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论文编号：	11436
作者编号：	1120150843
上传时间：	2019/12/16 7:39:14
中文题目：	独立董事信息共享机制的治理效应研究
英文题目：	The Governance Effect of Independent Directors’ Information Sharing
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	独立董事；信息共享；价值效应；监督效应；群体决策
英文关键字：	Independent directors; Information sharing; Value effect; Monitoring effect；Group decision-making
中文摘要：	公司制度在所有权和经营权的分离的基础上爆发出巨大的社会效能，为调配社会资源、提高商业效率发挥了重要作用。然而，公司治理问题也伴随着两权分离而产生，作为投资人与管理层之间的桥梁，董事会这一机构也是公司治理结构中的重要组成，为公司的战略规划、日常重大决策、内部监督、合规建议等发挥出重要的作用。作为具有任务导向特征的会议型组织，董事会不同于公司中的科层制度安排，具有独立的运行特征。不少学者为探究董事会发挥功效的路径、影响效果、情境因素而倾注了大量心血，这些研究逐渐形成三条董事会研究的路径：第一，立足于董事会的静态结构特征，探讨董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事会领导力结构、专业委员会构成等对公司绩效产生的影响。第二，引入社会组织非正式结构的相关理论和观点，结合董事会成员的互动过程，探索管理层与董事会关系、董事会非正式层级、董事会断裂带等对组织绩效、管理者行为的影响效果。第三，从董事会内部资源、信息的构成与整合出发，结合社会网络研究工具，考察董事背景特征、董事会网络为公司经营和发展带来的深远影响。这体现了董事会研究重心从静态的结构安排转向动态的沟通和决策过程，完善中间环节的趋势。而关注对象也从个体特征转向群体关系和互动过程。 在董事会运作过程中，信息的构成、散布趋势、整合及重构方式决定了董事会的最终决策，对组织绩效形成决定性的影响。然而，已有研究缺乏对董事会信息集合的考察。受限于可获取的年报数据类型，以及处理数据的研究工具，学者们往往难以从董事会人员构成特征中，抽象出董事会决策信息集合的特征，这也构成董事会研究的瓶颈，使得相关研究难以与组织绩效构成直接的联系，也因此，学者们致力于寻求打开董事会“黑箱”的方法和工具。 本文受到董事会会议频率研究的启发，以独立董事为切入点，考察独立董事这一具有同质化偏好群体的信息共享过程以及与内部董事的博弈过程，构建了独立董事信息共享模型和监督博弈模型。该模型结合年报数据基础，推导出独立董事信息共享程度的指标，并作为其咨询职能、监督职能的具体强度指标，从而考察其治理效应。研究结合2004年至2018年A股上市公司数据，实证检验了模型的预测效果和理论假设的正确性。研究结果在证实独立董事信息共享这一治理路径的同时，验证了独立董事信息共享有助于促进公司财务绩效和股东价值提升，并且相同条件下有效降低了管理层薪酬，具有显著的价值效应和监督效应。此外，本文还结合董事会与公司层面情境因素，验证了独立董事的外部兼职网络与内部沟通网络之间存在联动关系，促进独立董事治理能力的提升。而在管理层权力较大公司中，独立董事信息共享机制受到抑制，治理有效性下降。在公司层面情境因素方面，尽管股权集中度对独立董事信息共享的价值效应影响不显著，但是对其监督效应的发挥存在抑制作用。此外，环境不确定性的升高还会增大独立董事信息共享机制的价值效应，但是会抑制监督效应的发挥。 研究的贡献包括以下几点：首先，梳理并引入了群体决策理论，借助这一理论分析董事会成员决策特征和影响因素，为科学分析董事会过程中独立董事成员行为对决策信息的影响疏通了理论基础。其次，以传统的人员结构研究为基础，结合数学模型和特定董事会群体的参会情况构建数学模型，实现了信息结构视角下的董事会治理有效性研究，为构建董事会过程与公司经济后果之间提供新的视角、新的工具和新的变量。第三，验证了董事会成员信息共享机制的治理有效性，从价值效应与监督效应两个角度分别验证了独立董事信息共享水平升高的正面意义，同时针对独立董事兼职特征、管理层行为、股权集中度以及环境特征等情境要素的影响进行了深入考察，为探讨董事会内外部网络的信息交换、重新审视独立董事履职效果提供了启示。
英文摘要：	With the separation of ownership and management, the corporate institutions have achieved great social efficiency and played an important role in allocating social resources and improving business efficiency. However, corporate governance problems also arise with the separation of ownership and management. The board of directors is not only as a bridge between investors and the management, but also an important part of the corporate governance structure, which accounting for the company’s strategic planning, major decisions, internal supervision and compliance recommendations. As a committee organization with task-oriented characteristics, the board of directors is different from the hierarchical arrangement in the company and operates independently. Many scholars dedicate themselves to explore the function of the board, the key factors influencing it, and the moderating variables. These studies gradually formed 3 trends in researching board of directors: first, based on the static structure of the board characteristics, researchers discuss the board size, the proportion of independent directors, the board leadership structure and professional committee of the board and their impacts on corporate performance. Secondly, relevant theories on the informal structure of social organizations are introduced, and the interaction process of board members is considered to explore the effects of the relationship between the management and the board, the informal hierarchy of the board, and the faultline of board, and their impacts on firm performance and managers’ behavior. Thirdly, based on the composition and integration of resources and information of the board, and combining the research tools of social network, many studies investigate the profound influence of the background characteristics of directors and the boardroom network, and their influence on companies. This reflects that the research focus is transforming from the static board structure characteristics to the dynamic decision-making process. The researchers’ attention has also shifted from individual characteristics to group relations and interactive processes. During the board involvement, the composition, distribution, integration and reconstruction of information determine the final decision of the board, and the board information collection has a decisive impact on organization performance. However, there is a lack of studies on the collection of board information. Restricted to the available data types and research tools, scholars have difficulties to use the data of director’s personnel characteristics to get the extract decision-making information data. This also makes it hard to open the "black box" of the board and understanding its functioning methods. Inspired by the study on the frequency of board meetings, this paper takes independent directors as the starting point to investigate the information sharing process, exploring the information collection of independent directors, a group of people with similar preference. Then we using game theory to explore the interaction in board, and constructs the information sharing model of independent directors and the game model of board supervision. Based on the data of the annual reports, the model derives the index of information sharing degree of independent directors, and uses it to investigate the effectiveness of governance effect. In addition, based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2018, this study empirically tested the prediction of the model and the correctness of the hypothesis. It also confirmed the governance path of information sharing among independent directors. The results verify that information sharing among independent directors helps promote the corporate financial performance and shareholder value, and effectively reduces the management compensation during the same conditions, which means that it has significant value effect and supervision effect. In addition, combined with micro and macro moderate variables, this paper verifies the linkage between the external network and internal communication network of independent directors, and information sharing promotes independent directors’ governance ability. However, in companies with large management power, the information sharing mechanism of independent directors is restrained and the effectiveness of governance is reduced. Besides, although stock concentration has no significant influence on the value effect of independent directors’ information sharing, it has a restraining effect on the supervision effect. In addition, the increase of environmental uncertainty will also increase the value effect of the information sharing, but will inhibit the supervision effect. The contributions of this paper include the following points: first, the group decision-making theory was introduced to analyze the decision-making process of board members, and the theoretical basis was cleared for analyzing the impact of independent directors’ behaviors on decision-making information. Second, the research is based on the study of traditional personnel structure, combined with the mathematical modelling to get data of board information. The effectiveness of board governance is studied from the perspective of information structure. It provides new perspectives, new tools and new variables for board process and tries new way to study the economic consequences of the company. Third, the study verifies the governance effectiveness of the information sharing mechanism among board members from two aspects: value effect and supervision effect. The influence of moderating variables such as interlock of independent directors, management power, stock concentration and environmental uncertainty was also investigated, which provided enlightenment for the information exchange between the internal and external network of the board, and have a re-examination of the capability of independent directors.
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