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论文编号：	11720
作者编号：	2120182922
上传时间：	2020/6/20 0:12:43
中文题目：	管理者过度自信对并购溢价的影响研究 —基于代理成本的中介效应
英文题目：	Research on the Influence of Managerial Overconfidence on M&A Premium:Based on the Mediating Effect of Agency Costs
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	过度自信 ；并购溢价 ；代理成本
英文关键字：	Overconfidence ; M&A Premium ; Agency Costs
中文摘要：	随着我国资本市场的不断发展，中国企业并购交易的数量和金额都在快速上升，并购重组成为企业成长的重要方式之一。现有的研究发现，并购并不能达到预期的效果，其中原因之一就是企业在并购中支付了过高的溢价。企业的管理者在并购中处于核心的地位，如果管理者在心理认知上出现了非理性的偏差，那么这种偏差就可能反映在最终的并购结果中。现有的研究发现，过度自信的管理者会过高估计自己的能力，对并购过程中存在的风险问题进行选择性忽略或低估，导致企业决策出现失误。 本文采用了2009年至2018年中国上市公司的并购交易事件，首先梳理了关于管理者过度自信，代理成本和并购溢价的相关研究，并分析了三者之间的影响作用，然后在理论分析部分从委托代理理论，过度自信理论，高层梯队理论和信息不对称理论这四个角度分析了管理者过度自信这种心理特质对并购过程中的溢价产生的影响，并探讨了代理成本的在其中的扮演的角色。通过采用相对薪酬法，盈利预测法和企业景气指数法从企业层面上验证了本文的假设，然后在稳健性检验中通过对董事长个人特征从个人层面上实证检验了本文的假设，最后更换不同的变量和工具变量法检验本文研究结果的稳健性。 通过理论与实证分析，本文得出以下结论：过度自信的管理者在并购中支付的并购溢价更高；过度自信的管理者会造成更严重的代理问题，导致更高的代理成本；代理成本与并购溢价正相关，代理成本越高，并购时支付的溢价越高;代理成本在管理者过度自信和并购溢价中存在中介效应，即管理者过度自信会部分通过代理成本影响并购溢价。 根据本文的研究结果，本文提出相应的建议：提高公司治理水平，完善公司的治理机制，通过董事会的治理能够纠正因管理者非理性出现的决策偏差；通过采用业绩承诺与股权支付的方式缓解并购中的信息不对称情况；通过增加长期业绩考核的比重与股权激励缓解管理者与股东之间的代理问题及管理者过度自信造成的影响。
英文摘要：	With the development of China's capital market, the scale of M&A in China has increased significantly, M&A have become one of the important ways for company to develop rapidly. Existing research finds that M&A cannot achieve the expected results, one of the reasons is that companies have paid excessive premiums in M&A. Managers are at the core of the M&A process, if managers have irrational deviations in psychological cognition, then such deviations may be reflected in the final merger results. Current research has found that overconfident managers overestimate their abilities and selectively ignore or underestimate the risk problems in the M&A process, leading to errors in corporate decision-making. Based on the M&A events from 2009 to 2018, this paper studies related research on managerial overconfidence, agency cost and M&A premium, and analyzes their mutual influence, then in the theoretical part, based on the principal-agent theory, overconfidence theory, upper echelons theory and asymmetric information theory, this paper analyzes the impact of overconfidence of managers on M&A premium, and discusses the impact of agency cost in this process. This paper verifies the hypothesis proposed at the enterprise level by using three different methods, then empirically tests the hypothesis at the individual level by analyzing the personal characteristics of the chairman of the board, and finally the instrumental variable method is used to test the robustness of the results. This article draws the following four conclusions through theoretical and empirical analysis of overconfidence: overconfident managers pay higher M&A premiums during M&A; overconfident managers will lead to more serious agency problems, resulting in higher agency costs; agency cost is positively correlated with M&A premium, the higher the agency cost, the higher the premium paid during M&A; agency costs have a significant mediating effect both on overconfident managers and M&A premium, which means managers' overconfidence partially affects M&A premiums through agency costs. According to the research results, this paper put forward the following suggestions: Improving corporate governance capabilities, and effectively correct decision deviations caused by managers' irrationality through corporate governance; Using valuation adjustment mechanism and choose to use equity payment to mitigate information asymmetry in M&A; By increasing the focus on long-term performance and equity incentives to alleviate the agency problems between managers and shareholders and the impact cause by managers' overconfidence.
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