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论文编号：	11829
作者编号：	1120140784
上传时间：	2020/6/22 13:36:49
中文题目：	绿色建筑开发企业动态定价策略研究
英文题目：	The Research on Dynamic Pricing Strategy for Green Building Development Enterprises
指导老师：	严建援
中文关键字：	绿色建筑；绿色度；定价策略；消费者偏好；补贴；碳交易
英文关键字：	Green building；Green degree；Pricing strategy；Consumer preference；Carbon transaction
中文摘要：	伴随着全球经济的快速发展，环境污染和能源消耗已经成为影响人类未来生存的重要问题。建筑业作为全球能源消耗最高的产业之一，迫切需要探索并建立可持续的发展模式。由于绿色建筑节能减排的潜力巨大，大力发展绿色建筑产业已成为当前的必然选择。而从市场的角度看，中国绿色建筑市场发展的内生动力不足，单纯依靠行政手段和技术理论的推动，忽略了不同利益主体的影响，从而导致了效率的缺失。绿色建筑市场的发展，是由开发企业、政府、消费者等相关各方共同完成，而其中开发企业是最重要的执行主体。因此，协同各相关方的利益关系，并明晰各方利益诉求与开发企业定价策略的关系，是当前绿色建筑发展困境的破题关键。在此背景下，本文通过探究绿色建筑开发企业的在绿色建筑产业生命周期内的动态定价策略，尝试提出可兼顾各方诉求的最优解，以期为绿色建筑产业的发展提供助益。本文从绿色建筑的兴起与发展出发，通过分析我国绿色建筑产业的发展现状与困境，得出了本文的研究方向；通过梳理外部性理论、产品生命周期理论、博弈论、产品定价理论，构建了全文的理论基础；通过梳理国内外绿色建筑研究的相关文献，得到了绿色建筑领域的最主要的研究要素；后通过对绿色建筑的生产与消费进行系统的分析，明确了绿色建筑的产品属性、生产标准、成本效益、产品市场生命周期与产业发展瓶颈。在此基础上，本文将绿色建筑市场的主要参与主体开发企业、政府、消费者的利益诉求及相互关系进行了系统分析，根据供求均衡理论，确定了绿色建筑市场的基本供求模型，并以此为基础，建立了开发企业、消费者及政府部门的基本效益模型。以各方基本效益模型为基础，首先，本文从双寡头市场和垄断市场两种市场结构对考虑消费者绿色度偏好的绿色建筑多级市场动态定价决策问题进行了研究。通过构建两种市场条件下，单一价格策略和歧视定价策略下，开发企业和消费者的效益模型，推导出了开发企业的最优定价模型。通过理论分析和数值模拟两种方法，得出并验证了在因绿色建筑技术水平变化而产生的绿色建筑产业全生命周期内，消费者偏好和消费者收入等要素影响绿色建筑定价的规律。其次，本文研究了在政府补贴情况下，绿色建筑开发企业如何在绿色建筑产业全生命周期内动态制定最优的绿色建筑产品价格的问题。通过利用动态竞合博弈刻画垄断市场下政府补贴企业、垄断市场下政府补贴消费者、双寡头市场下政府补贴企业、双寡头市场下政府补贴消费者四类情境，结合绿色建筑技术水平的变化体现绿色建筑产业发展的不同阶段，给出了不同情境下的政府最优补贴模型以及在此补贴下的企业最优定价模型，分析并验证了绿色建筑技术水平、绿色建筑绿色度等关键参数对最优定价和最优补贴的影响规律。最后，本文从碳交易机制在建筑业推广的现实难点和现阶段研究空白出发，在政府制定社会最优总碳排放限额且绿色建筑企业的生产决策受到自身配额量约束的前提下，考虑垄断市场和双寡头市场两种市场情况，构建了政府和企业的动态竞合博弈模型，通过逆向求解法，得出了政府最优基准碳排放限定模型和在此限定下绿色建筑开发企业的最优定价模型，通过理论分析和模拟仿真分析并验证了最优基准碳限额、企业最优定价与相关要素之间的关系和规律。总体来讲，本文通过对考虑消费者偏好、政府补贴和新型金融工具介入三种重点情境中绿色建筑企业动态定价策略的研究，得出了多种不同情况下绿色建筑开发企业的最优定价模型，也为政府制定相应的政策提供了最优补贴模型和最优碳排放限额模型。同时结合对模型的分析和数据仿真，得到有参考性的企业定价策略。最后，结合研究成果，对政府提出了有参考性的建议。
英文摘要：	Along with the fierce global economic modernization, environmental pollution and energy consumption have become the important questions to determine the future survival of mankind. The construction industry, one of the world's most energy intensive industries, urgently needs to explore and build a sustainable model of development. Because the potential advantage of green building for energy conservation and emission reduction, it is a necessary choice to develop green building industry. From the perspective of the construction market, the development of green building market in China is not enough. The development of green building is accomplished by the development enterprises, government, consumer and other related parties, and the development enterprises is the most important party who builds green buildings. Therefore, it is important to coordinate the interests of all parties concerned, and to clarify the pricing strategies of the development enterprises. In this background, this paper attempts to propose the optimal solution to the needs of all parties in order to help the development of green building industry by exploring the dynamic pricing strategies of the green building development enterprises throughout the industry life cycle. Based on the development of green building, this research analyzes the development of green building industry in China and the related difficulties, and draws the research direction. Through the analysis of externality theory, product life cycle theory, game theory and product pricing theory, this research constructs its theoretical foundation. By reviewing the research on the green building field, the research obtains the most important research elements in the field of green building. Then, through the analysis of the production and consumption of green building, this research systematically analyzes the interest demands and interrelationships of the main participating subjects of the green building market. Finally, according to thee equilibrium theory of supply and demand, the basic supply and demand model of green building market is determined. Based on this, the basic benefit models of development enterprises, consumer and government are established. Based on the basic benefit models, firstly, considering the heterogeneity of different consumers ' preference for green building, this research divides the consumers into multi-level markets, and studies dynamic pricing decision for green building in two market structures which are the duopoly market and monopoly market, through the life cycle of green building industry. The optimal pricing model of the development enterprise is derived by constructing the profit model of the enterprise and consumers under the single price strategy and discrimination pricing strategy under the two market conditions. By means of numerical simulation, it is concluded that consumers' preferences and consumers' income influence the green building’s price in the whole life cycle of green building industry. Secondly, this research studies how green building enterprises can decide the optimal price of green building products in the whole life cycle of green building industry under government subsidy. By using the competitive and cooperative game model, the enterprises’ optimal pricing model and the government’s optimal subsidy model are given in four types of models. In the end, this research starts from the practical difficulties of the CDM mechanism and the present research blank, in the light of the government set up the optimal total carbon emission limit, considering the duopoly market and monopoly market situation, constructs the competitive and cooperative game model, obtains the government’s optimal benchmark carbon emission limit model and the green building development enterprise's optimal pricing model. In general, this research studies the dynamic pricing strategy of green building enterprises in three key situations considering consumer preference, government subsidy and new financial instruments, and obtains the optimal pricing model for green building development enterprises in many different situations, and also provides the optimal subsidy model and optimal carbon emission quota model for the government. At the same time, some worthy precepts are obtained through the analysis of the model and the simulation of the data. Finally, the relevant suggestions have been put forward for both the enterprises and the government.
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