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论文编号：	11854
作者编号：	2120182963
上传时间：	2020/6/23 9:13:25
中文题目：	信用评级、并购支付方式与并购溢价 ——基于中国上市公司的实证研究
英文题目：	Credit Ratings, Payment Methods and M & A Premiums: An Empirical Study Based on Chinese Listed Companies
指导老师：	覃家琦教授
中文关键字：	主体信用评级；支付方式；并购溢价
英文关键字：	credit ratings; payment methods; M&A premiums
中文摘要：	并购重组交易是我国资本市场上优化配置资源的关键方式。在我国深化改革实体经济的大背景下，并购重组一方面服务于我国国有企业改革，另一方面为民营企业发展创造新机会。因此，并购重组交易越来越成为我国资本市场运作和实体企业发展扩张中重要的一环。交易价格的确定则是市场经济下最为关注的问题之一，在我国企业的并购重组交易中，高溢价产生的并购泡沫饱受批评。随着我国债市市场和评级业的发展，信用评级为市场投资者提供越来越多的附加信息，一定程度上缓解了并购交易双方之间的信息不对称困境，促进企业价值评估更加接近其真实价值；另一方面信用评级等级下调的风险可有效约束管理层行为，促进主并方管理层优化经营投资决策，更谨慎地进行并购交易，进而对降低并购溢价起到积极作用。其次，我国上市公司并购重组交易中最为主流的支付方式为股票支付和现金支付，二者本质的差别也会对并购溢价产生显著不同的影响。从信号传递和风险补偿的角度来看，股票对价支付方式向目标方传递了主并企业价值被高估的信号，目标公司获得的主并方股权缺乏一定的流动性，为了补偿未来股价波动的风险，因此目标方会要求比现金支付方式下更高的并购溢价。基于此，论文研究了主并方主体信用评级和支付方式对并购溢价产生的影响。 论文以2009年至2018年我国沪深A股上市公司发生的并购交易数据为研究样本，梳理了学者关于信用评级、并购支付方式与并购溢价的研究成果，并结合信息不对称理论和信号传递理论分析了主并方信用评级、支付方式与并购溢价之间的关系，在此基础上提出本文的研究假设，利用中国上市公司的并购交易数据实证分析和检验了主体信用评级、并购支付方式对并购溢价的单独和交互作用。论文得出以下结论：当主并方存在主体信用评级时，目标企业愿意接受较低的并购溢价，且主并方的国有产权性质削弱了主并方信用评级对并购溢价的作用；其次，相较于现金支付方式，主并方采用股票支付方式时并购溢价率会更高。第三，主并方信用评级存在性会降低股票支付方式与并购溢价之间的正相关关系。最后论文针对实证研究结果围绕政府和企业提出了几点针对性建议。
英文摘要：	M&A is the key way to optimize the allocation of resources in China's capital market. In the context of deepening the reform of the real economy in China, M&A and restructuring, on the one hand, serve the reform of state-owned enterprises in China, on the other hand, create new opportunities for the development of private enterprises. Therefore, M&A has become more and more important in the operation of capital market and the development and expansion of real enterprises. The determination of transaction price is one of the most concerned problems in the market economy. In the merger and reorganization transaction of Chinese enterprises, the M&A bubble generated by the high premium has been criticized. With the development of national debt market and rating industry, credit rating provides more and more additional information for market investors, alleviates the information asymmetry dilemma between the two sides of M&A transactions to a certain extent, and promotes the enterprise value evaluation to be closer to its real value; On the other hand, the risk of credit rating downgrade can effectively restrain the behavior of the management, promote the management to optimize investment decision-making, and conduct M&A transactions more cautiously, thus playing a positive role in reducing the M&A premium. Secondly, stock payment and cash payment are the most popular payment methods in the M&A transactions of Listed Companies in China. The essential difference between them will also have a significant impact on the M&A premium. From the point of view of signal transmission and risk compensation, the stock consideration payment mode transmits the signal that the value of the acquirer is overvalued to the target. The acquirer’s equity acquired by the target company lacks certain liquidity. In order to compensate for the risk of future stock price fluctuation, the target will require a higher merger premium than that under the cash payment mode. Based on this, this article studies the impact of credit ratings and M&A payment methods on the M&A premium. Based on the data of M & A transactions of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2009-2018, this paper combs the research results of scholars on credit rating, M&A payment method and M&A premium, and analyzes the relationship between credit rating, payment method and M&A premium in combination with information asymmetry theory and signal transmission theory, and then puts forward the research hypothesis of this paper. This paper uses the data of M&A transactions of Chinese listed companies to analyze and test the independent and interactive effects of credit rating and M&A payment mode on M&A premium. The paper draws the following conclusions: when the acquirer has credit rating, the target enterprise is willing to accept a lower M&A premium, and the nature of the state-owned property rights of the acquirer weakens the effect of credit rating on the M&A premium; secondly, compared with cash payment, the M&A premium rate will be higher when the acquirer adopts stock payment. Thirdly, credit rating will reduce the positive correlation between stock payment and M&A premium. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions for the empirical research results around the government and enterprises.
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