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论文编号：	11811
作者编号：	2120182937
上传时间：	2020/6/22 11:14:28
中文题目：	两权分离、股权制衡与高管私有收益 ——基于并购交易的研究
英文题目：	Separation of Control Rights from Cash Flow Rights, Equity Balance Mechanism and Executive Private Benefits: Research Based on the M&A Transactions
指导老师：	梅丹
中文关键字：	并购；高管私有收益；两权分离；股权制衡
英文关键字：	M & A; Executives Private Benefits; Separation of Control Rights from Cash Flow Rights; Equity Balance Mechanism
中文摘要：	随着并购活动在资本市场中越来越活跃，越来越多的经验证据表明高管能够在此项活动中获取私有收益，西方学者大多将此归咎于高管与股东间的代理问题。然而，在诸如我国等股权集中度较高的国家中，相较于高管与股东之间的代理问题，控股股东与中小股东之间的代理问题事实上更加突出。控股股东有动机通过并购这一复杂的交易实施“掏空”行为，侵占中小股东的利益，而高管在并购中所获取的私有收益很可能是控股股东为了取得其配合而给予的利益分享。基于此观点，本文以控股股东掏空问题产生的根源——控股股东两权分离为出发点，探究控股股东两权分离的程度越高，高管在并购中获取的私有收益是否会越大。并研究较高的股权制衡度能否对控股股东两权分离与并购中高管私有收益的作用关系起到负向的调节作用，以检验股权制衡在并购中是否存在治理效应。 本文以2008-2017年我国A股发生并购重组的公司为样本，研究发现：（1）控股股东的两权分离度越高，高管在并购中获取的非货币性私有收益（超额在职消费）越大，但控股股东两权分离度对并购中高管的货币性私有收益（超额薪酬）无显著影响；（2）相比于股权制衡度低的公司，股权制衡度高的公司中，控股股东两权分离对并购中高管非货币性私有收益的影响作用较小，即股权制衡表现出治理效应；（3）在关联并购以及并购前主并公司的业绩表现良好的并购中，控股股东两权分离对并购中高管非货币性私有收益的影响作用更大。本文认为，以上结论表明，并购中高管所获取的私有收益一定程度上来源于控股股东的利益分享；并且为了降低社会“愤怒成本”以及私有收益的“掩饰成本”，高管倾向于采用隐性收益（在职消费）的方式进行利益分享；而股权制衡在此过程中存在治理效应，即能够通过抑制控股股东的掏空行为，减弱控股股东两权分离对并购中高管私有收益的影响。同时该结论也间接证明了，在关联并购和并购前主并公司的业绩表现良好的并购中，控股股东更可能通过向高管分享收益、与高管合谋的方式对中小股东进行利益侵占，“掏空”公司。
英文摘要：	With the M & A becoming more and more active in the capital market, more and more empirical evidence shows that executives can obtain private benefits in this transaction. Western scholars prefer blame this on the first-class agency problem which occurs between executives and shareholders. However, in countries with high equity concentration, such as China, the agency problem between large and minority shareholders, that is, the second-class agency problem, is more prominent than the first-class agency. Large shareholders have the motivation to expropriate the interests of small shareholders through M & A. Thus, the private benefits obtained by executives in M & A is more likely to be the benefits-sharing from large shareholders, who want to get executives’ cooperation. Based on this point of view, and considered that many empirical evidences shows that the separation of major shareholders’ control and ownership right is the root of the major shareholders' tunneling behavior, this paper studies whether the larger the separation of major shareholders’ control and ownership right is, the more benefits that executives private can obtain in M & A. Furthermore, in order to verify whether equity balance mechanism has governance effect in M & A, this paper studies whether equity balance mechanism plays a moderate role in the above relationship. This paper takes the sample data of A-share listed company in China from 2008 to 2017 that sucessfully complete M & A. The results show that, (1) the larger the separation degree of major shareholders’ control and ownership right is, the higher the implicit non-monetary executives private benefits (abnormal perks) in M & A, but the separation degree of two right has no significant effect on the explicit monetary executives private benefits (abnormal salary); (2) equity balance mechanism plays a negative moderate role in the above relationship, that is, equity balance mechanism shows governance effect in M & A; (3) compared with unrelated M&A, in the related M&A, the separation of two right has more significant effect on executives’ private benefits; compared with M&A that occurs after a decline of the company's performance, in the M&A that occurs after an increase of the company's performance, the separation of two right has more significant effect on executives’ private benefits. The conclusions show that, to some extent, the executives private benefits in M & A comes from major shareholders’ benefit-sharing, and the executives prefer share the benefits in an “implicit way”, because the "social anger cost" and "disguise cost" is lower. In addition, the conclusions show that equity balance mechanism has the governance effect on restraining the tunneling behavior of major shareholders in M & A. At the same time, the results also indirectly prove that in M & A, especially in the related M&A and the M&A that occurs after an increase of the company's performance, the major shareholders expropriate the interests of small shareholders by colluding with executives.
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