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论文编号：	11740
作者编号：	2120182948
上传时间：	2020/6/20 11:17:58
中文题目：	管理者过度自信、机构投资者与并购溢价
英文题目：	Managerial Overconfidence, Institutional Investors and Acquisition Premiums
指导老师：	王志红
中文关键字：	并购溢价；管理者过度自信；机构投资者
英文关键字：	Acquisition premiums; Managerial overconfidence; Institutional investors
中文摘要：	并购是帮助企业快速实现规模扩大和资本扩张的一种十分有效的手段，越来越多的上市公司选择通过并购的方式来实现企业的快速发展。但是，并购本身也是一项十分复杂的战略活动，且企业所处的资本市场环境又是瞬息万变，如果缺乏足够成熟的战略思考和准备工作，企业的并购活动就可能会带来一系列复杂的问题。其中，由于在并购交易中支付过高的溢价而导致并购后企业绩效下降的现象十分普遍，导致许多并购交易并不能发挥其真正的战略作用。因此，分析产生过高的并购溢价背后的原因就显得尤为重要。而管理者通常在企业的各项决策中占据着主导地位，其个人特征必然会对企业的各项决策产生重大影响，而本质上作为一种投资决策的并购也是如此。因此本文选择管理者心理特征中相对较为稳定的一个因素——管理者过度自信，来研究其对并购溢价的影响。机构投资者在我国日渐发展壮大，其投资持股行为在市场中可以作为一种信号传递，降低市场中的信息不对称，同时通过在企业中的持股能够在公司治理中发挥话语权，对公司和管理者的行为进行监督和约束。因此，本文还试图考察机构投资者对于管理者过度自信造成的高并购溢价能否起到外部治理机制的作用。 本文以2009-2018年十年间我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本，对管理者过度自信与并购溢价之间的关系以及机构投资者的治理作用进行了研究。结果发现：（1）管理者过度自信程度与企业并购溢价水平呈正相关关系，即管理者过度自信的程度越高，企业在并购交易中的溢价水平越高；（2）机构投资者在公司中持股比例较高时能够弱化管理者过度自信对并购溢价的正向影响，即机构投资者能够在一定程度上发挥监督治理作用；（3）通过具体观察不同类型机构投资者的治理作用发现，证券投资基金、合格境外机构投资者以及社保基金持股能在一定程度上减弱管理者过度自信与并购溢价二者之间的正向关系，而券商和保险公司持股则不存在相应的调节治理作用。上述结论表明，在并购溢价的治理过程中，要充分重视管理者的个人心理特征等非理性因素对并购溢价产生的影响，并且应当充分利用机构投资者等治理机制在约束管理者行为方面发挥的作用，尤其是证券投资基金、合格境外机构投资者以及社保基金这类机构，同时应当注意引导券商等其他类型机构投资者在公司中发挥积极正确的治理作用。
英文摘要：	M & A is a very effective means to help companies achieve scale and capital expansion quickly. More and more listed companies choose to achieve corporate strategic development through M & A. However, M & A is a very complicated strategic activity, and the capital market environment in which the company is located is changing rapidly. Without sufficient mature strategic thinking and preparation work, the M & A activity of the company may bring a series of complex problems. Among them, the decline in corporate performance after M & A due to excessively high premiums paid in mergers and acquisitions is very common, resulting in many mergers and acquisitions not playing their true strategic role. Therefore, it is particularly important to analyze the reasons behind the excessively high acquisition premiums. Managers usually occupy a dominant position in corporate decisions, and their personal characteristics will inevitably have a significant impact on corporate decisions, as is M & A, which is essentially an investment decision. Therefore, this dissertation selects managerial overconfidence among managers’ personal traits to study its impact on acquisition premiums. Institutional investors are growing quickly in China, and their investment holdings can be used as a signal in the market to reduce information asymmetry in the market. At the same time, holding shares in enterprises can make them play a significant role in corporate governance so that they can supervise and restrict the behavior of companies and managers. Therefore, this dissertation also attempts to examine whether institutional investors can function as an external governance mechanism to lower the impact of managerial overconfidence on acquisition premiums. This dissertation selects A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2009 and 2018 as a sample to study the relationship between managerial overconfidence and acquisition premiums and the governance role of institutional investors. The results found that: Firstly, the degree of managerial overconfidence is positively correlated with the level of acquisition premiums, that is, the higher the degree of managerial overconfidence, the higher the level of corporate premium in M & A transactions. Secondly, institutional investors can weaken the positive impact of managerial overconfidence on the acquisition premiums so that institutional investors can play a supervisory and governance role to a certain extent. Finally, through specific observation of different types of institutional investors, it is found that the holding of securities investment funds, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) and social security funds can weaken the positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and acquisition premiums to a certain extent, while securities and insurance companies do not have a corresponding regulatory role. These conclusions indicate that during the governance of acquisition premiums, full attention should be paid to the impact of managers’ personal psychological characteristics and other irrational factors on acquisition premiums. In the meanwhile, institutional investors and other governance mechanisms should be fully utilized to restrict managers’ behavior, especially for securities investment funds, QFII and social security funds. It’s also crucial to guide securities firms and other types of institutional investors to play an active and correct governance role in the company.
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