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论文编号：	11683
作者编号：	2120182933
上传时间：	2020/6/19 17:17:40
中文题目：	控股股东股权质押与股价崩盘风险 —盈余管理的中介作用
英文题目：	Stock pledge of controlling shareholder and risk of stock price collapse——The intermediary role of earnings management
指导老师：	周宝源
中文关键字：	控股股东股权质押；盈余管理；股价崩盘风险；产权性质；分析师关注
英文关键字：	Equity pledge of controlling shareholders; Earnings management; Risk of stock price collapse; Nature of Property right; Analysts'' attention
中文摘要：	自2007年我国《物权法》再次明确股权可质押以来，股权质押作为方便快捷且行之有效的融资手段，受到我国上市公司大股东的青睐。然而随着股权质押的普遍使用，在有效解决企业资金紧张问题的同时，由此引发的股价异常波动、股价崩盘现象也屡见不鲜。这些问题不仅极大地损害了质权人和投资者的利益，也不利于我国资本市场的平稳发展。因此探索和研究上市公司控股股东股权质押行为对股价崩盘风险的影响以及这种影响是通过什么行为导致的，具有重要的现实意义。 本文以2008-2019年我国A股上市公司数据为样本，基于委托代理、信息不对称等相关理论，验证了控股股东股权质押与股价崩盘风险的关系，并探究盈余管理在其中发挥的中介作用。除此之外，本文还加入了产权性质和分析师关注程度作为调节变量，进一步证明了控股股东股权质押、盈余管理与股价崩盘风险三者之间的影响机制。本文主要的研究结论为：控股股东进行股权质押会加剧股价崩盘风险，质押后的盈余管理行为是其中一种中介传导机制；并且控股股东股权质押对股价崩盘风险的负面影响及盈余管理的中介作用在非国有企业以及证券分析师关注度较低的上市公司中更为显著。 本文拓展了控股股东股权质押对股价崩盘风险影响及作用机制的相关研究，对于如何规范股权质押行为，保护投资者和质权人的利益有一定的启发作用。
英文摘要：	Since《Property Law of the People’s Republic China》made it clear that the equity can be pledged in 2007, equity pledge has been more and more popular in shareholders of listed companies as a new useful and quick financing means. While equity pledge can help solving the problem of capital shortage effectively, it’s more common that stock price fluctuates abnormally even collapses with the widespread use of it. These problems not only damage the interests of pledgees and investors, but also go against the stable development of China's capital market. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to explore the impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on stock price collapse and what kind of management behavior lead to it. Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2019 and some related theories like agency and information asymmetry, this paper explores the relationship between the controlling shareholders' equity pledge and the risk of stock price collapse, and explores the intermediary role of earnings management in it. In addition, the nature of property rights and the degree of analysts' attention are added as adjusting variables to give further proof of the influence mechanism. The main conclusions of research are: the controlling shareholders' equity pledge would aggravate the risk of stock price collapse, and the behavior of earnings management is a possible mechanism of action; the negative impact of equity pledge on the risk of stock price collapse and the intermediary role of earnings management are more significant in these private enterprises and companies which less analysts focus on. This paper expands the relevant research about how controlling shareholder's equity pledge influence the risk of stock price collapse and the mechanism of it, which has a certain inspiration on how to regulate the equity pledge behavior and protect the interests of investors and pledgees.
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