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论文编号：	10178
作者编号：	2120162686
上传时间：	2018/6/11 11:30:20
中文题目：	管理者权力、高质量审计与股价崩盘风险
英文题目：	Managerial Power，High Quality Audit and Stock Price Crash Risk
指导老师：	梅丹
中文关键字：	管理者权力，高质量审计，股价崩盘风险
英文关键字：	stock price crash risk，managerial power，high quality audit
中文摘要：	股市稳定发展对整个资本市场健康发展有着至关重要的作用。不仅整个股市的崩溃会对世界经济造成重创，个股的暴跌也会对资本市场参与者造成不小的损失和信心打击，成为资本市场有序运行的噪音。自Jin and Myers（2006）提出“信息窖藏理论”以来，公司个股暴跌现象成为国内外学者关注的研究热点之一并持续至今。我国资本市场正处于发展与变革的关键时期，股市波动剧烈，个股暴跌现象更是频频发生，识别造成个股暴跌的因素并加强公司层面的治理显得格外重要。 “信息窖藏理论”认为信息不透明带来的坏消息延迟集中释放是导致个股暴跌的直接原因。管理层是公司对外披露信息的直接负责主体，但管理层具有推迟公布坏消息的倾向（Kothari，2009），当管理者权力过大时，坏消息窖藏状况更严重，增大了信息不对称程度。 　　　本文参照Finkeltein（1992）的理论构建管理者权力衡量指标，探讨管理者权力过大是否会增加个股暴跌的可能性，以期从权力配置角度丰富股价崩盘风险影响因素的研究。同时本文尝试寻找抑制管理者权力的外部治理机制，引入外部审计，探究高质量审计是否能发挥对管理者权力的治理效用，进而抑制其对股价暴跌风险的影响作用。 　　　本文选取2007-2016年我国沪深两市A股上市公司作为样本，就管理者权力、高质量审计与股价崩盘风险之间的相关关系进行实证研究。研究结果证明，管理层集权会加剧样本公司未来的股价暴跌风险，并且这种影响在不同产权性质的上市公司中均显著。加入外部审计治理变量后对全样本进行的进一步回归分析发现，高质量审计能够很好的抑制管理层集权对股价崩盘风险的加剧效果；但将样本按照产权分组后，上述结果只在民营企业中显著。
英文摘要：	The stable development of the stock market plays a crucial role in the healthy development of the entire capital market. Not only will the collapse of the entire stock market hit the world's economy, the plunge of individual stocks will also cause considerable losses and confidence blows to participants in the capital market and become capital. The noise in the orderly operation of the market, since Jin and Myers (2006) put forward the “information cellar theory”, the phenomenon of stocks plunge at the corporate level has become one of the research hotspots of domestic and foreign scholars and continues to this day. China's capital market is in a critical period of development and reform. The stock market has experienced fierce fluctuations, and stocks have plummeted. Identifying the factors that cause individual stocks to plunge and strengthening corporate governance are particularly important. According to the “information cellar theory”, the delayed release of bad news caused by opaque information is the direct cause of stocks plummeting. Management is the direct person responsible for corporate disclosure of information, but management has the tendency to postpone the release of bad news (Kothari, 2009) When the power of the management is too large, bad cellaring situation will become more serious and damage the transparency of the company's information. This thesis refers to Finkeltein's (1992) theory to build management power measurement indicators, to explore whether it will increase the possibility of stocks plunge, in order to enrich the study of the factors that affect the stock price crash risk from the perspective of power allocation. At the same time, this thesis attempts to find an external governance mechanism that inhibits the power of management, introduces external audit, and explores whether it can exert its governance effectiveness. 　　　This thesis selects the data of 2007-2016 China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as a sample to conduct empirical research. The research results prove that the centralized management of the company will increase the risk of stock price crash of the sample companies in the future, and this effect will be listed on the sample of different property rights. The company is significant. In addition, this thesis adds external audit governance variables and conducts further regression analysis with the full sample. After testing, it is found that the external audit can well suppress the aggravating effect of the management centralization on the stock price crash risk, but after the samples are grouped according to the property rights, the above results are only Significant in private enterprises.
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