学生论文
|
论文查询结果 |
返回搜索 |
|
|
|
| 论文编号: | 10035 | |
| 作者编号: | 2120162705 | |
| 上传时间: | 2018/6/7 9:01:32 | |
| 中文题目: | 董秘社会资本、会计信息质量与融资约束 | |
| 英文题目: | Social Capital of the Secretary of the Board of Directors, Quality of Accounting Information and Corporate Financial Constraints | |
| 指导老师: | 周宝源 | |
| 中文关键字: | 董秘社会资本;会计信息质量;分析师跟踪;融资约束 | |
| 英文关键字: | Social Capital of Secretary of the Board of Directors; Quality of Accounting Information; Analyst Following; Corporate Financial Constraints | |
| 中文摘要: | 融资约束是制约企业经营与发展的重要因素,根据世界银行最新发布的《2018年营商环境报告》,我国获得信贷指数排名全球第68位,反映了目前我国企业存在较为严重的融资约束问题。在会计研究中,众多学者从降低信息不对称这一视角,关注公司信息披露、信息中介在传递信息及缓解融资约束的积极作用,鲜有学者关注信息发布者在这一过程中发挥的作用。根据企业家社会资本理论,企业家社会资本反映了其通过社会网络所动员的资源或相关的能力,社会资本在信息连接、获得风险投资等方面发挥了重要的作用。董秘作为负责企业信息发布的高级管理人员,是否能更好地借助社会资本降低企业和投资者间的信息不对称,进而缓解企业的融资约束呢?对于这一问题,已有的文献并没有给出很好的解答。在此基础上,本文进一步探究了会计信息质量在董秘社会资本和融资约束之间的中介作用及分析师跟踪的调节作用。 通过对2007-2016年沪深两市A股主板非国有上市公司样本数据的实证检验,本文发现:(1)董秘社会资本可以缓解公司面临的融资约束,董秘社会资本越高,其所在公司的融资约束程度越低。会计信息质量在其中起部分中介作用。(2)分析师跟踪能加强会计信息质量对企业融资约束的缓解作用。相比分析师跟踪较低的公司,分析师跟踪较高的公司中会计信息质量与融资约束之间的负向关系更强。(3)会计信息质量对董秘社会资本与融资约束之间关系的中介作用受到分析师跟踪的调节。分析师跟踪越高,会计信息质量对董秘社会资本与融资约束之间关系的中介作用越强。 | |
| 英文摘要: | Financing constraints are important factors constraining the operation and development of enterprises. According to World Doing Business Report 2018 released by the World Bank, China ranks 68th in Credit Index, reflecting that Chinese enterprises are confronted with serious financial constraints. In recent studies, scholars have been paying attention to the positive roles of information disclosure, information mediation in the transmission of information and easing of financial constraints from the perspective of reducing information asymmetry. Few scholars are concerned about the role of information publishers. According to the social capital theory of entrepreneurs, the social capital of entrepreneurs is the reflect of the resources and capabilities mobilized by their social networks, indicating that secretaries of the board of directors are capable of information connection and accessing to venture capital through their social capital. As Executives of the companies, whether the secretaries of the board of directors can ease the financing constraints through their social capital remains a mystery because the existing literature does not give an answer. This study tries to answer the question. Furthermore, the intermediary mechanism of quality of accounting information between the social capital of the secretary of the board of directors and financial constraints and the moderating effect of analysts following are investigated. In this paper, taking 2007-2016 China’s A-shared non-state listed companies from Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges as a sample, the study finds that: (1) the more social capital of the secretary of the board of directors is, the lower financial constraints are. The quality of accounting information plays an intermediary role between the social capital of the secretary and financial constraints; (2) analyst following has strengthen the adjusting effect on the relationship between quality of accounting information and financial constraints; (3) analysts following has adjusted the mediating function of quality of accounting information on the relationship between social capital of the secretaries of the board of directors and financial constraints: the higher the level of the analysts following, the stronger the mediating role mentioned above,and the lower if it is the opposite. | |
| 查看全文: | 预览 下载(下载需要进行登录) |