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论文编号：	10051
作者编号：	2120162683
上传时间：	2018/6/7 14:25:59
中文题目：	管理者能力对盈余管理的影响研究
英文题目：	Manager Ability and Earnings Management
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	管理者能力； 应计盈余管理； 真实盈余管理；
英文关键字：	manager ability; accrued earnings management; real earnings management;
中文摘要：	企业进行盈余管理主要通过两种方式：应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理，应计盈余管理是一种通过变更会计政策以及会计估计调整企业盈余的管理行为，由于应计盈余管理存在反转性，所以长期来看，应计盈余管理并没有改变公司的真实盈余，改变的只是真实盈余在不同会计期间的分布情况。与应计盈余管理不同，真实盈余管理是一种管理者通过构建真实交易来影响财务信息的偏离正常业务的管理行为，会导致次优的业务后果，真实盈余管理是以牺牲企业未来企业价值为代价的，具有长期严峻的经济后果，与真实盈余管理相比较，应计盈余管理运作方式较为简单，一旦操纵过度，极容易被市场识别。 管理者能力作为一项重要的管理特征，近来备受关注，由Hambrick和Mason（1984）等人提出的高阶理论认为管理者特征会影响企业的战略选择并进一步影响企业行为，本文从管理者能力这个管理者特征的角度来研究对企业盈余管理行为的影响，高能力管理者拥有更多的社会资源、具有较强的专业知识能力以及处理复杂事物的能力，对会计制度以及会计政策更加了解，但是管理者并非完全理性，高能力管理者具有更强的自利心理和机会主义行为，对于各项会计政策的使用及会计信息的产生和发布，管理者均具有控制权和知情权，所以管理者在盈余管理的操纵过程中起着主导作用。 本文基于此背景对管理者能力与应计盈余管理程度与真实盈余管理程度之间的关系进行了检验，以2007-2015年所有A股上市公司作为研究样本，深入分析了管理者能力与盈余管理之间的关系，经过实证分析之后发现，高能力的管理者更有可能进行盈余管理行为，并且管理者能力与两种盈余管理方式之间均存在显著正相关关系。进一步稳健性检验之后发现研究结果与本文多元回归结果基本一致，进一步证实了管理者能力与两种盈余管理方式之间的显著正相关关系。本文不仅丰富了盈余管理与管理者的研究内容，还为管理者进行盈余管理提供了新的证据，对于规范企业盈余管理行为具有指导性意义。
英文摘要：	There are two ways of earnings management: accrued earnings management and real earnings management. The methods of accrued earnings management mainly include changing accounting policies and changing accounting estimates. Due to the reversal of accrued earnings management, in the long term, accrued earnings management does not change the actual earnings of the company, it changes only the distribution of real earnings in different accounting periods. Unlike accrued earnings management, real earnings management is a kind of management behavior that managers deviate from normal business by affecting financial information by constructing real transactions, which leads to sub-optimal business consequence. Real Earnings Management is at the expense of the company's future business value, and has long-term grim consequences. Compared with real earnings management, the operating mode of accrued earnings management is relatively simple. Once over-manipulated, it is extremely easy to be identified by the market. As an important management feature, managerial ability has recently attracted much attention. Upper echelons theory (i.e., Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) states that managerial characteristics partially influence organizational outcomes. This paper examines the influence of managers' ability on corporate earnings management. High-ability managers have more social resources, strong professional knowledge, and the ability to deal with complex things. They have a better understanding of accounting systems and accounting policies. However, high-ability managers have stronger self-interested psychology and opportunistic behavior. For the use of accounting policies and the generation and release of accounting information, managers have control and information rights, so managers play a leading role in earnings management. Based on this background, this paper examines the relationship between managers' ability and the degree of accrued earnings management and the degree of real earnings management. Using all A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2015 as research samples, after empirical analysis, it finds that high-capacity managers are more likely to perform earnings management. There is also a significant positive correlation between managerial ability and accrued earnings management and real earnings management. After the further robustness test, it was found that the results of the study were basically consistent with the multivariate regression results of this article, which further confirmed the significant positive correlation between managerial ability and earnings management.This article not only enriches the research content of earnings management and managers, but also provides new evidence for managers to manage earnings. It has guiding significance for regulating the behavior of earnings management.
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