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论文编号：	10061
作者编号：	2120162729
上传时间：	2018/6/7 17:18:53
中文题目：	高管薪酬、高-监督潜能独立董事与盈余管理
英文题目：	Executive Compensation、Independent Directors with High-supervisory Potential and Earnings Management
指导老师：	周建
中文关键字：	高管薪酬；盈余管理；财务背景独立董事；异地独董
英文关键字：	Executive Compensation；Earnings Management；Financial Background Independent Directors；Nonlocal Independent Directors
中文摘要：	作为公司治理的核心机制，独立董事制度一直是公司治理实践组织关注的焦点。一方面，独立董事与任何其他利益相关者不存在交易往来，能站在更客观公平的角度发表意见，能够抑制大股东的掏空行为，保护中小股东权益不受侵害；另一方面，独立董事能够有效监督高管的机会主义行为，缓解内部控制人现象，降低代理成本。然而，我国自2001年引入独董制度后，会计舞弊、造假事件仍然频频发生，学术界和实践界不禁开始怀疑独立董事是否真能发挥作用？在我国社会背景下，“人情独董”、“花瓶独董”的质疑声仍然不绝于耳。因此，本文从独立董事的监督视角出发，探讨独立董事对高管薪酬和盈余管理关系的影响，以此检验独立董事职业背景和任职地点对其监督有效性的影响。 在前人研究的基础上，本文以信息不对称理论、委托代理理论、人力资本理论、激励理论为基础提出了研究假设。本文以2012-2016年1651家A股上市公司为研究样本，使用扩展的修正JONES模型来计算公司盈余管理程度，并利用高管现金报酬作为解释变量，收集财务背景独立董事和异地独董数据作为调节变量，并对影响影响盈余管理的其他变量进行了控制，最后构建了本文的回归模型。本文用Stata14.0进行描述性统计、相关性分析、回归分析和稳健性检验。实证结果显示：公司高管薪酬水平越高，公司盈余管理程度越深；在其他条件相同时，财务背景独立董事占比可以负向调节高管薪酬与盈余管理之间的正相关关系；而公司是否存在异地独董对高管薪酬与盈余管理的关系并无影响。 所以本文得出如下结论:由于股东和高管之间信息不对称，高管有操纵盈余获得高额回报的动机。财务背景独立董事具有完善的财务知识储备和相关工作经验，他们更能够识别财务报表中的漏洞，从而有效抑制高管的盈余管理行为。独立董事的任职地点并没有对其监督有效性产生影响。基于本文的结论，本文从多个角度提出相应的政策建议：优化高管薪酬结构、完善公司治理结构、提高独董履职能力、培养专职独董和多方监督。
英文摘要：	As the core mechanism of corporate governance, the independent director system has always been the focus of corporate governance practice organization. On the one hand, independent directors do not have transactions with any other stakeholders, and they can express their opinions in a more objective and fair perspective. They can suppress the short-selling behavior of major shareholders and protect the interests of small and medium shareholders from infringement; on the other hand, independent directors can effectively supervise the opportunistic behavior of senior executives, ease the phenomenon of internal controllers, and reduce agency costs. However, since the introduction of the independent director system in China in 2001, incidents of accounting fraud and counterfeiting still occur frequently. The academic and the practice community can not help wondering whether independent directors can really play a role. In the context of our country’s society, the voices of “single human director” and “vase sole director” are still in doubt. Therefore, from the perspective of independent directors' supervision, this thesis discusses the influence of independent directors on executive compensation and earnings management relationships, and examines the influence of the background and position of independent directors on the effectiveness of their supervision. Based on the previous research, this thesis puts forward research hypotheses based on information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory, human capital theory and incentive theory. This thesis selects 1651 A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2016 as research samples, uses the extended revised JONES model to calculate the company’s earnings management level, and using the executive’s cash compensation as an explanatory variable, collecting data on the financial background of independent directors and remote directors as an adjustment variable, other variables affecting earnings management are controlled, and the regression model of this thesis is finally constructed. This thesis uses Stata14.0 for descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, regression analysis and robustness test. The empirical results show that the higher the company’s executive compensation level, the deeper the company’s earnings management; when other conditions are the same, the proportion of independent directors in the financial background can negatively adjust the positive correlation between executive compensation and earnings management; Whether there is an independent director in other places has no effect on the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management. Therefore, this thesis concludes that due to the information asymmetry between shareholders and senior executives, executives have the incentive to manipulate earnings to obtain high returns. Financial background Independent directors have a sound financial knowledge reserve and related work experience. They are more able to identify loopholes in the financial statements and effectively suppress the earnings management of senior executives. The location of independent directors does not affect the effectiveness of their supervision. Based on the conclusions of this thesis, this thesis presents corresponding policy recommendations from various angles: optimizing executive compensation structure, improving corporate governance structure, improving the ability of independent directors to perform duties, training full-time independent directors and multi-party supervision.
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