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论文编号：	1013
作者编号：	2120071954
上传时间：	2009/5/26 12:43:38
中文题目：	中国上市公司经营者股权激励对企
英文题目：	The Effect of Managerial Owner
指导老师：	陈国欣
中文关键字：	股权激励 企业价值 管理层持股
英文关键字：	Managerial Ownership Incentive
中文摘要：	管理层股权激励机制自上世纪后半叶起在西方发达国家得到了广泛认同和推广。近十年来中国企业一直探索如何实施股权激励机制。股权激励机制作为一项有效的长期激励机制，对中国企业的发展和内部治理都起到了积极的作用。 尽管国内外学者对股权激励机制的理论和实证分析已经在过去的几十年中取得了相当丰硕的成果，但是对这一制度在现实中的实际执行效果依然存在着较大的争议。2005年中国政府出台了一系列鼓励股权激励的政策，2006年中国完成了股权分置改革，这些举措对股权激励与企业价值又有什么影响？本研究将详细探讨股权激励与企业价值的关系，希望能够对今后实行股权激励的企业提供一定的帮助。 本文以两要素理论、代理理论、“团队生产”理论、不完全契约理论、人力资本理论作为理论基础，重点探讨了以下内容: 第一，中国上市公司实施股权激励机制的现状分析。本文收集了2003年至2007年在沪、深证券交易所上市的公司数据，剔除缺值数据和极端数据，选取样本1138家上市公司。采用统计分析方法，详细分析了中国上市公司高管薪酬现状以及实施股权激励的情况。 第二，选取2003-2007年间221家上市公司，共1105个数据样本，分析中国上市公司股权激励与企业价值的关系。并引入控制变量：独立董事比率、高管年度薪酬、公司规模、资产负债比率、无形资产比率。结果显示管理层持股比例与托宾Q值存在正相关关系；在存在控制变量的情况下，两者正相关关系更为显著。 第三，利用上述数据对管理层持股比率与托宾Q值做线性回归分析，结果表明其拟合效果不好，两者线性关系并不显著。 第四，把上述样本分为两类，把2004-2005年与2006-2007年的数据作对比分析。使用两配对样本非参数检验分析，得出如下结论：管理层持股比例变化不显著，而托宾q值变化显著。
英文摘要：	Managerial ownership incentive mechanism is gradually spread in western developed countries since the last half of 20th century. Companies in China have implemented this mechanism for about ten years. And it did affect companies both on their development and corporate governance as a valid long-term incentive way. Even if a number of theoretical and empirical accomplishments focus on managerial ownership incentive mechanism have been achieved, it is still in fierce argument that what it brings to us in real corporate operation. In 2005, Chinese government has put forth a series of policies to spread managerial ownership incentive mechanism. In 2006, non-tradable shares reform was over. So how these activities affect managerial ownership incentive mechanism? My study will explore the relationship between managerial ownership incentive mechanism and corporate valuation in detail and wish this outcome could make a help to companies which is doing or will implement managerial ownership incentive mechanism. This thesis is based on five theories; those are two factor theory, agency theory, group production theory, incomplete contract theory and human capital theory. It has four important conclusions. First of all, this thesis analyzes the managerial ownership incentive mechanism status in China with the datum of 1138 from 2003 to 2007 of all the listed companies except missing and extreme datum. Secondly, it also analyzes 221 listed companies from 2003 to 2007 which comes out about 1138 datum. It uses control variables which are the ratio of independent directors to all directors, the annual salaries of executives, the company size, liabilities to assets ratio and the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. The outcome shows that managerial ownership incentive mechanism and corporate valuation have a positive correlation. And this outcome becomes more obvious by using the control variables. Thirdly, this thesis makes a linear regression using the datum mentioned in the second conclusion. But the outcome shows that they can’t show in one line obviously. The last one of all, I classify the same datum into two departments. One includes the companies in 2004 and 2005 while the other one includes companies of 2006 and 2007. I make a comparative analysis and find out that shares of management do not change much while Tobin’s Q does.
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