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| 论文编号: | 10032 | |
| 作者编号: | 2120162699 | |
| 上传时间: | 2018/6/7 7:46:04 | |
| 中文题目: | 激进真实盈余管理对当期及后期审计收费的影响研究 | |
| 英文题目: | Research on the Impact of Aggressive Real Earnings Management on Current and Later Audit Fees | |
| 指导老师: | 张继勋 | |
| 中文关键字: | 审计收费;经营风险;审计风险;真实盈余管理 | |
| 英文关键字: | audit fees;business risk;audit risk;aggressive real earnings management | |
| 中文摘要: | 管理者追求通过真实活动盈余管理来影响报告的收益,后果是改变现金流并牺牲公司的价值,与应计盈余管理相比其影响更具有长期性。对审计师来说,区分公司采用何种盈余管理方式是很重要的。本文以2012-2016年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,以Houston等学者2005年提出的审计收费理论模型为基础,研究激进真实盈余管理对当期及后期审计收费的影响,验证激进真实盈余管理对审计定价行为的影响是否存在长期效应。本文对“激进”的定义是公司真实盈余管理的程度处于其所属行业当期前四分之一。此外,本文进行了两个进一步检验,按照公司是否存在真实盈余管理嫌疑(Suspect)和高资产负债表膨胀两种方式分组,探究不同子样本之间真实盈余管理程度对当期及后期审计收费的不同影响,以验证审计师感知到的经营风险对审计师定价行为的影响。 本文研究结果表明,激进真实盈余管理与当期及后期审计收费之间呈显著正相关,验证了激进真实盈余管理对审计师定价行为的显著影响。可以说,当期及后期审计收费的增加是激进真实盈余管理行为的一项附属成本。从进一步分组检验的结果得出,真实盈余管理行为对后期审计收费影响的产生,部分是因为审计师感知到的经营风险的增加,而审计师感知到的经营风险,部分取决于客户使用真实盈余管理的动机及其替换方法应计盈余管理使用的受限程度。本文的结果提供证据表明,审计师的定价行为是在考虑由真实盈余管理引发的风险提高后,做出是否保留客户的决策,即当通过提高审计收费以额外付出审计努力可以将审计风险降低至可接受的水平时,审计师不会从客户处辞职。这是对审计师应对真实盈余管理反应相关研究的一种补充。 | |
| 英文摘要: | Managers seek to influence the earnings of the report through using real earnings management, which leads to change cash flow and sacrifice the value of the company. The effect of real earnings management is more long-term than the accrued earnings management. Therefore, it is important for auditors to distinguish the way of earnings management. The thesis takes China's A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2016 as the research sample, and bases on the expected audit fee model from Houston et al. to research the impact of aggressive real earnings management on current and later audit fees, and verify whether there is a long-term effect of aggressive real earnings management on auditors’ pricing behavior. The definition of “aggressive” in the thesis is the company that the level of real earnings management is in the first quarter of the current year in its industry. Besides, this thesis conducted two additional tests. According to whether companies have suspect of real earnings management and high balance sheet bloat, the thesis takes the sample into two sub-sample, to explore the different impacts of real earnings management have on different samples and verify the impact of auditors perceived business risks on auditors' pricing behavior. The results of the thesis show that there is a significant positive correlation between aggressive real earnings management and current and later audit fees, which verified the significant impact of aggressive real earnings management on auditors’ pricing behavior. It can be said that the increasing in current and later audit fees is an ancillary cost of aggressive real earnings management. From the results of additional tests, the reason of the impact of real earnings management on the later audit fees, in part, is that the auditors perceived the increasing business risks, and the auditors perceived risks partly depend on the use frequency of real earnings management by customers. At the same time, the results of the thesis provide evidence on the auditor's pricing behavior: after considering the increased audit risk brought about by the real earnings management, auditors make decisions about retain customers or not. | |
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