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论文编号：	11812
作者编号：	2120182935
上传时间：	2020/6/22 11:17:09
中文题目：	股权激励对非效率投资的分阶段效应研究
英文题目：	Research on the Staged Effect of Equity Incentive on Inefficient Investment
指导老师：	王志红
中文关键字：	股权激励；利益趋同；非效率投资；高管自利
英文关键字：	equity incentive; interest convergence; inefficient investment; executive self-interest
中文摘要：	自2005年底，中国证券监督管理委员会首次颁布了与股权激励有关的规章制度，即《上市公司股权激励管理办法（试行）》，标志着股权激励制度的正式引入，并且开始受到实务领域的重视和广泛尝试。随着股权激励在我国企业中的应用逐渐普遍，股权激励的实施效果也成为研究热点，股权激励对企业经营绩效、投资决策、长远发展会带来怎样的影响，怎样使股权激励计划的设计更加合理一直是学者们关注的焦点。本文在已有研究的基础上，关注实施股权激励对于非效率投资的影响，重点关注实施后的较长期间内的效果，并分阶段考察股权激励实施后其效果的变化与分布情况，尝试对产生不同效果的驱动机制进行分析解释。本文选取2006-2017年间首次实施股权激励的公司以及通过倾向得分匹配得到的未实施股权激励公司作为样本，利用多元线性回归进行实证研究。在对长期效应进行考察时，采取了分期分阶段的方式进行分析和验证，并在解释长期效应的驱动机制时使用双重差分法进行实证检验。结论显示，在考核期中，第一次限售期或等待期内股权激励对非效率投资的作用不明显，从第一次解除限售期或可行权期开始，由于利益趋同效应的存在，股权激励对于非效率投资具有显著抑制作用；进入非考核期后，股权激励对非效率投资的抑制作用仍然存在，但这一作用逐渐减弱，并未发挥预期的长期激励作用，通过双重差分法发现高管存在减持股票套现的自利行为是重要原因之一。因此，本文建议在股权激励方案的设计、考核指标的制定方面需要进一步强化，同时完善外部市场的监管，维护市场稳定透明，以便股权激励能够更好地发挥积极作用。
英文摘要：	Since the end of 2005, China Securities Regulatory Commission has promulgated the rules and regulations related to the equity incentive system for the first time, namely the administrative measures for equity incentive of listed companies (for Trial Implementation), marking the formal introduction of the equity incentive system. With the application of equity incentive becoming more and more popular, the implementation effect of equity incentive has become a research hotspot. How equity incentive affects business performance, investment decision-making and long-term development, and how to make the design of equity incentive plan more reasonable has been the focus of scholars. Based on the existing research, this paper focuses on the impact of the implementation of equity incentive on inefficient investment, especially the long-term effect after the implementation, and examines the distribution of the effect in stages. And this paper explains the driving mechanism that produces different effects. This paper selects the companies that first implemented equity incentive in 2006-2017 and the companies that did not implement equity incentive through the matching of propensity scores as samples, and use multiple linear regression. In the investigation of long-term effects, the method of stages is adopted to analyze and verify, and the double difference method is used to explain the changes of long-term effects. The conclusion of this paper shows that in the evaluation period, the effect of equity incentive on inefficiency investment is not obvious in the first restricted sale period or waiting period. From the first deregulated sale period or feasible right period, equity incentive has a significant inhibitory effect on inefficiency investment due to the existence of interest convergence effect. However, due to the self-interest behavior of senior managers in reducing stock holding and arbitrage, the inhibition of equity incentive on inefficient investment will gradually weaken when they enter into non-evaluation period. Therefore, this paper proposes to strengthen the design of equity incentive and assessment indicators. Meanwhile, we should improve the supervision of the external market, maintain the stability and transparency of the market.
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