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论文编号：	11843
作者编号：	2120182968
上传时间：	2020/6/22 18:11:24
中文题目：	企业绩效、CEO权力与高管离职关系研究
英文题目：	Research on the Relationship between Corporate Performance, CEO Power and Executive Turnover
指导老师：	牛芳
中文关键字：	高管离职；高管团队；企业绩效；CEO权力
英文关键字：	executive turnover；executive team；corporate performance；CEO power
中文摘要：	当代企业两权分离下的委托代理制度，使得高管团队成为维持企业稳定与发展的重点，因此，作为企业经营管理的核心，高管团队的稳定性至关重要，而高管成员的离职必然会引发企业经营决策的变动，对企业发展和股东价值不利。创业板市场独特的“三高”现象和高管离职潮的频发，使得创业板市场离职研究受到学者的关注，一种观点认为高管离职潮是由于“三高”现象带来的股票价值暴涨，使得高管通过离职的方式出售股票以锁定收益，但也有学者发现离职的高管不全为持股高管，因此套现这一猜想就无法对非持股高管或持股较少的高管离职情况进行解释。除此之外，当前研究对高管团队的划分没有一个明确且科学的标准，没有区分不同类型高管成员离职情况的差别，因此本文根据高管成员的入职时间、团队地位等细分了高管成员的类型，在此基础之上，研究企业绩效、CEO权力对不同类型高管离职的影响，更具体、更有针对性的分析不同类型高管成员离职的影响因素，探究企业内部治理结构存在的问题以及创业板市场治理机制的改进方向。由此，本文选取了2011年至2012年创业板上市企业的数据，根据IPO时期高管是否在职，分为IPO时期高管团队和外聘高管团队，并对IPO时期高管团队进行二次细分，根据高管是否属于创始团队成员，将其细分为创业团队和非创业团队，继而运用线性回归实证检验了企业绩效和CEO权力与不同类型高管团队离职之间的相关关系。结果发现：企业绩效对高管离职情况显著负向相关，且企业绩效影响IPO后外聘高管团队离职的程度大于企业绩效影响IPO时高管团队离职程度；CEO是否创业者对IPO时高管团队离职影响不显著，但对IPO时期的非创业团队离职有显著影响，而CEO与董事长双职合一对IPO时高管团队和IPO后外聘高管团队均无显著影响，本文认为这是由于CEO董事长是否双职合一属于企业内部治理机制的一部分，而企业治理结构内生，对高管离职影响作用有限，且其对高管离职行为的影响主要体现在董事长和总经理两个职位上，所以与其他高管成员离职行为的相关关系并不显著。本文希望通过研究创业板企业高管团队离职的深层次原因和不同类型高管成员离职的细化因素，规范高管离职行为，提高高管团队稳定性继而促进企业长久发展，并且，结合创业板市场和上市企业的独特性，提出建议改进企业内部治理水平和市场治理机制，从而保护股东的最大化收益。
英文摘要：	The principal-agent system under the separation of the two powers in contemporary enterprises makes the senior management team the focus to maintain the stability and development of enterprises. Therefore, as the core of enterprise management, the stability of the senior management team is of vital importance, and the resignation of senior management members will inevitably lead to changes in enterprise management decisions, which is unfavorable to enterprise development and shareholder value. The unique phenomenon of "three highs" in the GEM market and the frequent turnover of senior executives have attracted the attention of scholars. One view is that the turnover of senior executives is due to the soaring stock value brought by the phenomenon of "three highs", which makes senior executives sell stocks through turnover to lock in profits. However, some scholars also find that the turnover of senior executives is not all those who hold shares. Therefore, the speculation of cashing out cannot explain the turnover of non-holding senior executives or those who hold less shares. In addition, the current research does not have a clear and scientific standard for the division of senior management team, and does not distinguish the differences of turnover of different types of senior management members. Therefore, this paper subdivides the types of senior management members according to their entry time, team status, etc. On this basis, it studies the influence of enterprise performance and CEO power on turnover of different types of senior management, analyzes the influencing factors of turnover of different types of senior management members in a more specific and targeted way, and explores the problems existing in the internal corporate governance structure and the improvement direction of the governance mechanism of GEM. Therefore, this paper selects the data of gem listed companies from 2011 to 2012, according to whether the senior executives in the IPO period are on the job, divided into IPO period executive team and external executive team, and carries on the secondary subdivision to the IPO period executive team, subdivides it into the entrepreneurial team and the non-entrepreneurial team according to whether the senior executives belong to the founding team member, then uses the linear regression empirical test the correlation between the enterprise performance and the CEO power and the different types of executive team turnover. As a result, it was found that corporate performance was negatively correlated with executive turnover, and the effect of corporate performance on external executive team turnover after IPO was significant IPO the impact of corporate performance on the turnover of executive teams; CEO whether the entrepreneur has no significant effect on the executive team turnover at IPO time, but has a significant effect on the non-entrepreneurial team turnover during IPO period, while the integration of CEO and chairman has no significant effect on the executive team at IPO time and the external executive team after IPO. So with other executives the correlation of staff turnover behavior was not significant. This paper hopes to standardize the executive turnover behavior, improve the stability of the executive team and promote the long-term development of the enterprise by studying the deep-seated reasons of the senior management team leaving and the detailed factors of the different types of senior management members leaving enterprise.
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