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论文编号：	10161
作者编号：	1120120767
上传时间：	2018/6/10 21:12:07
中文题目：	制度环境、债券融资与企业风险承担
英文题目：	Institutional Environments，Bond Financing and Corporate Risk Taking
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	债券融资；债券契约保护性条款；制度环境；企业风险承担
英文关键字：	Bond Financing，Bond Contract Protective Covenant，Coporate Risk-taking，Institutional Environments
中文摘要：	企业风险承担通常是指企业在进行经营投资决策时，对该决策项目预期收益水平和与之密切关联的收益波动程度的选择。企业追求更高的收益是其天性，但同时也必须承担更大的风险。因此，风险承担是企业生存发展过程中一个非常重要的决策，企业须根据内外部的不同情况做出慎重的抉择。近年来，众多国内外学者已经分别从管理者或股东特征、公司治理、外部环境等不同的角度，探讨了企业风险承担决策的影响因素，但债务资本在企业风险承担决策中扮演着什么样的角色？是否以及如何影响企业风险承担水平？现有研究还没有给予比较充分的重视。因此，本文尝试引入债务资本这一影响因素，通过债权人与股东（管理者）之间的委托代理关系，不完全契约等理论分析债务资本对企业风险承担水平的影响。具体而言，本文针对企业进行债券融资这一研究情景，以我国上市公司2007-2015年之间发行的公司债为研究样本，通过手工收集整理债券募集说明书和相关数据，试图回答债券发行和债券契约条款对企业风险承担有何影响？在不同的制度环境下，这种影响将会发生什么样的变化？研究目的在于从债务资本的角度进一步丰富企业风险承担的影响因素研究，同时也从企业风险承担的角度进一步丰富债券契约条款效应的相关研究。 本文的研究主要分为三个部分。第一部分研究债券发行对企业风险承担的影响。企业发行债券融入的资金，一方面为企业提供了资金支持，使企业有能力进行符合管理者或股东意愿的投资和经营，并且提高管理者与股东进行资产替代的动机，因此债券发行有可能导致企业提高其风险承担水平。但另一方面，债务定期还本付息的天然属性会减少企业的自由现金流，并且加大了企业的财务风险，因此企业为避免陷入财务危机，又可能降低进行高风险投资经营的意愿。本文研究发现，公司债券的发行规模越大，债券期限越长，企业风险承担水平越高，并且在债权人和企业代理冲突严重的企业中，发行规模和债券期限对企业风险承担的正相关关系更显著。这也意味着，在我国当前的制度背景下，债券融资的资产替代效应会超过债券融资的治理效应，过高的负债水平将极有可能给债权人的利益带来伤害和损失。 第二部分进一步研究债券契约保护性条款对企业风险承担的影响。契约条款是债券的重要内容，是债权人为了防止股东（管理者）损害自身利益而设定的一些约束性的条件，也是企业和债权人双方博弈的一个结果。对于发债企业而言，债券契约条款构成了其投资和经营决策行为上的一些必要限制和约束，但对债权人来说则是一个重要的保护手段，可以降低债务资本未来面临的风险，本文研究了我国债券契约条款中的保护性条款，分析其是否可以影响企业的风险承担行为，以及不同类型的保护性条款的影响作用的异质性。研究发现保护性契约条款数量越多，内容涵盖越多，也就是契约条款设计越严格，对企业风险承担的抑制作用越显著。进一步分析发现，相比于限制支付和限制投资类的保护性条款，治理型和事件型保护性条款监督和约束作用更显著。研究结果表明我国债券契约中严格的债券保护性条款总体上可以限制和约束发债主体的高风险行为，并且治理型条款和事件型条款的治理效果最显著。 第三部分研究不同的制度环境对债券融资与企业风险承担关系的调节作用。在我国的制度背景下，政府干预和法律环境两个因素构成了债务契约签订与履行最重要的制度环境，对借贷双方的行为都具有极大的影响。因此，本文从政府干预和法律环境两个维度检验了在不同的外部制度环境下，债券融资以及债券保护性条款对企业风险承担影响是否发生变化以及发生了什么样的变化。研究发现，政府干预可以抑制发债企业从事高风险经营和投资活动，但对债券契约保护性条款抑制企业风险承担的影响不显著；法律环境可以显著抑制企业利用债券融资进行的资产替代行为，同时，在良好的法律环境下，契约保护性条款对企业风险承担的抑制作用更显著。研究结果表明法律环境的改善可以显著影响发债企业的资产替代行为以及促进债券保护性条款的治理作用，对提高债权人保护具有显著的影响。 本文的理论贡献主要体现在三个方面：第一，本文从债券融资视角研究了债务资本对企业风险承担行为的影响，丰富了关于企业风险承担影响因素的相关研究。第二，结合委托代理理论分析研究了债券契约保护性条款与企业风险承担的关系，丰富了契约条款对企业行为的影响。第三，本文研究了不同类别的债券保护条款对企业风险承担水平影响的异质性，为我国政策制定者如何规范和监管契约保护性条款提供了参考借鉴。
英文摘要：	Corporate risk taking usually refers to the choice of the expected return level of the decision-making and the degree of the fluctuation of the income closely related to it during the corporate investment decision. It is the nature of the company to pursue higher returns, but at the same time it must also assume greater risks. Therefore, the risk-taking is a very important decision-making process in the survival and development of an enterprise. The company must make proper choices according to the internal and external situations. In recent years, many domestic and foreign scholars have separately discussed the factors affecting the corporate risk-taking from different perspectives, such as managerial or shareholder characteristics, corporate governance, and the external environment, and achieved rich results. But what role does debt capital play in corporate risk-taking decisions? Does it also affect the level of corporate risk taking? Existing research has not given full attention to it. Therefore, this paper attempts to introduce the effect of debt capital as potencial factors, through the principal-agent relationship between creditors and shareholders (managers), incomplete contracts and other theories to analyze the impact of debt capital on the corporate risk taking. Specifically, this article focuses on the research scenario of corporate bond financing. It uses corporate bonds issued by listed companies in China between 2007 and 2015 as research samples, and tries to answer bond issuance and bond contracts by manually collecting and revising the prospectus and relevant data. What impact does the debt covenant have on corporate risk taking? Under different institutional circumstances, what kind of changes will happen to this effect? The purpose of the research is to further enrich the research on the influencing factors of corporate risk taking from the perspective of debt capital, and at the same time, to further enrich the research on the effects of bond contract covenants from the perspective of corporate risk taking. The research of this paper is mainly divided into three parts. The first part of the research is the impact of bond issuance on corporate risk-taking. The funds for corporate bond issuance, on the one hand, provide financial support for enterprises, enabling enterprises to conduct investment operations that meet the wishes of managers or shareholders, and will also increase the motivation for managers and shareholders to replace assets. Therefore, bond financing may bepossible to increase their level of risk taking. However, on the other hand, the natural nature of debt repayment on a regular basis will reduce the company's free cash flow and increase the company's financial risk. Therefore, in order to avoid a financial crisis, companies may also reduce their willingness to invest in high-risk operations. This study finds that the larger the issuance of corporate bonds, the longer the maturity of the bonds, and the higher the level of corporate risk taking and the more positive the relationship between the issuance size and the maturity of the bonds to the company's risk taking in companies with serious conflict between creditors and corporate agents. Significant. The results of the study indicate that after companies issue bond financing, they are more likely to increase their risk exposure. This also means that under the current institutional background of our country, the asset replacement effect of bond financing will exceed the governance effect of bond financing, and an excessively high level of debt will most likely bring harm and loss to the interests of creditors. The second part of the study is the effect of the bond contract protection covenant on corporate risk taking. The contract covenant is the main content of the bond. It regulates the rights and obligations of the creditor and the debtor. It is a binding condition set by the creditor to prevent the shareholders (managers) from performing asset replacement and damage their own interests. It is also a result of the tradeoff between the company and the creditor. For debt-issuing enterprises, the terms of the bond contract constitute some necessary restrictions and constraints on their investment and business decision-making behavior, but it is an important means of protection for creditors, which can reduce the future risk of debt capital and protect itself. The rights and interests are not compromised. This article studies the protective covenants in China's bond contract terms, and analyzes whether it can affect the level of risk-takring of the issuer and whether the effect of different types of protective covenants is significantly different. The study found that the greater the number of protective contract covenants, the more content is covered, that is, the more stringent the design of contract terms, the more significant the inhibitory effect on corporate risk taking. Further analysis found that governance and event-based protection covenants have more significant monitoring and restraining effects than protective covenants restricting payments and restricting investment. The research results show that the strict bond protection covenants in China's bond contracts can generally limit and restrict the high-risk behaviors of bond issuers. Compared with restricted protection covenants, the governance effects of governance covenants and event-based covenants are the most significant. The third part studies the regulatory effect of different institutional environments on bond financing and corporate risk-taking relationships. In the context of our country’s system, government intervention and the legal environment constitute the most important institutional environment for signing and fulfilling debt contracts, which has a great impact on the behavior of both lenders and borrowers. Therefore, this paper examines whether the impact of bond financing and bond protection covenants on corporate risk taking changes and what changes have taken place under different external institutional environments from the perspective of government intervention and the legal environment. The study finds that government intervention can inhibit debt-issuing companies from engaging in high-risk operations and investment activities, but has no significant effect on the suppression of corporate contractual risk-taking by the protective covenants of bond contracts; the legal environment can significantly inhibit the use of bond financing by companies as a substitute for assets. In a good legal environment, the contractual protection covenants have a more pronounced inhibitory effect on corporate risk taking. The results of the study show that the improvement of the legal environment can significantly affect the asset replacement behavior of debt-issuing companies and promote the role of bond protection covenants, which has a significant impact on the protection of creditors. The theoretical contributions of this paper are mainly reflected in three aspects: First, this paper studies the impact of debt capital on corporate risk-taking behavior from the perspective of bond financing, and enriches relevant research on the factors affecting corporate risk-taking. Secondly, the author analyzes and studies the relationship between the protective covenants of bond contracts and corporate risk taking in combination with principal-agent theory, and enriches the influence of contract covenants on corporate behavior. Thirdly, this paper studies the heterogeneity of the impact of different types of bond protection covenants on the corporate risk-taking, and provides reference for policy makers in China on how to regulate and supervise contractual protection covenants.
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