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论文编号：	11787
作者编号：	2120182915
上传时间：	2020/6/21 16:41:05
中文题目：	竞争性供应商策略选择对于OEM双渠道采购策略的影响
英文题目：	The Influence of Competitive Supplier Strategy on OEM Dual-Channel Procurement Strategy
指导老师：	李勇建
中文关键字：	合作竞争供应链；策略选择；供应及生产不稳定性
英文关键字：	Co-opetitive Supply Chain; Strategic Choices; Instability of Supply and Production
中文摘要：	随着市场的不断发展，企业间的关系日益紧密，合作竞争已经变成许多供应链企业间的新形式，在高新技术产业中尤为如此。让竞争对手参与供应链合作，变成了很多高科技公司的战略选择。本研究从苹果与三星的案例中抽离出合作竞争的模式，在于其他案例的共同分析中发现这种合作竞争的关系出现在许多企业的供应链协调与竞争中。 本研究从实际供应链企业的实际案例中，明确了一种合作竞争模式，开发了一个分析模型，旨在研究竞争性供应商的策略选择对于原始设备制造商的双渠道采购策略影响。其中竞争性供应商既是原始设备制造商的下游市场竞争者，又供给原始设备制造商其生产需要的核心元件，从而构成合作竞争关系。模型中，将双渠道采购的另一个供应商，描述为供应能力不稳定的非竞争性供应商，其并不在下游市场与原始设备制造商形成竞争关系。面对原始设备制造商的双渠道采购策略，竞争性供应商可能会采取三种策略：退出性策略、预留产能策略及产能限制策略。通过比较不同策略中竞争性供应商、原始设备制造商、非竞争性供应商的利润变化以及非竞争性供应商的供应稳定性水平对于策略选择的影响，来讨论竞争性供应商采取这三种策略的可能性。 研究结果发现，当原始设备制造商引入非竞争性供应商时，竞争性供应商的利润都会受损。在大部分情况下，竞争性供应商的策略选择，对于原始设备制造商的双渠道采购策略无威胁，也就是说，在大部分情况下，即使非竞争性供应商存在供应不稳定的情况，原始设备制造商依然有动力采取双渠道采购策略，也就是说竞争性供应商的退出性策略、预留产能策略及产能限制策略对于原始设备制造商的双渠道采购策略基本没有影响。更有趣的是，我们还发现原始设备制造商在不进行双渠道采购策略的时候，更愿意让竞争性供应商先决策产能，这与斯坦科尔伯格产量博弈中的先动优势是相违背的。
英文摘要：	With the continuous development of the market and the increasingly interconnected relationship between enterprises, co-opetition has become a new form among many supply chain enterprises, especially in the high-tech industry. Involving competitors in the supply chain has become a strategic choice for many high-tech companies. This study developed an analysis model from the co-opetition between apple and samsung to study the influence of the strategic choice of competitive supplier on the dual-channel procurement strategy of original equipment manufacturer(OEM). Among them, the competitive supplier is the downstream market competitor of the original equipment manufacturer, and also supplies the core components needed by the original equipment manufacturer, thus forming a cooperative and competitive relationship. In order to facing OEM's dual-channel purchasing strategy, competitive supplier may adopt one of the three strategies: exit strategy, capacity reserve strategy and capacity limitation strategy. In the model, another supplier of dual-channel procurement is described as a non-competitive supplier with unstable supply capacity, which does not compete with OEM in the downstream market. The results show that when OEM brings in a non-competitive suppliers, the profits of competitive supplier suffers. In most cases, the strategic choice of competitive suppliers does not pose a threat to the dual-channel procurement strategy of OEM, that is, in most cases, OEM has an incentive to adopt dual-channel procurement strategy even if the supply of non-competitive suppliers is unstable. More interestingly, we also find that OEM is more willing to let the competitive supplier decide reserved capacity first when they are not pursuing a dual-channel purchasing strategy, which contradicts the first-mover advantages of the Stackelberg Quantity Competition
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