联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	11839
作者编号：	1120150809
上传时间：	2020/6/22 16:58:00
中文题目：	生产者责任延伸制下政府参与的供应链治理研究
英文题目：	Research on Supply Chain Governance with Government Participation under Extended Producer Responsibility
指导老师：	李勇建
中文关键字：	生产者责任延伸；环境规制；优惠政策；税收和补贴；供应链治理
英文关键字：	Extended Producer Responsibility; environmental regulation; preferential policy; tax and subsidy; supply chain governance
中文摘要：	由于工业生产导致愈发严峻的环境污染和资源消耗，供应链的运营不再局限于对经济绩效的追逐，而是更多考虑环境因素的治理诉求。由于多重利益相关者关系、多阶段运营环境和多维目标的存在，供应链中企业责任的履行呈现出复杂的治理结构，而政府主导的环境规制对供应链治理过程起着关键的引导和支持作用。在此背景下，为了应对供应链活动带来的环境影响，生产者责任延伸（Extended Producer Responsibility,简称EPR）理念产生，并在许多国家得到推广。 为了研究中国EPR制度在政府参与下的治理环境以及利益相关者之间的治理互动与决策问题。本论文在供应链治理视角下，结合文献研究以及对电器电子行业三个企业的探索性案例分析，聚焦到三个方面的治理研究：第一，在法治情境中，与EPR制度相关的中国环境规制的治理演进和治理特征研究。第二，在绿色转型情境中，政府优惠政策对制造商EPR创新投入的治理效果研究。第三，在产品激励情境中，政府奖罚激励对供应链成员EPR协作的治理效果研究。 在EPR制度环境下，本论文的治理框架源于企业可持续社会责任，考虑产品在供应链的延伸环境责任，对应三部分研究内容：第一，本论文在规制交互分析视角下，关注供应链治理中面向环境规制的合法化进程：本论文选取我国11个与EPR相关的法律文献，分析环境责任在法治环境中的演进，对利益相关主体、供应链环节与治理方法进行交互分析。第二，本论文关注EPR实施遇到的资金问题，通过模型研究方法得到供应链治理过程中制造企业的EPR生态创新投入决策，并分析政府优惠政策的治理效果。第三，本论文构建了政府与供应链之间的Stackelberg博弈，考虑综合社会福利影响下的治理目标，研究EPR制度下政府基于奖罚激励的治理策略对供应链EPR协作的治理效果。 本研究表明，中国EPR供应链治理实践正处于治理方案多样化和系统化的创新发展阶段，EPR制度环境下的供应链治理是环境规制与供应链活动交互的演进产物。本研究发现，政府对企业EPR投入的优惠政策存在治理边界减损的风险，政府针对企业EPR生态创新的优惠政策存在激励困境，政府和企业需要重点关注具有高水平生态系数和低水平生产成本的供应链特征。本研究建议，政府在参与治理供应链EPR供应商责任和产品生态设计责任的过程中，治理策略设计应该考虑面向综合社会福利的高水平补贴门槛。最后，本研究强调EPR目标的实现依赖包括政府、消费者和供应链上游企业在内的有效的协作式供应链治理。
英文摘要：	Because of the increasingly severe environmental pollution and resource consumption caused by industrial production, the operation of the supply chain is no longer limited to the pursuit of economic performance, but of more governance demands that take environmental factors into consideration. Due to the existence of multi-stakeholder relationships, multi-stage operating environment, and multi-dimensional goals, the implementation of corporate responsibility in the supply chain presents a complex governance structure, and government-led environmental regulations play a key role in guiding and supporting the supply chain governance process. In this context, in order to cope with the environmental impact of supply chain activities, the concept of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) has emerged and has been promoted in many countries. In order to study the governance environment of Chinese EPR system with government participation, and governance interaction and decision-making among stakeholders, this dissertation is conducted from the perspective of supply chain governance and combines literature research and exploratory case analysis of three companies in the electrical and electronics industry, focusing on three aspects of governance research: First, in the context of the rule of law, this dissertation studies the governance evolution and governance characteristics of the Chinese regulation environment related to the EPR system. Second, in the context of green transformation, this dissertation studies the governance effect of government preferential policies on manufacturers' EPR innovation investment. Third, in the context of product incentives, this dissertation studies the effect of government incentives on the governance of EPR collaboration among members of the supply chain. In the context of the EPR system, the governance framework of this dissertation stems from corporate sustainable social responsibility and considers the extended environmental responsibility of products in the supply chain. It corresponds to three parts of research content: First, from the perspective of regulatory interaction analysis, this dissertation focuses on the process of supply chain governance during the legalization process of environmental regulation: This dissertation selects 11 legal documents related to EPR in China, analyzes the evolution of environmental responsibility in the rule of law environment, and interactively analyzes stakeholders, supply chain stages and governance methods. Second, this dissertation focuses on the funding problems encountered in the implementation of EPR, explores the decision-making of EPR ecological innovation investment of manufacturers in the process of supply chain governance through model research methods, and analyzes the governance effects of government preferential policies. Third, this dissertation builds a Stackelberg game between the government and the supply chain, considers the governance goals under the influence of comprehensive social welfare, and studies the governance effect of the government's governance strategy based on reward and punishment incentives on the supply chain EPR collaboration under the EPR system. This dissertation shows that China's EPR supply chain governance practice is at the stage of diversified and systematic innovation development of governance solutions. Supply chain governance under the EPR system environment is an evolutionary product of the interaction between environmental regulation and supply chain activities. It finds that the government's preferential policies for enterprise EPR investment have the risk of deteriorating the governance boundary. The government's preferential policies for corporate EPR ecological innovation have incentive dilemmas. The government and enterprises need to focus on the supply chain with high-level ecological coefficients and low-level production costs. This research suggests that in the process of government participation in the governance of EPR supplier responsibility and product ecological design responsibility in the supply chain, the governance strategy should consider the high-level subsidy threshold for comprehensive social welfare. Finally, this dissertation emphasizes that the realization of the EPR goal depends on effective collaborative supply chain governance including government, consumers, and upstream companies in the supply chain.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)