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论文编号：	10215
作者编号：	2120162728
上传时间：	2018/6/11 23:07:30
中文题目：	管理层持股对企业风险承担影响的研究
英文题目：	The Study on the Imapct of Managerial Ownership on Corporate Risk-taking
指导老师：	齐岳
中文关键字：	管理层持股;风险承担;委托代理理论;国有上市公司
英文关键字：	Management equity; Company Risk; Agency Theory; Publice Listed Company
中文摘要：	管理层持股对于企业长远发展至关重要，因此管理层持股成为了现代公司治理体系的重要组成部分。本文主要研究了管理层持股对公司风险承担水平的影响，由于管理层持股是公司治理研究的重要环节，对管理层持股制度进行深入研究有助于提高企业对管理层持股的关注，企业可以设计合理的管理层持股计划对管理层进行有效的激励，进而使我国的公司治理体系更加的科学完整，同时对于我国上市公司的稳定快速发展具有深远的意义。但大部分国内外学者主要关注管理层持股和公司绩效的关系，较少研究管理层持股和公司风险承担之间的关系。 本文基于信息不对称和委托代理理论，在回顾已有研究基础上，提出本文的研究假设，本研究认为管理层持股与公司风险承担水平呈倒“U”型关系。当高级管理人员持有上市公司股份的比重低于临界点时，高级管理人员持股比重上升时，有利于企业风险承担水平的提高。企业高级管理人员和股东的利益趋于统一，管理层会倾向于选择虽然具有一定风险但是净现值高的项目。但是，当企业高级管理人员持有上市公司股份比重超出了临界值，会发生壕沟效应。管理者从个人利益最大化的角度出发会投资能使管理者个人获利但风险低的项目。这是由于管理者投资风险低的项目，管理者需要承担的成本也更低，相反若是投资高风险项目如果失败的话会将会面对被解雇的风险。管理者为了维护个人的声誉，其持股比例非常高的时候也有可能选择风险很低的项目，因为管理者害怕投资高风险的项目如果决策失误会对自己的声誉造成不利的影响。 本文选取了2011-2015年沪深A股非金融类上市公司相关数据作为研究样本，数据来源于CSMAR和WIND数据库。用季度资产回报率的标准差来衡量企业风险承担水平，使用面板数据的分析方法，将国有企业和非国有企业分组进行实证检验后得出了以下结论：（1）管理层持股比例和公司风险承担水平呈显著倒U型关系。当管理层持股比例低于临界点时，管理者持有的公司股份占公司股份的比例越高，管理者受到股权激励作用的效果就越强；但当管理层持股比例超过临界点，会发生壕沟效应。（2）对于国有企业来说，管理层持股比例和风险承担的关系并不显著，但对非国有企业，管理层持股与公司风险承担水平是显著呈倒“U“型关系。 最后，本文从建立合理的风险评价体系、完善公司治理结构等角度提出一些针对性的对策和建议。本文带来的启示主要有以下几点：第一，明确了管理层持股与公司风险承担之间的关系。第二，我们应该制定怎样的激励政策来提供企业的风险承担水平。第三，在提高企业风险水平时，要注意管理层持股比例要适度，防止过高或者过低，既要促使管理层和股东的利益统一，同时也要避免风险太高过度冒险。
英文摘要：	Management's shareholding is very important for the long-term development of the company. Therefore, management's shareholding has become an important part of the modern corporate governance system. This article mainly studies the influence of management holdings on the company's risk-taking level. Because management holdings are an important part of corporate governance research, conducting in-depth research can make our listed companies pay more attention to management's share-holding mechanism. An effective and reasonable management plan for the company’s shareholdings has improved the corporate governance system in China, which has far-reaching significance for the stable development of listed companies in China. However, most domestic and foreign scholars are very concerned about the relationship between management holdings and corporate performance, and less about the relationship between management holdings and corporate risk taking. Based on the information asymmetry and principal-agent theory, this paper puts forward the hypothesis of this paper on the basis of reviewing the existing research. This study believes that the level of management holdings and the company's risk-taking assume an inverted "U" type relationship. When the proportion of shares held by senior management personnel in listed companies is lower than the critical point, the increase in the proportion of senior management's shareholding will help improve the level of corporate risk taking. The interests of corporate senior managers and shareholders tend to be unified. Management will tend to choose projects that have certain risks but have high NPV. However, when the proportion of corporate executives holding the shares of listed companies exceeds the optimal range, a guttering effect will occur. From the perspective of maximizing personal benefits, managers will invest in projects that make managers personally profitable but have low risk. This is because managers have low investment risks and managers need to bear lower costs. On the contrary, if high-risk investment projects fail, they will face the risk of being laid off. In order to maintain personal reputation, managers may choose projects with very low risk when their shareholding ratio is very high, because managers are afraid of high-risk projects that will adversely affect their reputation if they make mistakes. This article selected the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies as research samples from 2011 to 2015. The data comes from CSMAR database and WIND database. Using the standard deviation of quarterly return on assets to measure the level of corporate risk taking, using panel data analysis methods, after grouping state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) Management's shareholding and corporate risks The level of commitment is significantly inverted U-shaped. When management's shareholding ratio is lower than the critical point, the larger the manager’s holdings of company shares, the greater the effect of managers’ equity incentives; but when management’s shareholding ratio exceeds the critical point, there will be a straitjacket effect. (2) The inverted "U" relationship between the state-owned company's management holdings and the company's risk exposure is not significant, but for non-state-owned enterprises, the level of management holdings and the company's risk-taking is significantly "U-shaped". Finally, this paper puts forward some specific countermeasures and suggestions from the perspectives of establishing a reasonable risk evaluation system and improving the corporate governance structure. The revelations brought by this article mainly include the following points: First, the relationship between management holdings and corporate risk taking is clarified. Second, we should formulate what kind of incentive policies to provide the level of corporate risk. Third, when raising the level of corporate risk, it is necessary to pay attention to the moderate proportion of management holdings, to promote the same interests of shareholders, and to prevent excessive risk taking.
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