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论文编号：	11806
作者编号：	2120182947
上传时间：	2020/6/22 10:31:52
中文题目：	管理层持股与行业专长审计师选聘研究
英文题目：	Study on Management Shareholding and Auditor Selection for Industry Expertise
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	管理层持股；审计师行业专长；产权性质；管理层财务背景
英文关键字：	management shareholding; Auditor industry expertise; Property right nature; Management financial background
中文摘要：	行业专长是审计师所拥有的专业知识及经验，对审计质量具有一定的提振效果。目前虽已有部分文献从代理理论角度论证管理层持股对审计质量的影响，但鲜有从专业能力角度进一步讨论审计质量的变化在审计师选聘中如何体现，且未考虑公司产权及管理层个人特征对管理层持股与审计师选聘间关系是否具有调节作用。本文试图从委托代理和管理层权力视角，研究管理层持股比例对行业专长审计师选聘研究的影响，并进一步检验产权性质和管理层的财务背景对二者关系的调节作用。 本文基于委托代理理论、管理层权力理论、资源依赖理论以及高阶理论，以2010-2018年在我国沪深交易所上市的非金融公司为样本，研究管理层持股比例对行业专长审计师选聘的影响，并通过分组检验和交乘项进一步论证公司的产权性质以及管理层财务背景对管理层持股比例与行业专长审计师选聘间关系的调节作用。 实证检验发现：管理层持股比例的提高有效降低了代理成本，进而削弱了公司选聘具有行业专长审计师的意愿。针对具有极高自利倾向的管理层，管理层持股显著增加了管理层干涉审计师选聘的权力，同样削弱了公司选聘具有行业专长审计师的可能性。进一步分组检验发现，其他条件不变，国有企业的多重代理和所有权缺位问题导致其代理成本较高，由于代理成本无法通过选聘具有行业专长审计师降低且国有企业对审计的鉴证功能和信号传达功能需求较低，非国有企业的管理层持股比例提高对公司所选聘审计师行业专长的负向影响更加显。由于具有财务背景的管理层持股比例提高时，管理层有动力将职业素养与财务专长运用至公司经营中，有效改善公司治理结构，进一步摆脱了对具有行业专长审计师的资源依赖，因此具有财务背景的管理层持股比例提高对公司选聘具有行业专长审计师意愿的负向影响更加显著。同时，无论分组情况如何，公司规模较大的企业更倾向于选聘具有行业专长的审计师进行外部审计。
英文摘要：	Industry expertise refers to the professional knowledge and experience possessed by auditors, which can improve audit quality to some extent. Part is still existing literature from the perspective of agency theory, management equity influence on audit quality, but there is little from the perspective of professional ability further discuss how the change of audit quality in selecting auditors, without considering the company property and personal characteristics of management equity management and the relationship between auditor hiring is adjustment. From the perspective of principal-agent and management's rights, this paper attempts to study the influence of management's shareholding ratio on auditor selection and appointment research of industry expertise, and further examine the moderating effect of property right nature and management's financial background on the relationship between them. This article is based on the principal-agent theory, the management rights theory, resource dependence theory and the theory of high order, from 2010 to 2018 in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange listed non-financial companies as sample, study management ownership of industry expertise, the influence of selecting and appointing the auditors and through the grouping test item and pay by further demonstrates the nature of property rights and management of the company financial background of management shareholding and industry expertise auditor hiring relationship adjustment. The empirical test found that the increase of the management shareholding ratio effectively reduced the agency cost, thus reducing the willingness of companies to hire auditors with industry expertise. For highly self-interested management, management ownership significantly increases the right of management to interfere with auditor selection and also reduces the possibility of selecting auditors with industry expertise. Further packet inspection found that, other things being equal, the absence of multiple agents and ownership of state-owned enterprises problems lead to the agency cost is higher, because the agency cost can't through with industry expertise auditors reduce the hiring and verification of state-owned enterprises on audit function and demand signal is low, non-state-owned enterprises increasing the proportion of management shareholding of the company hiring of auditor industry specialty negative effect more significantly; Due to the proportion of a background in financial management is to improve, managers have an incentive to apply professional and financial expertise to company management, improve corporate governance structure, further out of the resources with industry expertise auditors rely on, so a background in financial management stake improve so as to the company with expertise in the industry auditor will negative influence even more significant. At the same time, larger firms are more likely to hire auditors with industry expertise for external audits, regardless of the grouping.
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