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论文编号：	10177
作者编号：	2120162689
上传时间：	2018/6/11 11:29:02
中文题目：	CEO任期、出身与盈余管理
英文题目：	CEO Tenure, Origin and Earnings Management
指导老师：	李姝
中文关键字：	CEO任期；外部聘用；内部擢升；政治关联；盈余管理；产权性质
英文关键字：	CEO tenure; External recruitment; Internal promotion; Political connections; Earnings management; Property rights
中文摘要：	CEO是企业高级管理人员的典型代表，也是企业进行盈余管理的主体和核心人物之一，CEO的任期与出身是影响CEO行为的重要特征，因此，研究CEO的任期与出身对所在企业盈余管理水平的影响具有理论和现实意义。本文探讨的是在CEO任期内公司应计盈余管理水平的变化以及CEO的出身是如何影响应计盈余管理的。本文通过对2008年至2015年沪深两市A股上市公司进行实证检验，得出了关于CEO任期、出身与盈余管理的关系的结论。为了建立起高能力的声誉，在任职第一年CEO会进行向下的盈余管理，然后在接下来的两年进行向上的盈余管理，随着任期超过三年，CEO趋于稳健经营，不再进行显著的盈余管理。从产权性质的角度出发，相较于民营企业而言，国有企业CEO在任期前三年进行盈余管理的程度更高。同从公司内部擢升的CEO相比，外部聘用的CEO在任职初期会更加倾向于展现自己的能力，加之外部聘用的CEO对于换届留任抱有很低的期望，不用考虑盈余管理对公司带来的长期负面影响，因此外部聘用的CEO在任职第二年和第三年向上盈余管理的程度更高。当CEO经过短期考察得以留任之后，外部聘用和内部擢升的CEO的盈余管理水平则不再具有显著差异。相较于民营企业而言，国有企业的外聘CEO在任职初期更愿意利用操控性应计盈余来调整利润，以树立良好形象。在民营企业中，CEO是否具有政治关联对盈余管理水平具有重大影响。在CEO任职第二年和第三年，相较于无政治关联的CEO，具有政治关联的CEO所在民企利用操控性应计盈余调增利润的程度更高。当任期大于三年，CEO得到企业与市场认可以后，为了避免因利润过高而引起政府与外界关注，有政治关联的CEO将为了“藏利”而进行向下的盈余管理。总之，CEO进行盈余管理的程度会随着其任期增加而发生变化，CEO的出身不同也会对其盈余管理的水平产生影响，所以关注CEO的任期和出身将有助于了解和考察公司真实的业绩水平。
英文摘要：	CEO is a typical representative of corporate executives, and one of the central characters of earnings management. CEO’s tenure and origin are important traits that affect behaviors of CEO. Therefore, there are theoretical significance and applicable value to study how CEO’s tenure and origin impact the enterprise’s earnings management. This article examines the changes of the level of company's accrued earnings management during the tenure of the CEO and how the CEO's origin affects accrued earnings management. Based on the empirical test of all A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2015, we drew the conclusion about the relationship between CEO’s tenure, origin and the enterprise’s earnings management. In order to establish a reputation of high ability, CEO will conduct downward earnings management in the first of his tenure, and then carry out the upward earnings management in the next two years. When CEO has worked in a company for more than three years, CEO will tend to be robust and no longer conduct significant earnings management. From the perspective of property rights, compared to private enterprises, CEOs of state-owned companies will carry out upward earnings management in the first three years of CEOs’ tenure. Compared with CEOs promoted from the companies, CEOs from other companies will be more inclined to show their ability in the early tenure, and CEOs from other companies often have low expectations to remain in the company. So the external hired CEO will conduct upward earnings management for the second year and third year of tenure. After a short period of probation, the level of earnings management of CEOs whether from external recruitment or internal promotion will do not have significant difference. In order to establish a good manage, Compared with private enterprises, state-owned enterprises' external CEOs are willing to use discretionary accruals to adjust profits in the early tenure. In private enterprises, it is significant whether CEOs have political connections. In the second year and third year of the tenure, compared with CEOs without political connections, CEOs which have political connections is willing to carry out upward earnings management. When the tenure is more than three years, CEOs will be regarded as an insider by the enterprise and outside market. In order to avoid the supervision of the government and the outside world caused by excessive profits, CEOs with political connections will carry out downward earnings management for the purpose of "hiding interest". In short, the degree of CEOs earnings management will change with the increase of its tenure in companies. CEOs’ origin will also affect their earnings management level. So CEO's tenure and origin will help to understand and investigate the real earnings performance of companies.
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