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论文编号：	10064
作者编号：	1120130808
上传时间：	2018/6/7 19:03:01
中文题目：	治理环境、政治晋升与国有企业创新投资
英文题目：	Governance Environment, Political Promotion and Innovation Investment in State-owned Listed Company
指导老师：	李莉
中文关键字：	国有企业；政治晋升；创新投资；政府干预；法治水平
英文关键字：	State-owned Listed Enterprises; Political Promotion; Innovation Investment; Government Intervention; The Rule Of The Law
中文摘要：	改革开放后，我国经济经历了近四十年的增长，取得了卓越的成就。然而，在经济增长的背后，“结构性失衡”“重复建设”“行业投资过热”“产能过剩”等负面问题逐渐显现，我国经济正进入“新常态”。为了适应这一变化，我国政府提出了“供给侧改革”，要求中国经济从要素驱动、投资驱动向创新驱动转变。十九大对于国有资本提出的要求是做强做优做大，要求努力培育出一批据有全球竞争力的世界一流企业。而创新是国有企业做强做优做大的重要途径。因此，国有企业创新问题是一个重要且有意义的课题。 关于国有企业创新的问题，学者们主要基于我国国有企业“政治身份”带来的优势和劣势。然而，高管是企业决策的制定者和执行者，对于具备“经理人”“准官员”双重身份的国有企业高管而言，政治晋升激励是国有企业高管重要的隐性激励方式，对国有企业创新投资的影响不容忽视。另外，就我国国有企业所处的外部治理环境而言，一方面，我国国有企业与政府有千丝万缕的联系，政府的“帮助之手”和“掠夺之手”能够干预所辖国有企业的运营，能够左右所辖国有企业高管的考核和任免。另外一方面，国有企业委托代理问题、国有资产流失的问题比比皆是，完善的法律制度对于投资者的合法权利的保障起到至关重要的作用。这不禁让人思考，在中国情境下，具备“政治人”身份的国有企业高管，其政治晋升激励对创新投资有何影响？以及外部制度环境，如政府干预、法治水平等的差异对上述核心概念间关系有何影响？这些问题对于国有企业创新的探讨至关重要，但目前该领域的研究成果较少，理论与实证研究有待突破。 因此，本文从“人性假设”出发，结合中国制度背景和国有企业高管身份特性，分析并论证了政治晋升激励是国有企业高管一种重要的隐性激励形式；并通过文献梳理、现实情境分析，分析政治晋升激励下国有企业高管可能的行为模式，总结归纳出国有企业高管政治晋升的三条路径，基于此分析政治晋升对创新投资的影响；最后基于制度理论，在中国特殊的制度背景下，分析外部治理环境，如区域政府干预程度、区域法治水平对国有企业政治晋升与创新投资关系的影响。研究发现，国有企业高管存在三条可能的晋升路径，即职业路径、行政路径和关系路径；而国有企业高管为了获得晋升，会抑制创新投资；且政府干预较弱、法治水平较高时，这种抑制效果减弱。本文对于丰富我国国有企业创新问题的研究，以及国有企业高管激励问题的研究有重要的理论价值，同时上述问题的解答对于促进我国国有企业改革、完善高管激励机制，促进国有经济健康运行有重要的现实意义。 本文共分七章。第一章引言，主要介绍论文研究背景、意义、概念界定、 创新点等。第二章理论文献综述，从委托代理理论、激励理论、锦标赛理论出发，并对政治晋升、治理环境、创新投资等方面的文献进行回顾，梳理和归纳理论、文献的发展脉络进行，总结当前的研究热点和未来的发展方向；第三章制度背景分析与概念模型，探讨中国近四十年的国有企业政策环境的发展与演变，主要涉及创新政策、国企改革政策、国有企业高管管理政策等，并总结了我国治理环境的特点；同时结合理论与实践基础，给出本文的概念模型。第四章政治晋升与创新投资的实证研究，在分析国有企业高管身份特征与激励机制后，总结国有企业高管政治晋升的可能路径，并基于委托代理理论进行分析，提出本文的假设，设计实证检验方法，验证研究假设。第五章、第六章将政治晋升与创新投资的问题嵌入差异化治理环境中，分别考虑政府干预、法治水平的影响，并设计实证检验方法，验证研究假设。第七章是结论与展望，包括全文总结、主要研究结论、政策建议、研究不足。 本文存在的创新之处如下。第一，理论分析框架上，本文基于委托代理、政治锦标赛、制度理论等理论，率先构建治理环境、政治晋升与创新投资的分析框架，将企业问题嵌入我国宏观制度环境中，将经典理论与中国实际相结合，补充中国情境的理论研究。第二，研究路径上，本文理论结合实际地率先总结归纳国有企业高管政治晋升的三条路径，并从三条路径出发，厘清中国情境下政治晋升对创新投资的影响机理，对该领域的研究具有借鉴意义，对实务操作具有指导作用。第三，研究内容上，本文将高管激励、企业行为整合到治理情境中，从政府干预、法治水平两个维度揭示了中国特殊的制度情境对国企高管政治晋升与创新投资之间关系的影响，深化了相关领域的研究，也为政府政策制定提供科学证据和理论支持。
英文摘要：	After the China’s reform and opening policy, Chinese economy experienced nearly 40 years of high speed growth and achieved remarkable achievements. However, behind the economic growth, some problems such as "structural imbalance", "redundant construction", "investment overheating" and "overcapacity" have gradually emerged. China has entered a period of new normal economy. In order to adapt to the new normal economy, our government has put forward the "supply-side structural reform", which calls for the transformation from factors-driven and investment-driven economy to innovation-driven economy. During 19th CPC National Congress, the government put forward new directions for the SOEs, which is to be stronger, better and bigger, and to cultivate a number of world-class companies with great competitiveness. Innovation is an important way for SOEs to achieve these targets. Therefore, the innovation of SOEs is an important and meaningful topic. About the innovation of SOEs, scholars mainly focused on the advantages and disadvantages which the "political identity" of China's SOEs will bring. However, there are few papers talking about the SEOs innovation from perspective of senior executives’ "political identity". Different from executives in non-state listed companies, executives in state-owned list companies have double identities, namely managers and officials. Salary and stock option are traditional incentive methods. But in state-owned list companies, these two methods are not that useful. For salary incentive, there is a policy, made by government, called “salary limitation”, which means there is upper limit of salaries for executives in state-owned list companies. And the implementation conditions for stock option incentive are very harsh. Under these circumstances, political promotion incentive is an important incentive in state-owned list companies. In terms of external governance environment, our government can intervene in SOEs through "helping hand" and "predatory hand". Meanwhile, considering that the principal-agent problem is serious in SOEs, the completeness of legal system is important to the healthy operation of SOEs. This raises the question of how the political promotion incentives of SOEs have an impact on innovation investment. In terms of external governance environment, SOEs in our country have strong links with the government. The government can intervene in the operations of SOEs, also can make appraisal and appointment of SOEs’ executives. On the other hand, the SOEs’ agency problem and the loss of state-owned asset are serious, and the legal system plays an important role in protecting the legal rights of investors. This raises the question of how political promotion incentives affect innovation investment in China. And how does the difference in the external institutional environment, such as government intervention and the rule of law, affect the relationship between these core concepts? These questions are critical to the discussion of the innovation of SOEs, but there are few research achievements in this field. Therefore, based on "human nature hypothesis" and combined with China's institutional background and SOEs’ executives’ identity characteristics, this paper analyzes and demonstrates the political promotion incentive is an important incentive mechanism for SOEs’ executives. According to exiting references, after summarizing the promotion path of government officials and the factors influencing executives’ promotion in state-owned listed companies, this paper finds that there are three promotion paths for the executives of state-owned enterprises in China, namely career path, administrative path and relationship path. Career path means that strong individual ability can contribute to political promotion; administrative path emphasizes high political loyalty to the superior authorities; the relationship path refers to social relations and social capital. Based on the principal-agent theory, we explore the influence of political promotion on the innovation investment through the three paths mentioned above. Finally, based on the institutional theory, this paper analyzes the influence of external governance environment, such as the degree of regional government intervention and the level of regional rule of law, on the relationship between political promotion and innovation of state-owned enterprises. Based on data of state-owned listed companies in China from 2007-2015, this paper finds that political promotion has inhibitory effects on the innovation investment in state-owned list companies. The stronger the government intervention, or the lower the rule of law, the greater the inhibitory effect will be. This paper has important theoretical value. It enriches the research on the innovation problem of SOEs and the research on the incentive problem in SOEs. At the same time, the solutions to the above questions are of great practical significance for promoting the reform of SOEs and improving the incentive mechanism of senior executives in SOE, which can make state-owned economy healthy. There are seven chapters in this paper. Chapter 1 is introduction, mainly introduces research background, research problems, concept definition, research methods and innovation points. Second chapter introduces theories and literature review. This part summarizes the principal-agent theory, incentive theory, tournament theory, and reviews the literature about political promotion, governance environment and innovation investment. The third chapter is institutional background and conceptual model, mainly introducing the historical development of China's innovation policies, SOEs reform policies and executives management policies in SOEs. Chapter 3 introduces the characteristics of China's governance environment and research framework of this paper. The research framework formed three parts which are the research content of the fourth chapter, fifth chapter and sixth chapter. The fourth chapter is the empirical research of political promotion and innovation investment. Based on the analysis of the identity and the incentive mechanism of executives in SOEs, this part summarizes possible path of political promotion of SOEs’ executive. After that, this paper puts forward its first hypothesis on the basis of principal-agent theory, and then designs the empirical study to verify the research hypothesis. Considering the influence of government intervention and rule of law, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively design empirical research to verify the influence of governance environment. Chapter 7 is conclusion and prospect, including the summary of the paper, the main research conclusions, policies recommendations, and prospect of research in the future This dissertation is innovative for three reasons. First, the theoretical analysis framework is innovative. Based on the theory of principal-agent, the political tournament, institutional theory, this paper takes the lead in building an analysis framework made up by the governance environment, the political promotion and innovation investment. In this way, the micro-enterprise problem is embedded in our macro system environment. Second, the research path is innovative. This paper is the first to sum up the three paths of the political promotion of senior executives in SOEs, and to clarify the impact of political promotion on innovation investment from three paths. Third, the research content is innovative. From two aspects of external governance environment, namely government intervention and rule of law, this paper reveals the influence of external governance environment on the relationship between political promotion and innovation investment in SOEs, which deepens research in related fields and provides scientific evidence and theoretical support for government policy.
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