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论文编号：	1050
作者编号：	2120072070
上传时间：	2009/6/1 18:21:53
中文题目：	产品市场竞争、公司治理与公司现
英文题目：	Product Market Competition, Co
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	产品市场竞争 代理问题 公司治理
英文关键字：	Product Market Competition Ag
中文摘要：	现金持有是反映公司财务和经营战略的一项重要的理财行为，对公司的投融资行为、股利分配以及日常运营政策具有重要的影响。随着不完善资本市场研究的逐步深入，资金盈余管理、现金过度持有等公司资金问题越来越受到公司金融研究者的广泛注意。尤其是近年来世界范围内公司普遍增持现金的现象，使很多学者逐步从理论和实证两方面对其产生动因、存在状态等进行了深入研究，并相继提出了预防动机理论、交易成本理论、静态权衡理论、优序融资理论及自由现金流量理论等等对其进行解释。人们的研究范围也逐渐从公司财务基本特征面因素，转移到公司治理结构各因素的共同影响，研究出发点也逐渐从单纯的融资需求动机延伸到公司内部代理动机上来。 产品市场竞争是一种重要的公司治理机制，经济学家们普遍认为产品市场竞争可以有效地降低代理成本，提高生产效率。但是现有的研究很少从产品市场竞争的角度来研究代理动机产生的公司现金持有问题。产品市场竞争引入公司现金持有问题的研究不仅有助于我们综合考虑单一制度环境下所处外部背景及内部特点来研究公司现金持有问题，而且，产品市场和金融市场的多角度契入有利于全面认识公司现金持有的根源及内在价值，进而为公司通过调节现金持有水平来采取有效、合理的战略经营、财务决策提供保障和参考。 本文以产业组织、公司财务和公司治理理论作为基础，以592家上市公司五个年度的平衡面板数据为样本，采用固定效应模型和广义最小二乘法，从股权集中度、董事会、高管激励、CEO变更四个角度，考察产品市场竞争、公司治理与公司现金持有之间的作用关系。在此基础之上，结合不同的所有权结构，进一步探讨公司面临的市场竞争程度、公司治理状况对公司现金持有行为的影响机理。 来自平衡面板数据固定效应模型的研究结果表明，在我国上市公司中，管理者存在着基于个人利益持有大量现金的行为。当产品市场竞争不激烈时，管理者可能倾向基于个人利益而持有大量现金。但是，如果公司治理较好，代理成本较低，管理者在面临产品市场竞争程度较低时的大量现金持有行为会受到一定程度的抑制。具体来说：第一，当公司的股权集中度较高时，在产品市场上面临竞争程度较低的公司会降低现金持有水平。第二，公司持股董事比例、董事长与总经理两职分离可以有效降低产品市场竞争程度较低时管理者基于利益攫取而大量持有现金的行为；产品市场竞争通过独立董事对公司大量现金持有产生的影响在总样本中并不明显，这可能源于国有控股公司和非国有控股公司独立董事监督和战略咨询功能发挥的不同效果；董事长变更更多地表现出了基于董事长徇私行为而短期花费现金的效应。第三，当CEO持股比例较高，经理层持有公司股份时，在产品市场上面临竞争程度较低的公司会显著降低现金持有水平，而高管的货币性激励却并没有有效抑制产品市场竞争程度较低时管理者大量持有现金的行为。第四，CEO变更当年，继任CEO为了向市场传递公司未来的利好信息，并不会选择在产品市场竞争程度较低时为了个人利益而持有大量现金。但是，CEO变更对下一年度产品市场竞争与公司现金持有之间关系的影响却表明，CEO变更并没有真正降低企业的代理成本，公司下一年度的现金持有水平并没有下降。另外，值得注意的是，不同的所有权结构下，产品市场竞争、公司治理与公司现金持有的影响机理不尽相同，我们需要有针对性地完善公司治理结构，降低公司内部的代理成本，从而为公司制定科学合理的财务决策提供一定的帮助和借鉴。 本文首次基于产品市场竞争的外部市场条件，从公司股权、董事会结构与高管激励等方面来系统分析了公司治理对现金持有的影响，既全面展示了公司治理与现金持有之间的相互关系，也揭示了不同外部产品市场竞争条件下代理动机对公司现金政策的干预作用。但是，由于本文大多基于创新性的研究，已有的相关文献还较为欠缺，本文的研究仍然存在着一些局限和不足。例如，产品市场竞争对公司治理和现金持有的影响可能存在内生性问题；高管薪酬与公司现金持有之间的动态关系，本文并未涉及；本文虽然采用了两个衡量产品市场竞争的代理变量，但是鉴于产品市场竞争程度在产业经济学领域中一直都没有寻找到一个非常准确的并且易于采集的代理变量，我们希望在未来的研究中，能够探寻更为准确的代理变量，以寻求更为科学的研究结论。
英文摘要：	The decision making of corporate cash holdings is an important financing behavior in corporate finance and management strategy, which play a significant role in corporate investing and financing behavior, dividend distribution and daily operation. With the development of research in imperfect of capital market, earning management and excess cash holdings have gradually drawn extensive attention in corporate finance studies. Especially corporate has held more excess cash reserves all through the world nowadays, which improves the theoretical and empirical research in corporate cash holdings. Several theories about cash holdings have been researched in corporate finance, such as precautionary motive theory, transaction motive theory, static trade-off theory, pecking order theory and free cash flow theory. Correspondingly, research scope in corporate cash holdings has turned to corporate governance from basic financial factors in early studies. And researchers nowadays focus more on agency cost motive rather than pure financing motive. Product market competition is an important corporate governance mechanism. And scientists generally believe that product market competition could mitigate the potential agency problems and improve production efficiency. However, existing literatures have seldom discussed corporate cash holdings based on agency cost motive from product market competition. Consequently, studies on corporate cash holdings in combination with product market competition not only help us do comprehensive research of cash reserves based on the exterior background and internal characteristics of institutional environment, but also give us all-round attitudes about the original root and intrinsic value of corporate cash holdings. Stand on this perspective of research, it may provide good safeguarding and references for making scientific strategic management and financial decisions. Based on industrial organization, corporate finance and corporate governance theory, this paper makes an empirical investigation of balanced panel data of 592 listed firms in China using fixed effect model and generalized least square method, and discusses the influence mechanism of product market competition and corporate governance on the corporate cash holdings from different aspects of governance, such as ownership concentration, board of directors, managerial incentives and CEO turnover. On the basis of the studies above, we further analyze how does corporate governance have moderating effects on the relationship between product market competition and corporate cash holdings combined with different ownership structures. The results show that self-interested managers do choose to hold too much cash reserves in Chinese listed firms. We find that when firms face less market competition in industry, they have significantly higher cash reserves than firms facing intense market competition. It could be the case that managers can hoard cash for their own benefit when they face less market competition in industry. However, if the firms have strong governance, corporate governance mechanisms can help to mitigate the potential agency problems associated with this so large cash reserves in less market competition. To be specific, we provide evidence on the following four main aspects: First, when product market competition decreases, firms with higher ownership concentration have lower cash reserves. It could be the case that strong governance can mitigate managers’ large cash holdings activities based on their own profit in firms facing less market competition in industry. Second, when firms have higher proportion of directors holding share and non-duality leadership, managers may choose to lower cash reserves in less intensive product market competition; the relationship between product market competition, independent directors and corporate cash holdings is not significant in 592 Chinese listed firms, which may derive from the different action effects the independent directors have in stated-owned listed companies and private listed companies; chairman turnover shows a cash spending activity on the benefit of chairman who left. That is to say, when chairman turnover occurs, cash holdings are decreased in the firms in low level of competition in industry. Third, when CEO holds more share proportion and managers have equity compensation, firms would decrease cash reserves in less intensive product market competition. However, managerial monetary compensation can not mitigate managers’ large cash holdings activities based on their own profit in firms facing less market competition in industry. Fourth, when CEO turnover occurs, the successor would not choose to hold large sums of cash when the firms face less market competition in industry in order to transfer good news to capital market. However, when we study the lag effect of CEO turnover on the relationship between product market competition and cash holdings, we find that on one year after CEO turnover, firms facing low level of market competition do not reduce large cash holdings. This indicates that CEO turnover does not resolve agency problems in the next years. Further more, it is noteworthy that the relationship between product market competition, corporate governance and corporate cash holdings is not the same in different ownership structures. So we should make scientific financial decisions considering certain ownership structures. Overall, based on product market competition, our study gives a comprehensive research of the influence mechanism of corporate governance on the corporate cash holdings from different aspects of governance, such as ownership concentration, board of directors, managerial incentives and CEO turnover. This multi-perspective research not only discusses comprehensively the relationship between corporate governance and cash holdings, but also reveals the intervention effect of agency cost motive on the corporate cash holdings in different conditions of product market competition. However, stand on innovation research, there are not sufficient related literatures to support our results. Consequently, this paper has some limitations. For example, there may be an endogenous feedback form cash holdings to governance because cash holding and governance are jointly determined. And dynamic relationship between managerial incentives and corporate cash holdings is not included in our study. And the proxy variables for product market competition need to be improved. In view of the fact that it is difficult to find an accurate and available proxy variable to measure the product market competition, we hope we could find a more precise variable to gain a more scientific result in the future studies.
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