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论文编号：	10197
作者编号：	2120162741
上传时间：	2018/6/11 15:34:34
中文题目：	财务冗余、公司治理与高科技企业研发投资
英文题目：	Financial Slack, Corporate Governance and R&D Investment in High-tech Firms
指导老师：	李莉
中文关键字：	财务冗余；研发投资；公司治理；委托代理；高科技企业
英文关键字：	Financial Slack; R&D investment; Corporate Governance; Agency Theory; High-tech Firms
中文摘要：	高科技企业是国家创新的中坚力量，而其中研发活动起到了关键作用。但是，高科技企业通常无形资产占比较高，且多数企业规模较小，难以获得较多的外部融资支持；同时高科技企业处于高速发展的行业，投资机会较多，上述因素决定了高科技企业可能存在且需要财务冗余。但由于现代公司治理中，所有权与代理权分立，基于理性人自利假说，管理者与股东之间很可能出现利益诉求不一致情形，对公司资源拥有直接控制管理权的代理人为谋取私利，往往不会选择具有高风险和不确定性的研发创新活动，导致企业创新发展受阻。本文基于委托代理理论，探究财务冗余资源与高科技企业研发投入之间的关系，并考察公司治理因素对其关系的调节作用。样本选取范围为2012-2016年中国A股上市的540家高科技企业，利用面板数据进行实证研究发现，财务冗余与高科技企业研发投资呈负相关关系。管理层持股、两职合一能够较好的缓解代理问题，缓解财务冗余与研发投资之间的负相关系；但股权制衡并不能有效缓解第二类代理问题，且可能存在大股东合谋现象；独立董事、股权集中对代理问题的缓解作用不显著。进一步的，本文探究了财务冗余的最终去向，发现财务冗余与投资性房地产的配置呈显著正相关关系，而与并购活动没有显著相关性。本文创新地基于当前中国经济环境，从委托代理理论视角出发，丰富了财务冗余与企业研发投资的相关研究，并进一步探究了财务冗余的最终去向，对企业财务冗余资源的配置、公司治理具有一定的借鉴意义。
英文摘要：	High-tech firms are the cornerstone of national innovation, and R&D activities are the key to corporate innovation. However, high-tech firms often have more intangible assets and most of them are small in size, so that it is difficult to obtain more external financing support. At the same time, high-tech firms are in the rapidly developing industries with more investment opportunities. The above factors determine high-tech firms may exist and require financial slack. However, due to the separation of ownership and management power in modern corporate governance, and based on the rational self-interest hypothesis, there is likely to be inconsistency between interests of managers and shareholders. Agents who have direct control over corporate resources will not select R&D and innovation activities with high risks and uncertainties for their private interests, leading to the obstruction of corporate innovation and development. From the perspective of agent theory, this paper explores the relationship between financial slack and R&D investment in high-tech firms, and examines the regulatory effects of corporate governance factors on their relationship. A sample of 540 high-tech firms listed on the A-share market from 2012 to 2016 was selected as a sample. Using panel data, it was found that financial slack was negatively correlated with high-tech R&D investment. Management stockholding and CEO duality can better alleviate the agency problem and mitigate the negative relationship between financial slack and R&D investment. However, equity restriction cannot effectively mitigate the second type of agency problems, and there may be collusion among major shareholders. The mitigation effect of independent directors and equity concentration on agency issues is not significant. Furthermore, this article explores the ultimate direction of financial slack and finds that there is a significant positive correlation between financial slack and the allocation of investment real estate, and there is no significant correlation with M&A activity. This article innovatively based on the agent theory in the current Chinese economic environment, enriched the research on financial slack and corporate R&D investment, and further explored the ultimate destination of financial slack. This article has implications for the configuration of corporate financial slack resources and corporate governance.
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