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论文编号：	10166
作者编号：	1120140820
上传时间：	2018/6/11 8:41:52
中文题目：	合作行为的治理机制 ——实名制信息披露、组间竞争与概论惩罚的实验研究
英文题目：	The governance mechanism of cooperative behavior ——Experimental study on real-name system information disclosure, inter-group competition and probabilistic punishment
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	合作行为；治理机制；实名制信息披露；组间竞争；概率惩罚；实验
英文关键字：	cooperation behavior; governance mechanism; real-name system information disclosure; inter-group competition; probabilistic punishment; experiment
中文摘要：	合作行为是人类社会活动的基本行为，如何促进人们的合作也一直是理论界和业界关注的经典话题。由于个体理性与集体理性的冲突，以及信息不对称与制度成本等因素的约束，使得搭便车的机会主义行为一直广泛存在，这对于团队以及社会总福利来说都是一种损失，也有悖于社会公平。为了减少这些机会主义行为，学者们探讨了多种治理机制，如信息披露机制、竞争机制和惩罚机制，等等。近年来，信息披露中的实名制信息披露、竞争激励中的组间竞争以及惩罚机制中的概率惩罚等开始进入学者们的视野，本文利用公共物品博弈和嵌套公共物品博弈框架，考察单一社会困境和双重社会困境中人类合作行为的治理机制，重点探究实名制信息披露、组间竞争、概率惩罚和领导者等机制与人类合作行为的匹配。 实名制信息披露属于重要的信息反馈机制，现有研究在线性公共物品的单一社会困境中发现，实名制信息披露在合作行为中既有正向作用又有负向作用。实际上，社会中的个体更多情况下会面临多重困境的决策情景，因此，需要将实名制信息披露纳入嵌套公共物品博弈中考察合作行为的机制效应；竞争机制在促进合作行为过程中受到广泛关注，但现有的研究范式大多从个体出发，侧重于锦标赛式的激励，对于集体层面的组内和组间冲突与竞争相对忽视，因此，深入探讨组间竞争、尤其是结合平均分配和按劳分配等机制考察组间竞争的合作行为效应有重要的理论和现实意义；惩罚也是重要的合作行为治理机制，以往的文献聚焦于惩罚额度、惩罚方式等研究，本文重点考察概率惩罚机制与合作行为的关系。也就是说，惩罚的激励效应体现在惩罚的强度和惩罚的概率两个维度；合作行为是一个社会集体行为，集体中的领导者对社会集体行为有重要影响，因此，本文又考察了领导者机制与集体合作行为的匹配关系。 本文的主要研究结论包括： 第一，实名制信息披露研究方面，（1）信息反馈中的实名制能够显著提高人们在嵌套结构中小集体及整体的合作水平，但在嵌套大集体中的作用不明显；（2）实名制信息披露对合作行为的促进效应在小集体中更显著，且部分挤出了实名制信息披露对大集体合作的激励效应；（3）“同心圆”层级和风险偏好分别在实名制信息披露和投资量之间具有调节作用；（4）在嵌套结构下，实名制信息披露使得落后者对合作的抑制效应强于先进者的榜样效应。 第二，组间竞争研究方面，（1）通过设置平均分配组间奖励金额与按投资比例分配组间奖励金额这两种分配方式发现，相对于平均分配，人们更看重按劳分配；（2）人们在进行合作之前，会对其他成员的合作信念形成一个理性的预期，并以此为基础进行投资决策，即人们的决策行为受到其合作信念的影响，合作信念越高，人们在团队中也更容易合作；（3）组间竞争促进了人们的合作行为，即竞争激励在促进个体合作方面发挥着积极的作用；（4）物质激励依旧是促进合作较为有效的措施，且奖励金额越大，人们越合作。 第三，概率惩罚研究方面，（1）个体的合作行为除了依赖惩罚期望值外，还需要权衡惩罚强度和惩罚概率的平衡，且相对于惩罚概率而言，人们更看重的是惩罚的强度；（2）威慑惩罚的作用效果优于实际惩罚的损失效应。 第四，领导者机制研究方面：（1）领导者的存在不总是能够促进其他成员的合作水平，当领导者的投资量约等于或者低于其他成员投资量的均值时，其他成员会产生抵触情绪，更容易降低其投资量，采取较低的合作策略；只有当领导者的投资量接近于其资金拥有量时，其他成员才会因领导者的存在而提高合作水平，从而提高投资量；（2）其他成员的投资量与领导者的投资量显著正相关，且其他成员的投资量具有情景依赖性，即当其他成员先遇到低投资量类型领导者再逐步到高投资量类型领导者时，与先遇到高投资量类型领导者再遇到低投资量类型领导者时的表现存在差异；（3）水平参照点和风险偏好在领导者投资量类型与其他成员投资量间存在调节作用，合作信念在水平参照点和其他成员投资量之间存在完全中介效应。 本文的创新主要包括四点：（1）从实名制信息披露维度考察合作行为的变化规律，并将研究融入嵌套社会困境这一决策框架，拓展了合作行为理论的相关研究；（2）将组内冲突和组间竞争同时纳入统一的决策框架，细化了竞争机制奖励分配方式对合作行为的影响规律，丰富了激励理论的相关研究；（3）在考察惩罚机制在个体合作行为中的作用时，基于概率惩罚视角展开，并从威慑惩罚和实际惩罚两个维度对三种不同概率惩罚机制进行剖析，厘清了不同概率惩罚机制的作用机理，进一步细化了惩罚机制的激励效应研究；（4）在考察领导者与合作行为之间的关系时，依据投资量水平将领导者细分为低中高三种领导者类型，并借助序贯公共物品博弈实验展开领导者投资量类型及变更对合作行为的研究，厘清了领导者投资量类型及变更对其他个体决策行为及心理特征的作用机理，并进一步探明了水平参照点、风险偏好、合作信念与个体投资量的作用路径，拓展了领导者方面的研究。
英文摘要：	Cooperative behavior is the basic behavior of human social activities, how to promote cooperation has also been a classic topic in both academic and industry attention. Due to the conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality, and the constraints of information asymmetry and institutional cost, the opportunistic behavior of free riders has been widespread, which is a kind of loss for the team and social total welfare, also goes against the social equity. In order to reduce these opportunistic behaviors，scholars have discussed various governance mechanisms, such as information disclosure mechanism, competition mechanism and punishment mechanism, etc. In recent years, real-name system information disclosure in the information disclosure, inter-group competition in the competitive incentive and probabilistic punishment in the punishment mechanism have started to enter the scholars' field of vision. This paper uses public goods game and nested public goods game，examine the governance mechanism of human cooperative behavior in the dilemma of single society and double social dilemma, focus on the real-name system information disclosure, inter-group competition, probabilistic punishment and leaders and other mechanisms to match human cooperative behavior. Real-name system information disclosure is an important information feedback mechanism, the existing research finds that in the single social dilemma of linear public goods, real-name system information disclosure has both positive and negative effects in cooperative behavior. In fact, individuals in society are more likely to face multiple dilemmas, therefore, it is necessary to incorporate real-name system information disclosure into nested public goods game in studying the mechanism effect of cooperative behavior; Competition mechanism has received wide attention in promoting cooperative behavior, however, most of the existing research paradigms are from individuals, focusing on the incentive of the championship, and ignoring the conflicts and inter-group competition at the collective level, therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to delve into the cooperative behavioral effects of inter-group competition, especially combining the average distribution and distribution according to work. Punishment is also an important governance mechanism for cooperative behavior, previous literatures focused on the study of punishment quota and the way of punishment, this paper focuses on the relationship between probabilistic punishment mechanism and cooperative behavior. In other words, the incentive effect of punishment is reflected in the intensity of punishment and the probability of punishment; Cooperative behavior is a social collective action, leaders in the collective have an important influence on social collective behavior, therefore, this paper investigates the matching relationship between the leadership mechanism and collective cooperative behavior. The main conclusions of this paper include: First, in terms of real-name system information disclosure research, (1) Real-name system in the information feedback can significantly improve the cooperation level of the small group and the whole in the nested structure, but it is not obvious in the nested large group; (2) The promotion effect of real-name system information disclosure on cooperative behavior is more significant in the small group, and partly crowd out the incentive effect of real-name system information disclosure on large group cooperation; (3) The "concentric circle" hierarchy and risk preference have a moderating effect between real-name system information disclosure and the investment amount; (4) Under the nested structure, real-name system information disclosure makes the laggard's inhibitory effect on cooperation stronger than the model effect of the advanced. Second, in terms of inter-group competition research, (1)By setting two ways of distribution average distribution between groups reward and allocate between groups reward according to the investment proportion, found that compared with the average distribution, people pay more attention to distribution according to work; (2) Before cooperation, people will form a rational expectations about the cooperation beliefs of other members, and make investment decision based on this, that is, people's decision-making behaviors are influenced by their cooperative beliefs, and the higher the cooperative belief, people are also more cooperative in groups; (3) Competition among groups promotes cooperative behavior, namely competitive incentive plays a positive role in promoting employees cooperation; (4) Material incentives are still effective measures to promote cooperation, and the larger the incentive amount, the more people tend to cooperate. Thirdly, the research aspect of probabilistic punishment, (1) Besides punishment expectations, the individual's cooperative behavior also need to balance between the punishment and the probability of punishment, and relative to the probability of punishment, people are more focused on the intensity of punishment; (2) The effect of deterrent punishment is better than that of actual punishment. Fourth, in the research of leadership mechanism: (1) The existence of the leader is not always able to promote the level of cooperation of other members, when the investment of leaders is approximately equal to or lower than the mean of other members' investment, the employees will produce resistance, and easier to reduce its investment, adopt a lower cooperation strategy; Only when the investment amount of the leader is close to the amount of its capital, other members will improve the level of cooperation and increase the investment amount due to the existence of the leader; (2) The amount of other members' investment is positively correlated with the investment amount of the leader, and the investment amount of other members has the situation dependence, that is, when other members first encounter the low investment type leader and then gradually to the high investment type leader, there is a difference in the performance of the leader who encounters the high investment type leader and then encounters the low investment type leader; (3) The horizontal reference and risk preference have the moderating effect between the leader investment type and other members' investment amount, and the cooperative belief has the complete mediating effect between the horizontal reference and other members' investment amount. This article's innovation mainly includes four points: (1) Investigating the change rule of cooperative behavior from the perspective of real-name system information disclosure, also integrate research into the decision-making framework of nested social dilemmas, extends the research of cooperative behavior theory; (2) The group internal conflict and inter-group competition are integrated into the unified decision-making framework, this article elaborates the influence rule of the reward distribution mode behind the competition mechanism on cooperative behavior, and enriches the relevant research of incentive theory; (3) In examining punishment mechanism in the role of individual cooperative behavior, based on the perspective of probabilistic punishment, this article analyzes three different probabilistic punishment mechanism from two dimensions of deterrence punishment and actual punishment, clarify the mechanism of different probabilistic punishment mechanism, and further refine the incentive effect of the punishment mechanism research; (4) In examining the relationship between leaders and cooperative behavior, the leaders are divided into low-middle-high three types according to the level of investment, investigate the influence of leader investment type and the change on cooperative behavior, clarify the mechanism of leadership investment types and changes to other individual decision-making behaviors and psychological characteristics, and further explore the path of horizontal reference point, risk preference, cooperative belief and individual investment quantity, expand the research of leaders.
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