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论文编号：	11657
作者编号：	2120182909
上传时间：	2020/6/19 16:32:38
中文题目：	基于动态博弈的制造商融资选择分析：电商平台与银行
英文题目：	Analysis of Manufacturer''s Financing Choice Based on Dynamic Game: E-commerce Platform or Bank
指导老师：	方磊
中文关键字：	资金约束；电子商务平台；融资模式；动态博弈
英文关键字：	Capital-constraint；E-commerce platform；Financing model；Dynamic Game
中文摘要：	在全球经济发展的浪潮下，中小企业的数量急速增长，对经济发展和缓解就业压力起到重要作用。但是中小企业普遍面临两大发展问题——缺乏足够的资金和难以开辟销售渠道。本文考虑通过银行融资和电子商务平台融资解决中小企业的资金问题；通过电子商务平台销售解决中小企业的渠道问题。 在对供应链金融和电子商务平台相关领域的文献进行梳理总结的基础上，结合实际情况，构造由银行、电子商务平台及其合作的中小企业制造商组成的模型，在银行处于竞争市场和垄断市场两种情况下，考虑电子商务平台先选择提供保守型或策略型融资模式，制造商后选择通过电子商务平台或银行进行融资的完全信息动态博弈。首先分别对电子商务平台融资与银行融资时的最优生产量及最优利率进行分析，得到各参与方的利润；然后根据逆向递推的顺序对比制造商和电子商务平台在不同融资情境下的利润，对双方的策略进行分析并求出博弈的均衡。 本文的创新点有两点：一是考虑了制造商和电子商务平台两方的最优选择，二是考虑银行处于竞争市场和垄断市场两种情况。研究结果表明：首先，银行融资和电子商务平台融资模型均存在均衡解，可以为制造商决策生产量及电子商务平台和银行决策融资利率提供参考。其次，在银行处于竞争市场和垄断市场两种情况下，分别求出了电子商务平台和制造商在融资阶段的最优对策。最后，在电子商务平台提供与银行类似融资模式的情况下，电子商务平台融资的表现总是优于银行融资。
英文摘要：	In the tide of global economic development, the number of SMEs has grown rapidly, which has played an important role in economic development and easing employment pressure. But SMEs generally face two major development problems: lack of sufficient funds and difficulty in opening up sales channels. This article considers bank financing and e-commerce platform financing to solve the problem of SME funding; sales through e-commerce platform to solve the channel problem of SMEs. On the basis of combing and summarizing the literature in the related fields of supply chain finance and e-commerce platforms, combined with the actual situation, construct a model composed of banks, e-commerce platforms and their cooperation with small and medium-sized manufacturers. In both cases of the market, consider the e-commerce platform to choose to provide a conservative or strategic financing model first, and then the manufacturer chooses finance through the e-commerce platform or bank, they constitute a complete information dynamic game of financing. First, analyze the optimal production volume and optimal interest rate of e-commerce platform financing and bank financing separately to obtain the profits of each participant; then compare the profits of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms in different financing scenarios according to the order of reverse recursion, Analyze the strategies of both parties and find the equilibrium of the game. There are two innovations in this article: one is to consider the optimal choices of both manufacturers and e-commerce platforms, and the other is to consider the situation where bank is in a competitive market and the situation where bank is in a monopolistic market. The research results show that: First, there is a balanced solution for the bank financing and e-commerce platform financing models, which can provide a reference for the manufacturer's decision-making production volume and the e-commerce platform and bank's decision-making financing interest rate. Secondly, in the two situations where the bank is in a competitive market and a monopolistic market, the optimal countermeasures for the e-commerce platform and the manufacturer in the financing stage are respectively found. Finally, in the case where e-commerce platforms provide similar financing models to banks, e-commerce platform financing always performs better than bank financing.
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