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论文编号：	11704
作者编号：	2320170618
上传时间：	2020/6/19 20:37:33
中文题目：	从管理层动机、公司治理机制角度试证其与外购商誉的关系
英文题目：	From the perspectives of Management Motivation and Corporate Governance Mechanism to verify their Relationships with Purchased Goodwill
指导老师：	李亚
中文关键字：	外购商誉；管理层动机；公司治理机制；公司规模；代理问题
英文关键字：	Purchased Goodwill；Management Motivation；Corporate Governance Mechanisms；Company Size；Agency Problem
中文摘要：	近年来，我国上市公司的并购活动发展迅猛，并购数量和并购金额持续攀升，大规模的并购交易导致资本市场积累了大量的商誉。它的不断积累也是商誉规模不断飙升的主要原因。但是过高的“非核心”商誉不仅无法给企业带来经济利益，甚至会使商誉成为“泡沫资产”，给企业及资本市场带来各种负面影响。从商誉的产生源头来看，管理层是并购活动的主要决策者和实施者，决定着并购标的的评估与定价，因此管理层对商誉的产生特别是非核心商誉部分有着重要影响。 本文从商誉产生的源头出发，以委托代理理论为基础，探讨管理层动机对外购商誉的影响，具体表现为在规模越小的企业里，其管理层越倾向于实施导致企业产生更多的商誉的并购行为，即公司规模与外购商誉之间可能存在负相关关系，同时结合公司治理，探讨产权、公司治理机制对两者关系的影响。在实证研究中，本文以2013年至2018年沪深两市A股中的非金融类上市公司作为研究样本，实证结果表明：第一，公司规模与外购商誉呈负相关关系，即因为代理问题的存在，管理层为了获取私人收益产生扩大公司规模的动机，公司规模越小，管理层越倾向于实施存在溢价的并购，最终导致企业产生更多的商誉。第二，国有上市公司的公司规模与外购商誉的负向关系更显著，因为国有企业存在薪酬管制、绩效考评、高管任期等约束，因此管理层扩大公司规模的动机会更强烈。第三，在内部激励机制中，高管持股可以削弱非国有企业中公司规模与商誉的关系，而高管薪酬在两类公司中均没有明显影响。第四，在内部监督机制中，董事会持股、监事会规模、监事会持股、第一大股东持股、前五大股东持股比例平方和能够削弱非国有企业中公司规模与商誉的关系，其中监事会的制衡效果较弱；第一大股东持股、前五大股东持股比例平方和能够削弱国有企业中公司规模与商誉的关系，但其效果要弱于非国有企业。第五，在外部监督机制中，外部审计能够削弱非国有企业中公司规模和商誉的关系，但制衡效果较弱，而研报关注度在两类企业中均没有发挥显著效果。 本文为商誉的研究提供了新的视角，为投资者正确认识商誉、上市公司优化公司治理结构、相关市场提高信息披露均提供了理论帮助和实证依据，从而改善目前上市公司中普遍存在的商誉虚高现象，以保护投资者的利益、提高上市公司的经营效率、促进资本市场的稳定健康发展。
英文摘要：	In recent years, the M&A activities of listed companies in China have developed rapidly, the size and the quantity of M&A continue to rise. Large-scale M&A transactions have led to a large amount of goodwill in the capital market. Goodwill comes from the payment premium in M&A that are under the different control, which is essentially the discounted value of the company's expected future excess profit. However, in practice, the initial measure of goodwill is the balance of merger cost and the recognizable fair value share of net assets in acquired party, so the initial recognition of goodwill includes the “core” part, which is the embodiment of the essence of goodwill, but the initial recognition of goodwill also contains the “non-core” part, which is caused by various human factors, It is also the main reason for the soaring scale of goodwill. But huge “non-core” goodwill can not bring economic benefits to enterprises, even make goodwill a “bubble asset”, bringing various negatives influences to enterprises and capital markets. From the source of goodwill, management, as the main decision maker and implementer of M&A activities, will play an importent role in the evaluation and pricing of M&A targets. Therefore, management has an important influence on the generation of goodwill, especially the non-core goodwill. Thinking about the origin of the goodwill, this paper explores the impact of management motivation on goodwill based on principal-agent theory, that is, the smaller the company, the more its management tends to implement high-value mergers and acquisitions, which will leads to more goodwill. There may be a negative correlation between the company size and the goodwill. Then discusses the impact of property rights and corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between the management motivation and goodwill . In the empirical research, this paper takes the non-financial listed companies in the A-shares of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2012 to 2018 as the research samples. The empirical results show that: Firstly, the company's scale is negatively correlated with the goodwill, Because of the agency problems, management has the incentive to expand the company's scale in order to obtain private income. The smaller the company size, the stronger the management's opportunities, so more aggressive behaviors and strategies will be implemented in the merger, which will lead to excessive goodwill. Secondly, In state-owned enterprises, the negative relationship between the company size and goodwill is more significant, mainly due to the existence of constraints such as compensation control, performance appraisal, and executive term in state-owned enterprises. Therefore, the motivation for management to expand the company's scale are more intense. Thirdly, in the internal incentive mechanism, executive ownership can weaken the relationship between management motivation and goodwill in non-state-owned enterprises, while executive compensation have no significant impact in both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. Fourthly, in the internal supervision mechanism, the shareholding of the board, the size of the board of supervisors, the shareholding of the board of supervisors, the shareholding of the largest shareholder, and the square of the shareholding ratio of the top five shareholders can weaken the relationship between management motivation and goodwill in non-state-owned enterprises. Among them, the supervisory board’s checks and balances are weak; the first largest shareholder holdings, the square of the shareholding ratio of the top five shareholders can weaken the relationship between management motivation and goodwill in state-owned enterprises, but its effect is weaker than non-state-owned enterprises. Fifthly, in the external supervision mechanism, external audit can weaken the relationship between the management motivation and goodwill in non-state-owned enterprises, and the research attention has no significant impact on both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. This paper provides a new perspective for the study of goodwill. It provides theoretical help and empirical evidence for investors to correctly understand goodwill, help listed companies optimize the corporate governance structure, and improve information disclosure in relevant markets, Thereby improving the phenomenon of high goodwill in listed companies to protect Investors' interests, improve the operating efficiency of listed companies, and promote the stable and healthy development of the capital market.
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