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论文编号：	11676
作者编号：	2120182938
上传时间：	2020/6/19 17:02:43
中文题目：	控股股东股权质押对股价同步性的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the Influence of Controlling Shareholders'''' Equity Pledge on the Synchronization of Stock Prices
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	控股股东股权质押；股价同步性；盈余管理；审计师行业专长
英文关键字：	pledge of controlling shareholder''''s equity; stock price synchronization; earnings management; auditor industry expertise
中文摘要：	控股股东股权质押是指控股股东将其所持有的公司股份部分或全部出质给银行、券商等金融机构，以获得贷款的融资行为，具有流动性高、操作便利、风险可控及融资门槛较低等特点，是公司重要的融资方式之一。股价波动的同步性(Synchronicity)即为市场上所说的“同涨同跌”现象，是反映资本市场信息效率的重要指标。本文意在从市场角度，探讨控股股东股权质押作为一个较为普遍的现象，对资本市场信息效率造成的影响，并从盈余管理能够影响会计信息质量的角度探究这种影响产生的机理。同时，本文意图探讨具有行业专长的审计师作为重要的外部监督力量对上述控股股东股权质押——股价同步性联系的影响。本文首先回顾了股权质押方面与股价同步性方面的文献，运用理论分析方法提出研究假设。在此基础上，本文以2008～2018年度上市公司控股股东股权质押、股价同步性、公司经营情况、行业情况等数据为样本，运用实证分析方法，采取固定效应面板模型对研究假设进行检验，并采取倾向得分匹配法进行稳健性检验。本文主要结论有：（1）与未进行控股股东股权质押的公司相比，控股股东股权质押的上市公司股价同步性更高。（2）盈余管理发挥了部分中介作用，进行股权质押的控股股东有能力进行更多的盈余管理，降低会计信息质量，使公司股价波动与大盘“同涨同跌”趋势上升。（3）聘请具有行业专长的审计师对控股股东股权质押与股价同步性正相关关系具有负向调节作用。具备行业专长的审计师具备深入的知识和能力抑制盈余管理等机会主义行为，能够显著提高公司会计信息透明度，使公司信息更多地融入股价之中。
英文摘要：	The pledge of controlling shareholder's equity means that the controlling shareholder pledges part or all of the company's shares to banks, securities companies and other financial institutions to obtain loans, which is characterized by high liquidity, convenient operation, controllable risk and low financing threshold. It is one of the important financing methods of a company. The synchronicity of stock price fluctuations is a phenomenon known as "simultaneous rise and fall" in the market. It is an important indicator of the information efficiency of the capital market. This paper aims to explore the influence of pledge of controlling shareholder's equity on capital market information efficiency as a common phenomenon from the perspective of the market. This paper also aims to explore the mechanism of such influence from the perspective of earnings management affecting the quality of accounting information. At the same time, this paper intends to explore the influence of auditors with industry expertise as an important external supervisory force on the correlation between controlling shareholder's pledge of equity and stock price synchronization. Firstly, this paper reviews the literature on equity pledge and synchronicity of stock price and puts forward the research hypothesis by theoretical analysis. On this basis, this paper takes the data of 2008-2018 listed company's controlling shareholder's equity pledge, stock price synchronization, company operating conditions, industry conditions as examples. This paper uses empirical analysis methods and a fixed-effect panel model to test the research assumptions. A robustness test is performed using the propensity score matching method. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) Compared with companies that have not pledged the controlling shareholder's equity, the stock prices of listed companies with controlling shareholder equity pledge are more synchronized. (2) Earnings management plays a part of the intermediary role. The controlling shareholder who pledged equity has the ability to perform more earnings management, which can also increase the company's stock price synchronization. (3) Employing an auditor with industry expertise has a negative adjustment effect on the positive correlation between the equity pledge of the controlling shareholder and the synchronization of stock prices. Auditors with industry expertise have in-depth knowledge and ability to suppress opportunistic behaviors such as earnings management, which can significantly improve the transparency of company accounting information and make company information more integrated into stock prices.
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