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论文编号：	10048
作者编号：	2120162690
上传时间：	2018/6/7 12:35:31
中文题目：	高管股权激励对分类转移盈余管理的影响研究
英文题目：	Executive equity incentive and classification shifting earnings management
指导老师：	梅丹
中文关键字：	股权激励； 分类转移； 盈余管理
英文关键字：	Equity incentive; Classification transfer; Earnings management
中文摘要：	许多企业对高管进行股权激励，以降低代理成本，提高高管的工作积极性。 已有研究显示，高管股权激励的实施使高管与股东利益目标趋于一致，从而可以提高公司绩效（Cornett，Marcus和Tehranian，2008）；但也有学者认为高管为了达到股权激励的行权条件会进行更多的盈余管理（Qiang Cheng ，2005）。核心收益分类转移盈余管理（本文简称分类转移盈余管理）是利用核心收入（或费用）与特殊项目的错误分类来操纵核心盈余。核心盈余的持续性强，市场定价更高，提高核心盈余有利于提高公司的股价。分类转移盈余管理不对以后期间盈余产生影响，且受到审计师或监管者的审查力度较小，这使得其成本要小于其他盈余管理方式，并已经被上市公司较多地使用。目前我国学术界对分类转移盈余管理的关注度不高，导致这种盈余管理方式不能被有效识别。当前，我国证券法规定股权激励行权条件中与净利润有关的指标，应当使用扣除非经常性损益后的利润（即核心盈余）。可以合理预期实施股权激励的公司为了达到行权条件和提高行权后的权益价格，更有动机进行分类转移操作。为此，本文研究高管股权激励和分类转移盈余管理之间的关系。本文以2014至2016年我国上市公司相关财务数据为样本，就高管股权激励强度、股权激励期限与分类转移盈余管理的关系进行了实证研究。在此基础上，探讨了在核心盈余微小为正的公司中，高管股权激励对分类转移盈余管理的影响作用程度。本文通过实证研究得出主要结论：（1）上市公司在实施高管股权激励的过程会使用分类转移盈余管理对核心盈余进行操纵，股权激励强度越大，进行分类转移盈余管理的倾向就越强。并且，长期股权激励比短期股权激励对分类转移的促进作用更强。（2）零核心盈余是上市公司盈余的目标阈值，为使核心盈余大于零，上市公司会进行分类转移盈余操纵。在核心盈余微小为正的公司中，股权激励对分类转移有更强的促进作用。本文的发现可以帮助投资者、审计师以及监管机构识别分类转移盈余管理，并且对上市公司更好地实施股权激励发挥股权激励的正向作用有重要意义。
英文摘要：	Many enterprises carry out equity incentive to executives, so as to reduce agency costs and improve the enthusiasm of executives. Previous studies have shown that executive equity incentives make the goals of executives and shareholders consistent, which can improve corporate performance (Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian, 2008), but some scholars believe that executives will carry out more surplus management (Qiang Cheng, 2005) in order to achieve the right conditions of equity incentive. Classified transfer earnings management (classified transfer) uses core revenue (or cost) and erroneous classification of special projects to manipulate core earnings. The core surplus is strong and the market price is higher. Improving core earnings is beneficial to improving the company's stock price. Classified transfer earnings management does not affect the surplus in the future, and is less scrutiny by auditors or regulators, which makes the cost less than other earnings management methods, and has been more used by listed companies. But at present, China's academic circles pay little attention to the classified transfer surplus management, resulting in such a way of earnings management can not be effectively identified. At present, the securities law of China stipulates that the index related to the net profit in the conditions of equity incentive is to use the profit (i.e. the core surplus) after deducting the non recurrent profit and loss. It is reasonable to expect that companies implementing equity incentive will have more incentive to classify transfer operations in order to achieve the right conditions and raise the rights and interests after the exercise. Therefore, I studies the relationship between executive equity incentive and classified transfer earnings management. Based on the related financial data of Listed Companies in China from 2014 to 2016, I makes an empirical study on the relationship between executive stock incentive intensity, equity incentive period and classified transfer earnings management. On this basis, the influence of executive equity incentive on classified transfer earnings management is discussed. The main conclusions are drawn through empirical research. (1) The process of Listed Companies in the implementation of executive equity incentive will use classified transfer earnings management to manipulate the core earnings, the greater the intensity of equity incentive, the stronger the tendency to carry out classified transfer earnings management. Moreover, long-term equity incentive is more effective than short term equity incentive in classifying transfer. (2) Zero core surplus is the target threshold of earnings of listed companies. In order to make the core surplus greater than zero, the listed companies will classify the transfer of earnings manipulation. In the companies with small core earnings, equity incentive has a stronger role in promoting classified transfer. The findings can help investors, auditors and regulators to identify the classified transfer earnings management, and it is of great significance to the better implementation of equity incentives for listed companies to play a positive role in equity incentive.
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