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论文编号：	10179
作者编号：	2120162694
上传时间：	2018/6/11 11:47:44
中文题目：	控制权与现金流权分离、机构投资者异质性与公司债发行定价
英文题目：	The separation of ownership and control, institutional investor heterogeneity and corporate bond issuance pricing
指导老师：	陆宇建
中文关键字：	控制权与现金流权分离；机构投资者异质性；公司债利差
英文关键字：	The separation of control rights and cash flow rights; heterogeneity of institutional investors; corporate bond spreads
中文摘要：	根据中国人民银行的货币政策执行报告，企业债券（包含公司债）在企业主要融资方式中占比不断提高。2007年，第一支公司债“长电债”发行。2015年1月，中国证监会在《公司债发行试点办法》的基础上，发布了《公司债券发行与交易管理办法》。在十余年间，公司债的发行规模从2007年的122亿增长到2016年的23372亿元，公司债已成为企业重要的融资方式。已有研究表明企业股权结构对企业债务融资方式和融资成本具有显著影响，本文尝试结合我国上市公司终极控制人通过交叉持股和金字塔结构实现的控制权与现金流权分离的现象，研究其对发行公司债定价的影响。 本文在对有关公司债利差影响因素、发行流程和债券信用风险度量等文献进行综述的基础上，提出研究思路。运用实证分析的方法研究了以下三个问题：（1）终极控制人控制权与现金流权分离和公司债发行定价的关系；（2）机构投资者持股对终极控制人控制权与现金流权分离和公司债发行定价的关系的影响；（3）不同类型机构投资者持股对终极控制人控制权与现金流权分离和公司债发行定价的关系的影响。本文以2007-2016年沪深上市公司在公司债一级市场公开发行的公司债为样本，研究发现：（1）当公司债发行主体存在控制权与现金流权分离时，公司债利差更高，大约为10个基点；且分离程度越大，利差越高；（2）机构投资者持股对控制权与现金流权分离和公司债利差之间的关系具有调节作用；（3）按照机构投资者与被投资单位投资关系的类型的差异，将机构投资者细分为压力抵制型机构投资者和压力敏感型机构投资者，本文发现，压力抵制型机构投资者持股对控制权与现金流权分离与公司债利差的相关关系的调节效应显著，而压力敏感型机构投资者持股则不能显著影响二者之间的关系。最后，本文提出相关政策建议。
英文摘要：	According to the implementation report of the people's Bank of China's monetary policy, corporate bonds (including corporate bonds) account for a continuous increase in the main financing methods of enterprises. In 2007, the first corporate debt "long electric debt" was issued. In January 2015, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "Regulations on the issuance and trading of corporate bonds" on the basis of the "company debt issuance pilot scheme". Over the past decade, the scale of corporate bond issuance has increased from 12 billion 200 million in 2007 to 23372 billion in 2016. Corporate bonds have become an important way of financing for enterprises. The existing research shows that the ownership structure of the enterprise has a significant impact on the debt financing mode and the financing cost of the enterprise. This paper tries to study the effect of the separation of control rights and cash flow rights through the cross shareholding and the Pyramid structure of the ultimate controller of the listed companies in China. Based on the literature review of the factors affecting the company's debt interest margin, the issuing process and the credit risk measurement of bonds, this paper puts forward the research ideas. The following three problems are studied by means of empirical analysis: (1) the relationship between the ultimate control rights of the ultimate controller and the separation of cash flow rights and the pricing of corporate debt; (2) the influence of institutional investor ownership on the relationship between the separation of the ultimate controller and the separation of cash flow rights and the pricing of corporate debt; (3) the investment of different types of institutions The influence of Shareholding on the relationship between the ultimate controller's control rights and the separation of cash flow rights and the issue price of corporate bonds. This paper is based on the sample of corporate bonds issued by Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies in the first level market of corporate bonds. The study shows that: (1) when the corporate debt issuers are separated from the right of control and cash flow, the debt profit margin of the company is higher, about 10 basis points, and the greater the degree of separation, the higher the profit margin; (2) institutional investors hold. Shares have a regulating effect on the relationship between the separation of control rights and the separation of cash flow rights and the difference of corporate debt and interest. (3) according to the differences in the types of investment relations between institutional investors and the invested units, institutional investors are subdivided into pressure resistant institutional investors and pressure sensitive institutions. The effect of investor holding on the relationship between the separation of control and cash flow rights and the difference of corporate debt and interest is significant, while the stock ownership of the pressure sensitive institutional investors can not significantly affect the relationship between the two. Finally, this paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions.
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