure" is only the equilibrium of two types of agency costs. At the same time, ownership structure researching paradigm only reveals the "economic logic" of shareholders, and focusing on the allocation of control rights and the balance of powers. Therefore, it is difficult to provide mechanisms to resolve shareholder coordination and shareholder interaction, and the deep integration of mixed ownership is also difficult to achieve. In conclusion, researchers need to build effective governance mechanisms and governance structures to promote shareholder interaction, coordination of intrests conflicts, taking resource advantages of multiple shareholder, and restrain two types of types of agency problems. Based on the realistic background and reform practices, under the background of the ownership structure decentralization, the “controlling shareholder governance” has shifted to “multiple blockholder governance”. As the shareholder relationships and its network structure provide important channels for shareholder interaction, coordination, power balances and cooperation, it has played a more important governance function in corporate governance, reshaping the power and information status of shareholders, affecting two types of agency costs and decision quality ultimately. Integrating social network theory with corporate governance and ownership structure research, exploring construction of “shareholder network researching paradigm”, and trying to verify whether and how the shareholder network affecting two types of agency problems and corporate decisions, then effectively alleviateing the two types of agency problems and promote shareholder interaction and coordination, balancing the power and information of shareholders, accumulating trust resources and further leverage the resource advantages of multiple shareholders. Comparing to the ownership structure researching paradigm, shareholder network researching paradigm focuses on the “society role” of shareholders, emotion and resource exchange, and interest coordination and cooperation, exploring the effect of shareholder relationship resources on shareholders' power and information status. That will help revealing the governance and support functions of shareholder netweork’s resource allocation effect and the social capital effect, then provide a useful theoretical supplement to the existing research of ownership structure and new theory path to alleviating two types of agency problems and exploiting the competitive advantages of enterprises. Finally, this perspective will not only promote the reform of mixed ownership from “equity mixture” to “mind mixture”, but also ehance the incentives of enterprises to expand equity financing. Based on the principal-agent theory, social network theory, and resource-based theory, taking A-shared listed companies of China as the research sample, using normative analysis methods, social network analysis methods, and regression analysis methods to build theoretical model and empirical model to explore the governance and supporting effects toward the two types of agency problems and corporate decision-making. We obtain the following research conclusions: First, the shareholder network can effectively curb the two types of agency problems and reduce corporate agency costs. First of all, shareholder network can relieve information asymmetry between shareholders and managers through the allocation of information resources. At the same time, its social capital effect make managers’ opportunistic behavior face higher cost and reputation constraints. So the shareholder network can improve the shareholder's information resource base and enhance the supervision motivation and ability, which has a strong "reputation threat" effect on the moral hazard of the management, thereby alleviating the first-class agency problem. Secondly, the information transmission effect of the shareholder network enhances the information status of non-controlling shareholders. Not only can it reduce the cost of collecting information about the controlling shareholder's private behavior, but it can also expand the information acquisition channels of non-controlling shareholders and improve their information controlling capabilities; Meanwhile, the shareholder network provides a structural basis for non-controlling shareholders to carry out coordinated supervision, and leads to higher cost of controlling shareholders to conceal private informations. Above-mentioned governance effect makes the allocation of information resources and power no longer depend solely on the ownership structure, makes non-controlling shareholders occupying a better information status and power status to suppress the second type of agency problems. Second, shareholder network can significantly improve the quality and preference of investment decisions, improving the investment efficiency and risk-taking level of enterprises. As an important resource base of an enterprise, shareholder relations carry an information exchange function and affect the information advantage of the enterprise. This resource-based effect can not only help companies overcoming the information constraints in investment decisions, but also provide financing channels for corporate investment activities and crack possible financial dilemma. At the same time, the information effect of shareholder networks can help companies selecting excellent managers to prevent the problem of "adverse selection" in the manager's market and curb the moral hazard behaviors of management. Therefore, the shareholder network can improve the investment efficiency of enterprises. Except that, shareholder network can alleviate the information constraints of corporates, help management or board of directors to overcome market uncertainty, identify and capture high-quality investment opportunities, industry information, and policy trends, reducing the potential cost of risk-taking; Meanwhile, based on the information transmission effect of the shareholder network, shareholders in core position will propagate the risk-taking behavior of the management, and the management will obtain higher reputational incentives and market recognition, thus stimulating the management motivation for risk-taking. In addition, the shareholder network promotes cooperative behavior among enterprises, which promotes risk sharing among enterprises and helps enterprises reduce decision-making risks and potential losses of investment activities. In summary, the shareholder network has also played a significant role in promoting corporate risk-taking. Thirdly, based on the perspective of ownership structure, we explore shareholder identity and internal governance structure constrained effect on shareholder network’s governance effects and support effects. First of all, referring to the shareholder network's suppression effect on the two types of agency costs, ownership concentration strengthens the shareholder network's suppression effect on the first type of agency problems, but significantly weakens the shareholder network's suppression effect on the second type of agency problems. After considering the nature of the ownership, it is found that shareholders with different identity properties have different regulatory effects. Political-driven shareholders and financial-driven shareholders have significantly strengthened the inhibitory effects of shareholder networks on the two types of agency issues, while strategic-driven shareholders and social-driven shareholders have no significant impact on governance effects of shareholder networks. Secondly, from the perspective of the support effect of shareholder networks on corporate decision-making, Political-driven shareholders can’t significantly affect the promotion effect of shareholder networks on investment efficiency, but significantly inhibit the promotion effect of shareholder networks on risk-taking; Financial-driven shareholders and strategic-driven shareholders play an important positive role in the investment decision-making process of the enterprise, which can significantly improve the support effect of shareholder network on investment efficiency and risk-taking; Social-driven shareholders have no significant impact on the promotion effect of shareholder network on investment efficiency and risk-taking. In addition to shareholder identities, the corporate secretary human capital also have an impact on the support effect of the shareholder network. The conclusion of this study shows that the human capital of corporate secretary cannot significantly influence the promotion effect of the shareholder network on investment efficiency, but it can significantly strengthen the promotion effect of the shareholder network on risk taking. Finally, we examine how shareholder networks affect corporate performance. In the path of supervisory effect, the shareholder network improves corporate performance by reducing the two types of agency costs; While in the path of decision support effect, the shareholder network improves corporate performance by promoting risk-taking, indicating that risk-taking plays a significant intermediate role between shareholder network and corporate performance; However, the mediating effect of investment efficiency has not been supported by data test, indicating that shareholder networks cannot promote corporate performance through improving investment efficiency. Compared with the existing research, the above theoretical exploration has the following possible innovations: First, we provide a new theoretical perspective for the study of shareholder intervention in corporate governance and decision-making, providing a new explanatory variable for the study of shareholder behavior and shareholder governance. Second, putting information allocation as a researching point into analysis framework, expanding the research of information asymmetry in corporate governance, and responds the concerns of two types of agency issues on information asymmetry. Finally, the structural roots of the shareholder's “social capital” were further explored, realizing the fusion of the ownership structure and the shareholder network, and the “economic person” attribute and the “social person” attribute of shareholders were combined to reveal shareholder behavior logic more completely. In addition, our study has practical instruction significance for corporate governance practices under the background of mixed ownership reform and equity financing expansion policies. First, our conclusions confirm that the shareholder network can play a positive governance effect and support effect, so the company can reduce the two types of agency costs by optimizing the shareholder network structures, and it also can promote the corporate investment efficiency and risk-taking level; Ownership structure, shareholder identity and internal governance structure play a significant moderating effect on the shareholder network governance and supporting effect. Above researching conclusions provide a new feasible path for enterprises to optimize the ownership structure and corporate governance mechanism, improving governance performance and competitive advantage of Chinese companies. Secondly, this study clarifies that the shareholder network as an important governance mechanism promoting the reform of mixed ownership from “mixture” to “cooperation”, shifing from “cross-shareholding” to “spiritual integration”. Meanwhile, it also adds momentum to expand equity financing. Shareholder network promotes the information and power balance of the multiple shareholders, coordinating the interests of the multiple shareholders, and is conducive to suppressing the self-seeking behaviors of controlling shareholders and improving the power and information status of minority shareholders. Furthermore, shareholder network establishes the communication channels to promote the accumulation of trust among shareholders, which is beneficial to the coordination and cooperation of multiple shareholders to strengthens governance supervision and decision support. In addition, shareholder network can quickly capture the information flow of capital market and help carring out the supervision and control of important information nodes. Finally, the efficiency of capital market supervision may get improved and the external governance mechanism will be further strengthened.
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