第74期公司财务与金融市场学术论坛
浏览次数: 340 更新时间: 2017年07月06日

导读一:在并购活动中,并购公司与目标公司之间潜藏着明争暗斗,目标公司的股东通常被认为会被并购方的管理者或者控股股东大量盘剥。事实果真如此吗?欢迎光临第74期公司财务与金融市场学术论坛!

时间:2017710日(星期一)上午10:00-11:30

地点:南开大学商学院422

报告题目:

Are Target Shareholders Systematically Exploited

in Management Buyouts and Freezeouts?

(目标公司股东在管理收购与冻结收购中被大量剥削吗?)

 

报告人:Prof. Feng Zhang (张枫)

张枫博士现为美国University of Utah金融系的助理教授,先后毕业于加拿大University of British Columbia(金融学博士)、新加坡National University of Singapore(经济学硕士)、中国西安交通大学(会计学学士和硕士),研究兴趣集中于公司金融、公司治理、兼并与收购、行为金融学、公司事件的市场反应等。至今已在Review of Financial StudiesJournal of Financial EconomicsManagement ScienceCritical Finance Review等国际顶尖金融学与管理学杂志发表多篇论文。其文章多次被全球著名媒体专题报道,包括Harvard Business Review, Wall Street Journal, Reuters, New York Times, BBC World Radio, CBC等。

主持人:覃家琦  教授

主办方:财务管理系

论文摘要:

We provide evidence that managers and controlling shareholders time MBOs and freezeout transactions to take advantage of industry-wide undervaluation. Portfolios of industry peers of MBO and freezeout targets show significant alphas of around 1% per month over the first twelve months following the transaction. These returns are not explained by a battery of risk-factors, including a takeover-risk factor. In contrast, abnormal returns are not observed following armslength third-party acquisitions. Additional tests show that abnormal returns to industry peers are a reliable proxy for those to the target firm. Investors appear to be unaware of the industry-wide undervaluation when the MBO or freezeout bid is announced. Target shareholders receive bid premiums comparable to those of arms-length third-party acquisitions, and industry peers of

MBO and freezeout targets have insignificant returns around the announcement.

 

导读二:如何在美国顶尖金融杂志发表论文?本期论坛主讲嘉宾张枫博士将结合自己在Review of Financial StudiesJournal of Financial EconomicsManagement ScienceCritical Finance Review上的发文经历,为您奉上宝贵经验。欢迎光临第74期公司财务与金融市场学术论坛!

时间:2017711日(星期二)上午10:00-11:30

地点:南开大学商学院422

报告题目:如何在美国金融学顶尖杂志发表论文?

主持人:孙凌霞  助理教授

主办方:财务管理系