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论文编号：	10247
作者编号：	2120162767
上传时间：	2018/6/15 0:16:16
中文题目：	授权与责任转移——基于次要利益相关者视角的实验研究
英文题目：	Delegation and transfer of responsibility — An experimental study based on the perspective of secondary stakeholders
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	授权；委托代理；代理人产生方式 ；责任转移；比较制度研究
英文关键字：	delegation; principal-agent problem; the selection method of agent; transfer of responsibility; comparative institutional research
中文摘要：	近年来，随着我国经济的深入发展，各利益主体之间的关系变得更加多样化和复杂化，这些变化在一定程度上提高了社会效率，但是一些新型的矛盾也随之出现。诸如外包公司和解雇公司这类代理机构的兴起就是一个例子，这些代理机构以委托方的名义行事，可是一旦出问题，这类经济关系中的委托方与代理方就会不约而同地选择逃避责任。本文在这一背景下关注与授权相关的责任转移问题。本文赋予了这类委托代理关系中利益可能受损的次要利益相关者一定的惩罚权力，通过惩罚环节委托人和代理人接收的惩罚点数研究次要利益相关者角度的责任分配问题。 本文在回顾了委托代理理论、利益相关者理论以及惩罚动机等相关理论的基础上采用修正的独裁者博弈模型刻画了不同代理人产生方式下委托人、代理人和次要利益相关者之间的互动，借助非参数检验的方法从授权与否以及结果的公平性这两个维度研究了主要利益相关者对不同方案的选择偏好以及所应承担责任的不同。最后本文检验了授权对委托人和代理人绝对和相对惩罚的调节作用，从而得出了委托人转移责任的作用机制。 通过研究我们发现在不同的制度中主要决策者对于分配方案的偏好是有差异的，同时次要利益相关者角度的责任归因也因此存在差异，具体来说，委托人指定代理人的设置中委托人和代理人的责任划分最不清晰；权力较低的群体通过内部竞选的方式产生的代理人则在大多数情况下都会收到比委托人更少的惩罚；通过拍卖环节产生代理人的竞价制度中的惩罚差异会因授权与否产生正负两种结果，这一制度下实际决策的人会更多的被次要利益相关者所惩罚。同时授权对惩罚的调节作用显示只有在竞选和竞价设置中授权才会减弱委托人因为不公平的分配方案被选择而导致的绝对惩罚力度和相对惩罚力度的增加，而独裁设置中委托人的责任不会因为授权而有所降低。最后，本文从不同的利益主体出发给出了各自的管理策略。
英文摘要：	In recent years, with the in-depth development of China's economy, the relationship between various stakeholders has become more diverse and complex. These changes have increased social efficiency to some extent, but some new types of contradictions have also emerged. The rise of agencies such as outsourcing companies and dismissal companies is an example. These agencies act in the name of the commissioning party. However, once problems arise, the principal and the agent in such economic relations will invariably choose to evade their responsibilities. In this context, this article focuses on the transfer of responsibility related to delegation of authority. This article confers certain punish power on the secondary stakeholders who may have compromised interests in this type of principal-agent relationship. By comparing the points received by the principal and the agent, we can investigate the distribution of responsibilities from a secondary stakeholder’s perspective. After reviewing the principles of principal-agent theory, stakeholder theory, and the motivation of punishment，this article uses a modified dictator game model to describe the interaction between principals, agents, and secondary stakeholders under different electoral systems. Using the non-parametric test method, we studied the main stakeholder's preference for different schemes and the different responsibilities that should be assumed from the two dimensions of authorization and fairness of the results. Finally, this paper examines the moderating effect of authorization on the absolute and relative punishment of principals and agents and concludes the mechanism for principal's transfer responsibility. Through research, we find that the preferences of the main decision makers are different. At the same time, there are differences in the attribution of responsibility from the perspective of secondary stakeholders. Specifically，we found that the division of responsibilities between the principal and the agent is the least clear in the treatment where the principal assigned the agent. The agents elected by the lower-power groups through internal elections received less punishment than the principal in most cases. In the treatment where the agent is generated through the auction, the difference between the punishment of the principal and the agent will result in two positive and negative results due to the transfer of power. The actual executives of decision-making in third treatment will be more hated by the secondary stakeholders. Meanwhile, this paper concludes the mechanism for transferring the responsibility of the principal. That is, although an unfair distribution can increase the absolute and relative abhorrence of the principal, the delegation of the decision making can reduce both of the absolute and relative abhorrence caused by the choice of an unfair allocation. It is worth mentioning that such role only appears in the treatment where the agents elected by the lower-power groups through internal elections and the treatment where the agent is generated through the auction. However, the responsibility of the principal will not be reduced because of authorization in the treatment where the principal assigned the agent. Finally, this paper gives different management strategies from different perspectives.
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