第78期公司财务与金融市场学术论坛
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导读:

“能者多劳,按劳分配,多劳多得”,这是市场经济条件下各个领域普遍认可的薪酬制度。作为上市公司中位高权重的CEO,其薪酬也应体现市场原则。然而,中国部分上市公司的CEO在所任职的上市公司中分文未取,这究竟是为什么?什么动机支撑着这些公司及其CEO?这类公司的各方面表现又会受到什么样的影响?欢迎光临第78期公司财务与金融市场学术论坛!

时间:2018626日(星期二)上午10:00-11:30

地点:南开大学商学院722

报告题目:

Career Concerns and “Unpaid” Executives

 

报告人:罗炜  副教授

罗炜,现为北京大学光华管理学院会计系副教授、副系主任、博士生导师。2005年获得美国匹兹堡大学(University of Pittsburgh)会计学博士学位。研究专长为公司治理、风险投资、盈余管理、会计信息与公司激励计划。研究成果发表在《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《中国会计评论》、《会计研究》、Journal of Business Finance & AccountingJournal of Corporate Finance等学术期刊。主持过两项国家自然科学基金项目:“高管政治升迁、盈余管理与公司业绩”和“风险投资退出研究:基于会计信息质量与政治关联的双重视角”。

 

主持人:黄福广  教授

主办方:财务管理系

论文摘要:

A significant portion of CEOs in publicly-listed Chinese state-owned enterprises receive zero pay from the companies for which they work. Instead, they are paid directly by their controlling shareholder who can be the Chinese government or parent firms controlled by the Chinese government. While their actual pay is unobservable, it is known to be low and contain few performance-based incentives. We explore how these parent-paid executives are motivated and whether the outcomes of this unusual incentive differ from conventional compensation. Consistent with career concerns as their main incentive, we find that these CEOs have a significantly higher probability of future promotion than other CEOs. We also conduct an event study using the Split Share Structure Reform in 2005. The reform liberalized the Chinese stock market and enhanced the role of the market mechanisms that potentially replaced promotion incentives in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence is generally consistent with a reduction in the strength of promotion incentives following the reform. Further analyses indicate that, compared to peers that directly pay their CEOs, firms with parent-paid CEOs have higher return on assets and asset growth, and they experience less tunneling by their shareholders.