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论文编号：	10152
作者编号：	1120140821
上传时间：	2018/6/10 10:49:24
中文题目：	社会规范与独立董事监督行为的实验研究
英文题目：	An Experimental Study of Social Norms and Independent Directors Monitoring Behavior
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	独立董事监督；社会规范；公平规范；合作规范；实验；右侧背外侧前额叶
英文关键字：	Independent directors monitoring; Social norms; Fairness norms; Cooperation norms; Experiment; Right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC)
中文摘要：	独立董事监督被公众和监管机构视为约束管理层舞弊的重要机制，这一制度安排在21世纪初随着“安然事件”等舞弊丑闻的爆发得到了空前加强。尤其是，国内资本市场相对集中的股权和公司治理机制的不完善使得大股东与管理层的冲突愈演愈烈——如2015年开始的万科控制权事件等——这对独立董事监督提出了更高的要求。但是，现有文献发现独立董事薪酬对企业绩效不敏感，其接受的物质激励难以保证独立董事认真履行监督职能，独立董事在监督过程中事实上扮演着类似旁观者的第三方角色。因此，从非物质激励因素入手探讨独立董事监督行为的动机、寻求有效提升独立董事监督意愿的机制设计，成为独立董事监督能否发挥作用的关键。 本文利用实验经济学方法，率先将社会规范这一反映社会成员共有价值观和信念的非正式制度引入独立董事治理领域，探析了独立董事对两类重要社会规范——公平规范和合作规范——的遵从如何促使其在董事会决策中履行监督职能。首先，设计了独立董事和内部董事的投票实验，考察了独立董事对公平规范的遵从如何影响其投票决策，以及独立董事的监督是否影响内部董事的舞弊行为。在此基础上，进一步考察了独立董事与内部董事的老乡关系是否与公平规范交互影响独立董事监督。其次，通过一个具有弱链（weak link）特征的协调博弈实验刻画了大股东和高管的冲突与合作过程，比较了独立董事可以采取内部沟通和信息公开两种监督机制下，合作规范对独立董事勤勉性监督的影响，以及独立董事的监督是否改善了大股东和高管的协调水平。另外，针对独立董事等第三方为何维护公平规范和合作规范这一问题，本文通过经颅直流电刺激技术探析了第三方遵从两类社会规范的内在神经机制，为独立董事为何遵从社会规范提供了神经元证据。本文主要研究结果如下。 第一，在董事会投票决策实验中考察了公平规范对独立董事监督以及内部董事舞弊的影响，以及独立董事和内部董事的老乡关系如何影响公平规范的作用。实验结果显示，独立董事对公平规范的遵从会显著降低其投赞成票的概率，但这一影响在独立董事和内部董事存在老乡关系时不再显著。进一步，独立董事的监督并未显著影响内部董事的投票行为，且公平规范与董事会绩效的关系受到项目质量的调节。上述结果表明，公平规范是独立董事监督的重要动机。然而，借助信息优势以及与独立董事的社会关系，内部董事在董事会中拥有着更大的谈判权力，使得独立董事制度并未有效遏制内部董事的谋私行为。另外，独立董事对公平规范的遵从是一把“双刃剑”，只有当公司存在较严重的代理问题时才有助于提升董事会绩效。 第二，通过一个具有弱链特征的协调博弈刻画了大股东和高管在董事会决策中的冲突或合作过程。在这一过程中，独立董事可以通过付出认知努力获得与大股东和高管中合作水平较低一方内部沟通（内部沟通设置），或者将其个人和决策信息对外公开（信息公开设置）的机会。实验结果显示，独立董事对合作规范的遵从水平与其监督意愿呈现显著的正向关系，且相比信息公开设置，这一正向关系在内部沟通设置中更加明显。另外，独立董事对合作规范的维护有助于提升大股东和高管的协调水平，且这一作用在信息公开设置下更加显著。上述结果表明，无论监督形式是内部沟通还是信息公开，独立董事在合作规范驱使下会付出更高的勤勉性来监督大股东和高管，进而提升董事会的合作绩效。 第三，本文探讨了独立董事等第三方遵从社会规范的神经机制。通过对右侧背外侧前额叶区域（rDLPFC）进行不同极性的经颅直流电刺激（tDCS），探寻了情绪和自利加工机制对第三方维护社会规范的作用。结果发现，独立董事等第三方在看到社会规范（包括公平规范和合作规范）被违反时，会产生负面情绪并在其驱使下产生监督或惩罚规范违反者的冲动。然而，当惩罚需要付出成本时其对自利的理性考量会抑制情绪机制的作用，最终削弱其对社会规范的遵从水平。 本文主要创新如下：第一，率先将公平规范和合作规范引入独立董事监督研究，考察两类规范影响独立董事和内部董事决策的内在机制；第二，利用决策者行为交互的投票博弈和弱链结构的协调博弈考察独立董事的监督规律，拓展了行为公司治理的实验研究范式；第三，率先借助经颅直流电刺激技术考察独立董事等第三方维护社会规范背后的情绪和自利加工机制，为独立董事监督行为的内在动因提供了神经元证据，拓展了决策神经科学与公司治理的交叉研究。
英文摘要：	The prevailing view among public and regulators is that shareholders can mitigate conflicts of interest with insiders by entrusting independent directors, which has been brought to the center of policy debate and academic research involving governance reform since a series of high-profile corporate failures (e.g. Enron). In particular, the relatively concentrated ownership of domestic capital market and imperfection of the corporate governance mechanism intensify conflicts between executives and major shareholders (e.g. the event of Vanke which begins in 2015), which raise higher requirements for the independent directors monitoring. However, direct compensation of independent directors is not sensitive to performance and thus insufficient to get them to work hard, making independent directors actually play the roles of third parties in the process of supervision. Therefore, exploring the psychological motivation behind the monitoring and supervision of independent directors, and seeking mechanisms which can effectively enhance this motivation, plays vital roles in the efficiency of the monitoring system of independent directors. Using laboratory experiments, this paper is one of first study which introduces social norms, the informal enforcement mechanisms that reflect the common values and shared beliefs of group members, into the governance of the board. This paper aims to explore how compliance of independent directors with two types of important social norms - fairness norms and cooperation norms - affects their monitoring behavior in the decisions of the board. First of all, this paper examined how fairness norms affect the board behavior and board performance by conducting a board voting task on project, in which the effects of fairness norms on the behavior of independent directors could be measured and how insiders and board performance reacted to fairness norms could be estimated. On this basis, it further examined whether the hometown connectedness between independent directors and internal directors interacted with fairness norms on the monitoring of independent directors. Secondly, the conflict and cooperation process between major shareholders and managers was portrayed through a coordinated game experiment with a weak-link structure, in which the impact of the cooperation norms on monitoring behavior of independent directors and the coordination between major shareholders and managers were analyzed. This paper also compared effects of two monitoring mechanisms, internal communication and information disclosure, of the independent directors. Finally, to explain why third-party players (such as independent directors) comply social norms, we explored neural mechanisms of fairness norms and cooperation norms of third-party players by the transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) technology. The main findings of this paper are as follows. Firstly, this paper performed an experimental study to investigate the roles of fairness norms in a board composed of insiders and uninformed independent directors, who simultaneously voted in favor of or against a project. The results indicated that independent directors with higher fairness norms were more likely to vote against the project, and this negative relation was no longer significant when there was hometown connectedness between independent directors and internal directors. The voting behavior of internal directors were not affected by independent directors monitoring, and the influence of fairness norms on the board performance depended on the quality of project. These results allow us to draw the following conclusions. Fairness norms are important motivations for independent directors’ monitoring. However, the norms heterogeneity and information disadvantage of independent directors reduce their bargaining power with insiders, and collapse the monitoring effect of fairness norms, making fairness norms can suppress, but not totally diminish, agency problems of insiders. Meanwhile, fairness norms should be treated as a double-edged sword, and giving control to a group of independent directors with high fairness norms may shed light to shareholders only when agency costs of insiders are severe. Secondly, the conflicts and cooperation between major shareholders and managers in the board were described by a coordination game with weak-link structure. In the experiment, independent directors could communicate to the uncooperative major shareholders or managers or announce their personal and decision-making information to public, if independent directors accomplished a task which consumed their cognitive efforts. The results indicated that independent directors with higher cooperation norms were more likely to accomplish the task and showed higher monitoring motivations. Meanwhile, this positive relationship was more evident in the internal communication treatment than that in the information disclosure treatment. The independent directors' enforcements of cooperation norms enhanced the coordination between major shareholders and managers, especially in the information disclosure treatment. These outcomes suggest cooperation norms are important motivation of the independent directors in both communication and information disclosure treatments and enhance the cooperation performance of the board. Thirdly, the neural mechanisms of social norms complying by third-party players (e.g. independent directors) were explored. This paper used tDCS to investigate whether effects of increased or decreased right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) excitability, which was closely involved in regulating emotional responses and overriding self-interest motives, influence fairness norms and cooperation norms. Results indicate that third-party individuals, such as independent directors, will generate negative emotions and thus impulse to monitor or punish norm violators when they observe social norms (including fairness norms and cooperation norms) are not obeyed. However, their rational consideration of self-interest will suppress the emotional mechanisms and ultimately weakens the level of compliance with social norms. The main innovations of this paper are as follows. First, as one of first evidence to analyze the roles of social norms in board decisions, this paper analyzes the inherent patterns of "action or inaction" of independent directors and internal directors under the influence of fairness norms and cooperation norms; Second, this paper builds two manageable microeconomic systems in the laboratory which reflect the game processes of board voting and coordination, making it possible to closely examine the interactions and decision-making processes between actors in the boardroom, and provides an experimental methodology innovation for the behavioral corporate governance. Third, it analyzes the emotional and rational process behind third-party players’ (e.g. independent directors) enforcement of social norms from the perspective of neuroscience, thus opens the black box of brain activities involving monitoring motivation of independent directors, and extends the multi-discipline research between decision neuroscience and corporate governance.
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