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论文编号：	10246
作者编号：	2120162765
上传时间：	2018/6/15 0:13:14
中文题目：	经理人市场中的公司声誉与CEO薪酬
英文题目：	Company reputation and CEO compensation in the professional manager market
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	公司声誉；高管薪酬；经理人市场；信号理论
英文关键字：	Corporate Reputation; Executive Compensation; Manager Market; Signal Theory
中文摘要：	高管薪酬除了受到公司绩效等财务特征的影响外，也会受到经理人市场声誉机制的监督和激励，但是由于我国职业经理人市场不够发达，个人声誉机制的作用有限。而公司声誉也是声誉理论体系的重要分支，在现实中公司声誉是价值很高的无形资产，但是国内外从公司声誉角度探讨高管薪酬的研究并不多。我们将在本文探讨在中国情境下公司声誉与高管薪酬的关系，并比较不同企业类型下的经理人市场特征是否会影响公司声誉机制的效果。另外，我们考虑到内部治理机制和外部治理机制相互补充、相互替代的关系，在本文研究公司声誉、内部治理特征在高管薪酬方面的调节效应。 本文选择“最受赞赏的中国公司”作为公司声誉的量化指标，采用2007-2016年间《财富》杂志“最受赞赏的中国公司”上榜企业作为研究样本，以是否上榜作为判断标准构建公司声誉虚拟变量进行研究。高管薪酬以“前三名高管薪酬总额的自然对数”为量化指标，为了控制样本差异造成的潜在偏误，我们选取资产规模、ROA、营业收入、市值以及股票回报率作为控制变量，在研究内部公司治理特征与公司声誉的相互关系时我们采用董事长和总经理两职合一、董事会规模、董事会独立性以及第一大股东持股比例作为内部治理特征的替代变量。另外，在本文的稳健性检验部分我们采用倾向得分匹配法分析样本偏误问题，发现本文结论并未受到样本选取偏差的影响。 本文研究得到如下结果：（1）公司声誉对高管薪酬的正向影响比较显著；（2）公司声誉机制的作用强度与经理人市场的类型有关。在国有企业的经理人市场环境下公司声誉对高管薪酬的作用不明显，在非国有企业的经理人市场中公司声誉对高管薪酬具有显著的正向影响；（3）内部治理机制与外部经理人市场机制没有明显的相互补充关系，内外部治理相互配合的治理体系尚未形成。本文的研究结论表明加快发展和完善外部职业经理人市场建设十分必要，深化国有企业改革尤其是薪酬体制改革刻不容缓，另外在继续完善内部治理的同时加强外部治理并重视内外部治理的结合将是诸多企业在今后公司治理方面的重点工作。
英文摘要：	In addition to being affected by financial characteristics such as corporate performance, executive compensation may also be subject to supervision and incentives by the manager's market reputation mechanism. However, due to the lack of a well-developed market for professional managers in China, the role of personal reputation mechanisms is limited. We notice that the firm reputation is also an important branch of the reputation theory. Firm reputation is an intangible asset with high value. However, there is not much research on executive compensation from the perspective of firm reputation at home and abroad. We will discuss the relationship between company reputation and executive compensation in the context of China, and we will also figure out whether different type of manager's markets will affect the effectiveness of the firm reputation mechanism. In addition, we consider the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and external governance mechanisms. In this paper, we will explore the interrelationships between internal and external governance mechanisms of listed companies. We choose “the most admired Chinese company” as a quantitative indicator of firm’s reputation. And we use the Fortune’s “Most Admired Chinese Company” list from 2007 to 2016 as our research sample, and we build the reputation dummy variable on the basis whether it is in the list in one year. Executive compensation is based on the “natural logarithm of top three executives’ compensation” as a quantitative indicator. In order to control the potential bias caused by sample differences, we use firm size, ROA, sales, market value, and stock returns as control variables. In the study of the relationship between internal corporate governance characteristics and reputation, we use duality, board size, board independence and the block shareholder ratio as alternative variables to internal governance characteristics. In addition, in the robustness test of this paper, we use propensity score matching method to analyze the sample bias problem and found that the conclusion of this paper is not affected by sample selection bias. The following results are obtained in this study: (1) The positive impact of corporate reputation on executive compensation is significant; (2) The strength of corporate reputation mechanism is related to the types of manager's market. In the state-owned company's managerial market environment, the company's reputation has no obvious effect on executive compensation. In the non-state-owned company's managerial market, firm reputation has a significant positive impact on executive compensation; (3) Internal governance mechanisms and external governance mechanism does not have a clear relationship with each other, and the systematical governance system for internal and external governance has not yet been formed in China. The research conclusions of this paper show that it is necessary to speed up the development of manager market. Deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, especially the reform of the remuneration system, requires no delay. In addition, continuing to improve internal governance while strengthening external governance and attaching importance to internal and external governance will be the priority of corporate governance for many companies in the future.
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