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论文编号：	11209
作者编号：	1120140822
上传时间：	2019/12/9 11:39:20
中文题目：	公司竞争战略、董事专业背景与异常关联交易
英文题目：	Corporate Competitive Strategy, Professional Background of Directors and Abnormal Related Party Transactions
指导老师：	武立东
中文关键字：	竞争战略； 异常关联交易；董事专业背景； 战略治理； 私有信息
英文关键字：	Competitive Strategy; Abnormal Related Party Transactions; Professional Background of Directors; Corporate Strategic Governance; Private Information.
中文摘要：	竞争战略一直在战略管理理论的发展历程中占据重要地位，关于竞争战略的早期研究主要考察其对组织绩效的影响，后来则开始关注竞争战略如何影响组织行为，近年来一些研究开始关注竞争战略对组织行为中代理问题的影响，且大多发现采取激进竞争战略的公司更有可能产生代理问题。相关的研究已经探讨了过度投资、盈余管理和公司违规等多个方面的代理问题，不过尚未有研究从关联交易的角度展开分析。考虑到较早的安然公司，以及近期的乐视公司，都是通过激进的竞争战略快速发展，但是却存在利用大量非正常关联交易粉饰公司业绩等现实问题，因此提出本研究的第一个问题：实施何种竞争战略的公司更有可能利用异常关联交易来支持其战略的执行。 进一步的，由于战略执行过程中代理问题的产生，因此有必要从公司治理的角度考察如何对代理问题进行治理。当前有关公司战略治理的研究，大多关注董事会对公司总体层面战略如多元化战略，或者职能层面战略如研发战略、财务战略等方面的治理作用，却尚未有研究考察董事会对中观层面的竞争战略会产生何种影响。由于竞争战略与其他层面的战略相比，兼具操作性与全面性，因此考察董事会与竞争战略的关系，将更有助于董事会提高战略治理水平。同时，考虑到当前有关董事会的研究已经从对董事会结构的考察开始转向对董事个体认知能力的考察，因此基于战略权变理论和高阶理论提出本研究的第二个问题：专业背景与竞争战略相匹配的董事对竞争战略执行过程中的异常关联交易行为会产生怎样的治理作用。 通过对上述两个问题进行研究，将为相关的领域提供一定的实践价值和理论价值。在实践价值方面，将有助于上市公司减少竞争战略执行过程中的代理问题；有助于利益相关者更好地对异常关联交易进行监督；对实践中如何提高上市公司董事会的战略治理水平提供理论支持。在理论价值方面，可以丰富有关公司竞争战略如何影响组织行为的相关研究；对董事与竞争战略关系的考察，既扩展了竞争战略层面的战略治理研究，又扩展了战略权变理论在董事这一重要战略行动者方面的应用；借鉴高阶理论分析董事的专业背景，丰富了这一理论在董事会战略治理研究中的应用。 为了对本研究提出的问题进行解答，本研究首先基于迈尔斯和斯诺的竞争战略分类模型，将公司竞争战略分为进攻型战略和防御型战略，通过分析不同竞争战略在企业课题、工程课题和行政课题三个方面的特征，分析了实施不同竞争战略的公司在公司高管的盈余操纵动机和自由裁量权方面的差异，探讨其差异所导致的对异常关联交易需求的影响。其次，为了考察董事在竞争战略执行过程中的治理作用，本研究基于高阶理论，将董事的专业背景分为输出型和生产型，从理论层面分析专业背景与公司竞争战略相匹配的董事是否能够发挥更积极的治理作用。与已有研究大多使用调节模式检验战略匹配效果不同，本研究使用组合背离模式考察董事专业背景与竞争战略的匹配，通过理论分析发现，输出型背景的董事与进攻型战略相匹配，而生产型背景的董事和防御型战略相匹配。接下来，考虑到不同来源的董事在战略治理过程中所发挥作用的不同，本研究分别从内部董事和外部董事的角度提出有关董事专业背景与公司竞争战略相匹配时如何影响异常关联交易的假设，并进行了实证检验。最后，在进一步的研究中，从私有信息的角度对关联交易性质进行分析，从而更好地考察公司竞争战略对异常关联交易的影响。 本研究的主要结论如下：（1）相对于采取防御型战略的公司，采取进攻型战略的公司通常会实施较多的异常关联交易，原因可能在于采取进攻型战略的公司通常具有更强的高管盈余操纵动机和较弱的内部控制机制。（2）在采取进攻型战略的公司中，输出型内部董事比例的增加会导致异常关联交易的减少，而在采取防御型战略的公司中生产型内部董事比例的增加同样会导致异常关联交易的减少，这一结果表明无论公司实施何种竞争战略，那些专业背景与公司竞争战略相匹配的内部董事都可以发挥更好的战略治理作用。（3）在采取进攻型战略的公司中，专业背景与竞争战略相匹配的独立董事表现出对异常关联交易的抑制作用，说明其发挥了有效的战略治理作用；然而在防御型公司中，专业背景匹配的独立董事并未发挥显著的影响。（4）无论公司采取何种竞争战略，非执行董事团队中专业背景与竞争战略相匹配的董事越多，公司实施的异常关联交易就越多，原因可能在于专业背景与竞争战略相匹配的非执行董事通常代表着大股东利益，从而未能发挥积极的战略治理作用。 本研究的创新之处主要体现在以下几个方面：首先，本研究为研究公司实施关联交易的影响因素提供了新的研究视角；其次，本研究首次基于组合背离的匹配模式考察董事与公司战略的匹配，为扩展这一领域的研究提供了新的角度；最后，在本文的进一步研究中通过引入关联交易私有信息的概念，为研究关联交易提供了新的思路。 本研究的局限体现在：首先，虽然本研究采用了较为常用的方法对公司竞争战略进行了度量，但是这种度量方法可能存在着度量噪音，在准确刻画公司竞争战略方面相对于问卷数据存在着一定局限性。其次，没有对公司竞争战略影响异常关联交易的机制和情境因素进行深入地挖掘和实证检验。再次，在对董事专业背景进行考察时，出于研究目的和实证检验的需求对一些专业背景进行了精简，对于深入挖掘各类专业背景在战略过程中的治理作用来说略显不足。最后，由于并未详细的区分不同关联交易主体以及具体事项，因此对关联交易具体内容的考察略有不足。
英文摘要：	Competitive strategy has always played an important role in the development of strategic management theory. Early studies on competitive strategy mainly focused on its impact on organizational performance. Later, they began to focus on how competitive strategy affects organizational behavior. In recent years, some studies began to examine the impact of competitive strategy on agency problems in organizational behavior. And most of them found that companies that adopted radical competitive strategy are more likely to have agency problems. Relevant studies have explored the agency issues of over-investment, earnings management and corporate irregularities, but there are no studies have been carried out from the perspective of related party transactions. Taking into account the fact that Enron Corp and LETV company have developed rapidly through aggressive competition strategy, but actually used a large number of abnormal related party transactions to gloss over the performance of the company, the first question of this study is: how does the company's competitive strategy affect the abnormal related party transactions? Furthermore, due to the emergence of agency problems in the process of strategic implementation, it is necessary to examine how to deal with agency problems from the perspective of corporate governance. At present, most of the research on corporate strategic governance focus on the role of board of directors in corporate level strategy, such as diversification strategy, or functional strategy, such as R&D strategy or financial strategy. However, no research has been done to examine how board of directors will affect the competitive strategy. As competitive strategy is more operational and comprehensive than other levels of strategy, it will be more helpful for the board of directors to improve the level of strategic governance to examine the relationship between the board of directors and competitive strategy. At the same time, considering that the current research on the board of directors has shifted from investigating the structure of the board to investigating the individual cognitive ability of directors, the second question of this study is: what kind of governance role directors with matching professional background and competitive strategy will have in the process of implementing competitive strategy. Through the study of these two issues, it will provide some practical and theoretical value for the relevant fields. In terms of practical value, it will help listed companies reduce agency problems in the implementation of competitive strategy; help stakeholders better supervise abnormal related party transactions; and provide theoretical support on how to improve the strategic governance level of the board of directors of listed companies. In terms of theoretical value, it can enrich the relevant research on how corporate competitive strategy affects organizational behavior; the investigation of the relationship between directors and competitive strategy not only expands the research on strategic governance at the level of competitive strategy, but also expands the application of strategic contingency theory in directors. In order to answer the questions raised in this study, this study divided the company's competitive strategy into prospector and defender strategies based on the competitive strategy classification model of Miles and Snow. By analyzing the three issues of different competitive strategies in the enterprise, engineering and administrative subjects, the paper analyzed how the company's competitive strategy influenced the surplus of the company's executives. Manipulating motivation and decision-making space has an impact on abnormal related party transactions. Secondly, in order to investigate the governance role of directors in the implementation of competitive strategy, based on the Upper Theory, this study divides the professional background of directors into output type and throughput type, and theoretically analyses whether directors matching professional background and corporate competitive strategy can play a more active governance role. In this study, the Profile Deviation model was used to examine the matching between directors'professional background and competitive strategy. Through theoretical analysis, we found that directors with output background matched with prospector strategy, while directors with throughput background matched with defender strategy. Next, considering the different roles of directors from different parties, this study proposes the hypothesis of how directors' professional background matches the company's competitive strategy to influence abnormal related party transactions from the perspective of internal directors and external directors. Finally, in further research, the nature of related party transactions is analyzed from the perspective of private information, so as to better examine the impact of corporate competitive strategy on abnormal related party transactions. The main conclusions of this study are as follows: (1) Compared with companies adopting defender strategies, companies adopting aggressive strategies usually carry out more abnormal related party transactions. The reason may be that companies adopting aggressive strategies usually have stronger earnings manipulation motivation and weaker internal control mechanism. (2) In companies with prospector strategy, the increase of the proportion of output-oriented internal directors will lead to the decrease of abnormal related party transactions, while in companies with defender strategy, the increase of the proportion of throughput-oriented internal directors will also lead to the decrease of abnormal related party transactions. This result shows that no matter what competitive strategy the company implements, if those professional backgrounds match the company's competitive strategy, internal directors can play a better role in strategic governance. (3) In companies that adopt prospector strategies, independent directors with matching professional backgrounds show restraining effect on abnormal related party transactions, indicating that they have played an effective role in strategic governance; however, in defender companies, independent directors with matching professional backgrounds have not played a significant role. (4) Regardless of the competitive strategy adopted by the company, the more directors in the non-executive director team whose professional background matches the competitive strategy, the small in the scale of abnormal related party transactions. The innovations of this study are mainly embodied in the following aspects: Firstly, this study enriches the research on the impact of corporate strategy on corporate financial management behavior by exploring the impact of corporate competitive strategy on abnormal related party transactions. Secondly, this study provides a new perspective for the study of the factors affecting the implementation of related party transactions. Thirdly, based on the matching model of portfolio deviation, this study firstly explores the matching between directors and corporate strategy, which provides a new perspective for expanding the research in this field. Finally, through introducing the concept of private information of affiliated transactions in the further study of this paper, it provides a new way of thinking for the study of related party transactions. The limitations of this study are as follows: Firstly, although this study adopts a more commonly used method to measure the company's competitive strategy, there may be measurement noise in this measurement method, and there are some limitations in accurately describing the company's competitive strategy compared with the questionnaire data. Secondly, there is no in-depth mining and empirical testing of the mechanism and situational factors that influence abnormal related party transactions in the company's competitive strategy. Thirdly, in the investigation of directors' professional background, some professional backgrounds are simplified for the needs of empirical test, which is a little insufficient for the in-depth exploration of the governance role of various professional backgrounds in the strategic process. Finally, because there is no detailed distinction between different subjects of related party transactions and specific matters, the specific content of related party transactions is slightly inadequate.
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